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Abstract
This thesis presents three essays that address two of the most basic features of labour markets:
job loss and job finding. Chapter 1 introduces the topic. Chapter 2, the first essay, presents
considerable evidence that workers in the UK labour market can foresee job loss and respond by
starting to search for new employment. The chapter then builds and estimates a model of the
labour market in order to estimate how far in advance and how many workers change their search
behaviour prior to job loss; and to study the welfare implications of job loss anticipation, and
how the associated welfare gains interact with policy. Chapter 3 seeks to understand why the
unemployment rate rises during recessions in the UK and US using the flows based approach.
The chapter argues that one will overstate the contribution of layoffs to the rise in unemployment
during recessions, if one ignores the large number of workers switching jobs. The final essay,
Chapter 4, studies why variations in unemployment rates differ so markedly between genders
for eighteen OECD countries, using a similar approach to chapter two. The results indicate that
unemployment inflows explain the majority of the dynamics of the gender unemployment gap
for all eighteen countries. The chapter also demonstrates that a candidate explanation across all
countries for this result is the differing gender composition by sector. The thesis is concluded in
Chapter 5.
Chapter 2: Pre-layoff search
Note: This paper won the Sir Alec Cairncross Prize at the Scottish Economic Society Conference
in 2021, and The Best Paper by a Finalist at Royal Holloway in 2020.
How do workers mitigate unemployment risk? Can they foresee job loss? If so, how many and
how far in advance? In this paper, I provide evidence that workers can foresee impending layoff by
tracking changes in their search behaviour prior to job loss. Equipped with this information, I build
a search model of the labour market with stochastic human capital, where workers may receive
information of job insecurity, and are able to respond by picking their search effort and savings. I
show that the dynamics of “pre-layoff search” pins down key parameters governing the changes in
the average worker’s information set prior to job loss. The model estimates reveal that, two-fifths
and three-fifths of low and high skill workers, respectively, know of impending job loss on average
about three months before becoming unemployed. As well as fitting the dynamics of pre-layoff
vii
search, the model is also able to replicate the level of involuntary job switching, and the costs of
job loss for workers who immediately find new employment and for workers who do not, ascribing
an integral role for the job ladder and human capital dynamics. Counterfactual analysis shows that
the associate welfare gains from anticipating job loss are large: 1.6% in consumption equivalent
variation, or an extra at least £600 million in unemployment benefit expenditure. Endogenous
changes in search, as opposed to endogenous changes in savings, drives almost all these gains.
Chapter 3: Job-to-job transitions, job finding and the ins of
unemployment
Increases in the ins of unemployment during recessions are the result of two major forces:
increased layoffs, or a fall in job finding of potential job-to-job transitions. This paper quantifies
the contribution of these two channels using the flows approach to the labour market in the UK
and US over a period of two decades. The results show that fluctuations in job finding of potential
job-to-job transitions are at least as important as layoffs, where procyclical quits play a moderating
role in recessions. I show that these results are not driven by compositional changes in observable
characteristics, and are robust to an adjustment for time-aggregation.
Chapter 4: The ins and outs of the gender unemployment gap
Note: This paper is joint work with Reamonn Lydon. He has agreed that this paper represents
a significant contribution on my part and can appear in this thesis. This paper is a working paper
at the Central Bank of Ireland. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors only
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Central Bank of Ireland or the ESCB.
Variations in the unemployment rates of men and women often differ markedly. To understand
the dynamics of the gender unemployment gap, this paper estimates the inflows to, and outflows
from, unemployment by gender for 18 OECD countries over the last four decades. Whilst there
are cross-country differences in the relative contribution of inflows and outflows by gender, there
is a clear common pattern: differences in the variations of the inflow of unemployment explain
the majority of the dynamics of the gender unemployment gap for all countries under study.
Specifically, in the recessions covered by our data, the change in the flow of males into unemployment
viii
is typically larger than the change in the flow of females into unemployment. Using data on output
by sector, we show that a candidate explanation for these results for each country is the differing
gender composition by sector. Over the four decades of data we analyse, and across all countries,
females were more likely to work in sectors less exposed to economic downturns.
ix
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Introduction to the thesis
Labour markets are dynamic. They are categorised by large flows into and out of employment and
from one job to another - approximately one million workers flow into and out of employment
and 800,000 workers switch employers each quarter in the UK. These flows change considerably
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FIGURE 1.1: The UK quarterly job-to-job transition probability. The vertical axis represents the
proportion of the employed who switch jobs each quarter. A job switch is defined as any worker
who reports to be employed in quarter t and quarter t +1, and has less than three months tenure in
quarter t +1. The shaded region represents the Great Recession period.
An immense literature has studied these flows to understand how labour markets function, and
to understand how and when policy makers should intervene to improve welfare. Of particular
interest in this thesis is the study of workers moving from one job to another, or job-to-job
transitions, and captures the attention of the first two chapters.
1
2
One would suspect that job-to-job transitions represent quits by workers, but this is not always
the case. Around a quarter of all job-to-job transitions actually proceed a layoff in the UK. The
abundance of “involuntary job-to-job transitions" suggests that many workers know of impending
job loss, be it through formal advance notice of informally catching wind, and respond by increasing
search to avoid a spell of unemployment. Is there evidence of increased search prior to layoff?
How many workers have knowledge of impending job loss? How valuable is knowledge of future
job loss to the worker? What is the most important mechanism that workers use prior to losing
their job? How do policy instruments impact job loss anticipation? It is these questions that are
the focus of Chapter 2.
Using microdata from the UK Labour Force Survey and UK Household Longitudinal Panel, I
provide an array of evidence that workers have knowledge of impending job loss. Most notably,
I show that the proportion of workers who report to be searching increases significantly during
the quarters that precede job loss. And that the prevalence of “pre-layoff search" is stronger for
high skill relative to low skill workers. Using this information, I build and estimate a job ladder
model of the labour market where workers may receive information of impending job loss and can
respond by choosing their search effort and consumption. The model is able to jointly replicate
the reality of pre-layoff search and involuntary job-to-job switching, as well as the large earnings
losses associated with job loss for those who transition into unemployment, and much smaller
losses for those who manage to switch employers.
The model estimates reveal that two-fifths and three-fifths of low and high-skill workers
have knowledge of impending job loss, approximately three months prior to being pushed into
unemployment. This anticipatory behaviour has sizeable welfare gains for workers, increasing
consumption by about 1.3% and 1.9% for the low and high-skill workers, respectively. These
welfare gains can be split into those attributed to increased search, and increased saving whilst
employed. The welfare gains are almost entirely due to increased search. I further show the
unemployment rate is reduced by around 20% as a result of the endogenous decisions taken by
individuals to mitigate the costs of job loss.
A basic question that has acquired a lot of attention from macro economists is, why does
the unemployment rate rise in recessions and fall in expansions? This question can be answered
in different ways, through either structural or purely empirical methods. The approach I adopt in
Chapter 3 of this thesis is purely empirical, through the use of worker flows: does the unemployment
rate rise in recessions because more workers are let go, or because fewer workers can find employment.
Using data from the UK Labour Force Survey for the UK, and the Current Population Survey
and Survey of Income and Program Participation for the US, the chapter shows that ignoring
3
job-to-job transitions and the relationship between the ins of unemployment and job finding can
result in significantly understating the contribution of job finding to unemployment dynamics, and
overstating the contribution of layoffs.
In Chapter 4, again using worker flows, we study why the unemployment varies so differently
for males and females for 18 OECD countries over the last four decades. We decompose the
changes in the gender unemployment gap into those attributable to differences in the rate at which
males and females flow into unemployment, the inflow gap, and differences in the rate at which
males and females flow of unemployment, the outflow gap. For all 18 countries, variations in the
inflow gap explain the majority of the dynamics of the gender unemployment gap. Using data on
output by sector, we show that a candidate explanation for this result is the gender composition
by sector: males tend to be in sectors that are more susceptible to economic swings than females,




Note: This paper won the Sir Alec Cairncross Prize at the Scottish Economic Society Conference
in 2021, and the prize for The Best Paper by a Finalist at Royal Holloway in 2020.
2.1 Introduction
Job loss is a fundamental and pervasive aspect of labour markets. In the UK, on average
around a million workers are laid off from their jobs every year. A vast literature has studied how
workers fare post displacement, finding that earnings are significantly depressed in the short and
long-run.1 How do workers mitigate this unemployment risk?
Interestingly, job loss does not always result in unemployment. Around a quarter of all layoffs
in the UK result in a worker transitioning directly to a new employer without an intervening spell
of non-employment, and these workers experience much smaller earnings losses post job loss.2
Figure 2.1 shows the pre and post layoff earnings dynamics for all job losers and for only those
who immediately find new employment in the UK.
The fact that a large number of workers manage to switch jobs immediately post layoff,
suggests that many workers have received information of impending job loss, be it through formal
advance notice or informally catching wind.3 Using data from the UK, I find clear evidence that
some workers have knowledge of impending job loss by tracking the changes in the proportion
of workers who report to be searching during the four quarters prior to layoff, a stylised fact I
refer to as “pre-layoff search”. I study this pre-layoff behaviour in a model of on-the-job search,
savings and stochastic human capital, and find that the model is able to replicate salient features
1See Jacobson et al. (1993), Stevens (1997), Couch and Placzek (2010) and Davis and Von Wachter (2011) to
name just a few. The costs of job loss shown in Figure 2.1, are estimated using a framework shown in Section 2.5.
2These types of transitions are not unique to the UK. A similar magnitude is present in the US, see Carrillo-Tudela
and Smith (2017). Schwerdt (2011) finds that some workers leave quarters before mass layoffs in Austria, and
experience significantly smaller earnings declines than those who remain until the end.
3In the UK firms are required to provide advance notice to workers, or if written in the contract, instead provide
the worker payment in lieu. See UKGov (2020) for further information regarding mandatory advanced notice in the
UK, and I discuss the institutional setting further in Section 2.2.
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FIGURE 2.1: The estimated costs of job loss in the UK
Note: The bold line shows the estimated costs of job loss for all workers who lose their job. The dashed line shows the
estimated costs of job loss for all workers who immediately find new employment following job loss. Workers report
their yearly labour market histories throughout the year, allowing me to categorise direct job-to-job transitions that
proceed a layoff (without a non-employment spell in between). The costs are estimated using (2.29). Bars represent
95% confidence intervals. 1991-2018.
Source: Data from the British Household Panel Survey and the UK Household Longitudinal Study.
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of search, job switching and earnings dynamics associated with job loss. The estimated model
provides new insights into, how many workers receive information of impending job loss, how
far in advance they change their behaviour, the driving forces behind the smaller costs of job loss
for those switching employers relative to those transitioning into unemployment, the size of the
welfare gains pre-layoff information provides to workers, and how these changes in behaviour
impact policy analysis.
To study how workers’ search changes before job loss, I use data from the UK Labour Force
Survey (LFS). The LFS has unusually rich on-the-job search information for large representative
data sets. Workers are asked, whether they are searching, the reasons for searching, and how many
methods used. This, coupled with a longitudinal component, makes the LFS a particular good data
set to study search dynamics before job loss. In Section 2.2, using data over the past two decades,
I document three novel facts from the LFS. First, search incidence increases by approximately
20 percentage points (pp) during the quarter that precedes job loss, and this “pre-layoff search”
is predominantly due to workers “thinking their job may end”. Second, the increase in search
incidence is much stronger for high-skill (32pp) relative to low-skill (17pp) workers.4 Finally, the
average wage change for a job-to-job transition following a layoff is negative.5 These results build
a clear picture of search and involuntary job switching in the labour market. Workers somehow,
formally or informally, realise that their job is less stable than before, and respond by increasing
search effort and reducing their current reservation wage.
With these empirical observations in mind, I build a job ladder model, split into two skill levels,
where workers may receive information that their job is less secure. The model also incorporates
savings and stochastic human capital. The model captures the essence of “pre-layoff” search:
workers respond to information that their job is more likely to end by increasing search and
reducing the reservation productivity to regain a more stable employment relationship. Intuitively,
following the displacement information, the model also predicts that workers reduce consumption
in order to save for the increased possibility of unemployment. These mechanisms are endogenous
decisions taken by the worker in order to mitigate the costs associated with job loss.
I perform a full estimation of the model and show that the estimated levels of increased search
at different quarters before job loss, identify key parameters regarding job loss anticipation in
4I study further heterogeneity by observable characteristics, and find that pre-layoff search does not vary
significantly by gender, age, firm size and even by firm tenure. This final observable is particularly interesting given
the fact that government mandated advance notice is increasing in firm tenure.
5I consolidate these results with evidence from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) on subjective job
insecurity elicitations. I find that workers who report that their job is very likely to end have a large increased
likelihood of moving into unemployment, but also switching jobs following a layoff.
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the model. Whilst fitting the levels of pre-layoff search, the model also replicates other salient
features in the labour market, namely the reality of job-to-job transitions following layoff, and post
displacement earnings losses for those workers who transition into unemployment and for those
who switch jobs involuntarily. The model estimates reveal that approximately 42% and 62% of
low and high skill workers, respectively, know that job insecurity has increased on average three
months prior to becoming unemployed.
I first use the estimated model to understand the driving forces behind the differences in
earnings losses post job loss for those who manage to switch jobs compared to those who transition
into unemployment. The losses can be decomposed into three contributing components: an
employment effect, a job ladder effect, and a human capital effect. In the model, the employment
effect quickly dissipates and the job ladder effect is very small, and the human capital effect drives
all the long-run differences. When workers manage to switch employers and avoid unemployment
following layoff, they do not lose out on foregone human capital accumulation. This human capital
effect drives significant long-run differences in the costs of job loss between the two destinations.
Next, I study to what extent the endogenous decisions taken by workers, prior to layoff, to
mitigate the costs of job loss, increase aggregate welfare. The model shows large welfare benefits,
equal to approximately 1.31% and 1.89% of consumption equivalent variation for the low and high
skill workers, respectively. This is equivalent to increasing unemployment benefits by 48% and
60% for the low and high skill workers, respectively, which would cost the government at least
£600 million.6 These welfare gains are due to workers increasing their search effort and increasing
their savings following the increase in job insecurity. The welfare gains can be decomposed into
those attributable to each mechanism. I find that the gains are almost entirely due to endogenous
search: increased saving following the anticipation shock provides negligible benefits to workers.
The dominant force that workers use to mitigate the increased unemployment risk is to change
their search effort.
I finally use the model to understand the implications for policy. I first study whether the
employed would be willing to forego earnings in order to finance a scheme that provides them with
further time to find new employment - are workers willing to pay for information of impending job
loss? The model shows that such a scheme is only beneficial to workers once endogenous changes
in search behaviour are allowed. If workers do not increase search on this scheme, workers remain
in the scheme for much longer, resulting in the costs of implementing the scheme outweighing the
benefits. When I allow for endogenous changes in search, workers experience significant welfare
gains - they are willing to forego earnings in return for more advance knowledge of job loss.
6Calculated using 2020 information from Statista (2018).
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Next, I study how the welfare gains from anticipating job loss are dependent on the level
of unemployment benefits in the economy. I model an unemployment benefit scheme, again
financed by taxing labour income. An intuitive result is that, increasing unemployment benefits
reduces the gains from anticipating job loss - the pre-layoff warning becomes less valuable when
unemployment becomes more enjoyable. I show that this distortion does not, however, impact the
optimal unemployment benefits level in the economy, which is close to the current level in the UK
labour market.
Related literature
There are only a small number of studies analysing pre-layoff behaviour. These include
Stephens Jr (2001, 2002, 2004), Benito (2006), Gong (2011), Basten et al. (2016), Hendren (2017)
and Bryan and Longhi (2018) who study how workers’ consumption, asset holdings or spousal
labour supply, change before job loss. Bryan and Longhi (2018) find no significant increase in
spousal labour supply in the quarter prior to layoff in the UK, suggesting that “unemployment is a
surprise”. Using search information, this paper presents clear evidence that unemployment is not
a surprise to a large proportion of workers in the UK.
To the best of my knowledge, the only paper that studies search prior to job loss is found in
Burgess and Low (1992).7 Using recall information of the currently unemployed, Burgess and
Low (1992) show that a significant proportion of workers report that they were searching before
losing their job and moving into unemployment. In this paper, I do not rely on recall. Instead I
follow workers up until they lose their job, allowing me to track the changes in search incidence
before layoff. Tracking how search incidence changes before layoff is necessary for pinning down
important parameters that describe how many workers receive information of impending job loss,
and how far in advance they change their behaviour. Another distinction is that I do not only
look at those who are laid off and move into unemployment, but also those who switch jobs and
describe the reason for separation as involuntary.
A central feature of the model in this paper is to incorporate involuntary job-to-job transitions,
which in turn results in an economy where some job switching results in wage falls.8 To match
these features, many papers including, but not limited to, Jolivet et al. (2006), Bagger et al. (2014),
Tjaden and Wellschmeid (2014) and Bagger and Lentz (2019) invoke the so called “godfather
shock”, in environments in the spirit of Burdett and Mortensen (1998). The godfather shock
7There is also a related literature on advanced notice that studies to what extent longer notice periods impact
labour market outcomes post job loss. See Swaim and Podgursky (1990), Nord and Ting (1991) for two examples.
8See Jolivet et al. (2006) for evidence of a significant number of job switching with wage falls in Europe and the
US.
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forces the worker into a take-it-or-leave-it job offer, where the workers’ reservation wage is equal
to that of unemployment, resulting in job switching with wage cuts. In this paper I estimate that
the job ladder effect plays only a negligible role in explaining the differing paths between those
who lose their job and move to unemployment compared with those who lose their job and move
directly to a new job. This implies that workers behave similarly to the unemployed when they are
in layoff employment, and so invoking the godfather shock in these models is appropriate.
A paper with an explicit focus on developing a mechanism for involuntary job switching
is shown in Carrillo-Tudela and Smith (2017).9 They build a model that incorporates return
employment. When workers are subject to job destruction shocks, they are able to re-sample
from declined firm contacts to see if the job still exists. The more contacts the worker has, the
less likely they are to experience unemployment. This is described as search capital, an insurance
mechanism for the worker. The model is used to study the implications of search capital for the
unemployment rate and productivity. In this paper, I show that the size and shape of pre-layoff
search is able to replicate the level of involuntary job switching in the UK.
The seminal paper of Davis and Von Wachter (2011), showed that off the shelf job search
models find difficulty in replicating the average workers earnings decline following layoff. A
significant literature has been dedicated to augmenting search models to replicate and understand
the scarring affects of layoff, and to understand the policy implications of fitting this feature of
labour markets. Jarosch (2021) and Krolikowski (2017) aid the job ladder model by, in different
ways, including a distribution of unemployment risk. Separations, therefore, are more likely
to precede further separations and increase the costs of initial job loss. Burdett et al. (2020)
build a model with skill loss in unemployment (Jarosch (2021) also incorporates skill loss in
unemployment). They are able to replicate the cost of job loss, arguing that, human capital loss is
the main long run cost of job loss.
Following on from Jacobson et al. (1993), research has shown that the welfare costs of these
displacement events are large (see Daniel (1987), Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1990), Rogerson and
Schindler (2002) and Low et al. (2010)). It is not surprising, therefore, that allowing search models
to replicate the earnings decline post job loss is important for policy and welfare analysis, as is
shown in Jarosch (2021) and Cozzi and Fella (2016). Cozzi and Fella (2016) show that positive
severance pay provides welfare gains for workers, a result in contrast to the preceding literature
(see Alvarez and Veracierto (2001)). They show that the reason for this difference in result is
because their model can replicate the costs of job loss. In order to estimate the gains associated
9Garibaldi (2004) studies the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model (Pissarides (2000)) with advance notice,
allowing for transitions that are analogous to involuntary job switches.
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with the pre-layoff warning and understand how these gains interact with policy, it is important,
therefore, that the model is able to replicate the large earnings falls post layoff. In this paper
I follow the theme of skill loss in unemployment and a job ladder, which allows the model to
replicate the differing costs of job loss by destination.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents considerable evidence
that workers can foresee job loss in the UK labour market, and most notably tracks changes
in the incidence of search before job loss. Section 2.3 describes the model and presents the
key endogenous features. Section 2.4 derives the model counterpart of pre-layoff search, and
shows that two key parameters govern the dynamics of pre-layoff search. Section 2.5 outlines
the estimation strategy and presents the model fit. Section 2.6 studies the model implications
for the costs of job loss. I pay close attention to understanding the economic forces that drive
the observed difference in the costs of job loss for those transitioning to unemployment relative
to those who switch employers. Section 2.7 presents counterfactual analysis where I study the
impact of switching off the pre-layoff warning on consumption and unemployment. In Section
2.8 I model salient policies financed by taxing labour income. Finally, Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 Pre-layoff search in the UK
In this section, I document three novel results for the UK labour market. (1) The proportion
of workers who report to be searching increases by 20pp during the quarter that precedes job
loss, and this increased incidence is solely due to workers “thinking their job may end”. (2) The
prevalence of pre-layoff search is stronger for high-skill relative to low-skill workers. (3) The
average involuntary job switch results in a 10% wage cut.10 Before I present these results, I will
briefly describe the institutional setting and the data.
2.2.1 Fixing ideas: why might workers be able to foresee job loss?
Here I outline some possible reasons as to why workers may be able to foresee unemployment
approaching. I draw the reader to three likely causes
1. The institutional setting.
2. Privately bargained notice periods.
10In Appendix A.1 I also show that subjective job insecurity elicitations provide significant explanatory power in
predicting whether a worker will make an employment to unemployment transition or an involuntary job switch.
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3. Informally catching wind of job loss.
The institutional setting: In the UK workers must either receive a mandatory notice period
that is increasing in tenure, or can instead be paid in lieu of the stipulated notice period length.
For workers with less than two years tenure, the worker is required to receive at least one week of
advance notice. The length of notice increases by one week for every extra year that the worker
is employed, up to a maximum of three months. Privately bargained notice periods: Firms may
provide longer notice periods than those mandated by the government, or provide notice periods
in institutional settings that do not mandate them. We can think of many reasons for why longer
notice periods may be written into contracts. The notice period length is a salient feature of the
contract for the worker, and the worker may bargain for it to be increased in length. Notice periods
may also be thought to increase the productivity of the worker, as they are not worrying about the
possibility of unemployment the following day. Since workers can be paid in lieu of contract,
however, the institutional setting or contractual notice periods do not guarantee that workers are
able to foresee unemployment. Paying the worker in lieu of contract may well be optimal for
the firm, if the current productive capacity of the worker has suddenly reduced or is expected to
reduce significantly. I do not have information on how many workers work their notice or receive
payments in lieu.
Informally catching wind of job loss: Workers may also receive private information about the
insecurity of the job, that is unrelated to more formal firing procedures. I show in Appendix A.1
that workers subjective elicitations of their own job insecurity has significant explanatory power
- if workers report that their job is “very likely to end in the next 12 months”, they are around
30 percentage points more likely to lose their job than those who report that their job is “very
unlikely to end in the next 12 months”. This is an order of magnitude greater than the baseline. Of
course, the fact that workers have explanatory power could be due to presence of mandatory notice
periods in the economy. This private information of job insecurity is, however, also found in the
US in Stephens Jr (2001, 2002, 2004) and Hendren (2017), a country with very short mandatory
notice periods. In this work, I will not take a stance on which of these contributing factors is of
most importance, but it is possible that all three play a role.
2.2.2 Data
The UK Labour Force Survey
The LFS is a household-based survey that is used as the backbone for UK government labour
force statistics. While the survey was originally used for cross-sectional analysis, in 1992 the
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survey introduced a longitudinal component. Following this reform, survey participants are sampled
for five consecutive quarters, allowing for the construction of a five quarter panel of workers from
1992 to the present. As well as having a longitudinal component, the LFS has unusually high
quality on the job search information for large representative data sets.11 Workers are asked three
main questions: whether they are searching for a different job, the reasons for searching for a
different job, and the number of methods used for searching.12 A longitudinal component coupled
with quality on the job search information allows for a comprehensive study of changing search
behaviour prior to job loss.
The British Household Panel Survey
The BHPS is a household longitudinal study. It followed individuals from 1991 to 2009,
and began with 10,000 households. As well as the LFS, the BHPS is used for official statistics.
The BHPS is required firstly to estimate the costs of job loss as seen in Figure 2.1. To do so,
we need to be determine whether a worker made an involuntary job-to-job transition. In the
BHPS, workers provide a full labour market history of the preceding year, including all changes
in spells and employers, the start and end date of each job, and the reason a job ended. We
can, therefore, identify job-to-job transitions without an intervening spell of non-employment,
and subsequently determine whether the job ended due to the job being lost or due to a quit.
Second, the survey provides information on subjective job security elicitations as well as reasons
for separation, allowing me to consolidate findings from the LFS. Finally, the survey contains
information on wealth and consumption that I will use in the estimation and evaluation of the
results.
2.2.3 Raw measures
I begin by providing a brief overview of on the job search in the UK. In the LFS, employed
workers are asked whether they are searching for a different job. There are two clear possible
questions that a sceptic would ask of one who is using such information: (1) Are some people
searching but just not answering the question? (2) Is job search a good indicator for whether
someone subsequently switches jobs and, therefore, a good indicator for whether they are practically
11Because of this, other researchers have used the LFS to understand search patterns on the job, see Pissarides and
Wadsworth (1994), Longhi and Taylor (2010) and Fujita (2012).
12The exact questions are: “Were you looking for a different or additional paid job or business in the week ending
Sunday the [date]?”, “Why were you looking for another job?”, and “In the four weeks ending Sunday the [date], did
you do any of these things...”. The third question refers to methods of search.
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searching? In Table 2.1, I show that, by these accounts, on the job search is a credible measure in
the LFS.
The top panel of Table 2.1 shows the answers to the question and percentages. The vast
majority of respondents answer either yes (6.04%) or no (93.43%) to the question, a negligible
amount do not answer, and a small but non negligible amount respond by saying it does not apply.
It is not true that a large proportion of workers do not report whether they are searching or not in
the LFS. For the remainder of the paper, I continue assuming that both of the final categorisations
are not searching.
The lower panel shows the percentage of the employed who report to be searching prior to
either remaining at their employment, switching jobs, or being laid off. I assign a job switch
as when a worker is employed in period t and, given that the data has a quarterly frequency, also
employed in period t+1 with less than three months tenure.13 A layoff is defined as any transition
out of a job that remains in the labour force and is described as involuntary.14 5.19% of the stayers
are searching. This increases by about 6 fold for those who subsequently switch jobs to 30.7%.15
These statistics are reassuring and suggest that reporting to be searching on the job is a good
indicator for whether a worker is practically searching. Table 2.1, therefore, shows that the on the
job search indicator in the LFS is a useful measure to study the search patterns of the employed.
The final column shows the proportion of workers who report to be searching when they lose
their job in the next period. 24.8% of workers report to be searching before a layoff. Layoffs
proceed a much higher incidence of on the job search relative to staying at your employer. The
final two rows split the statistics by low and high skill workers.16 The conclusions are broadly
similar for both of these worker types, but search incidence is larger prior to layoff for high
skill relative to low skill workers. These results suggest that some workers have knowledge that
their job is soon to end, and are responding by changing their search effort in order to avoid
unemployment.
13There may be non-employment spells in between in the LFS data. This is not, however, important for the
determination of pre-layoff search dynamics, all we care about is whether they lost their job. We can, however, look
at “true” job-to-job transitions with the BHPS data since workers give a full labour market history of the preceding
year.
14See Appendix A.2 for the categorisation of involuntary separations.
15This is likely understated due to time aggregation: since workers are only surveyed ever quarter, they may begin
searching in between surveys.
16High skill is defined as those who have more than A levels.
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No Does not
Yes No answer apply
All 6.04 93.43 0.01 0.53
Low skill 5.69 93.73 0.01 0.57
High skill 6.97 92.69 0.02 0.32
Stayer JJ LO
All at t +1 at t +1 at t +1
All 6.04 5.19 30.7 24.8
Low skill 5.69 4.86 29.8 22.8
High skill 6.97 6.09 33.2 32.9
TABLE 2.1: Answers by percentages to the job search question.
Note: Question - were you looking for a different or additional paid job or business in the week ending Sunday the
[date]? LO refers to layoff, where I assign layoffs using the categorisations shown in Section A.2. N = 2,219,645
(1,663,565, 556,080). 1995Q1 - 2016Q1.
Source: Data from the UK Labour Force Survey.
2.2.4 Pre-layoff search
The above results suggest that the possibility of layoff induces on the job search. One may
argue, however, that perhaps individuals who search hard before layoff are always searching hard.
It is not, therefore, the resulting layoff that is inducing a high incidence of search by the workers,
but instead it reflects worker heterogeneity. Next I formally assess whether the proportion of
workers who report to be searching changes as they approach layoff using the longitudinal nature
of the LFS. If search incidence increases as workers approach layoff, this is strong evidence that
they have correctly anticipated layoff and are responding with search.
To estimate how workers search incidence changes before layoff, I follow a similar technique
in the job loss literature and compare workers who are laid off to a control group (See Jacobson
et al. (1993)). The control group consists of workers who never separate from their job during
the entire five quarters. Between 1995 and 2016, this leaves me with 291,502 individuals in the
control group. It is important to note that some of the control group may experience layoff in
quarter six. The treatment group consists of workers who remain at their job from quarter one to
quarter four, and are laid off during the final quarter. This leaves me with 1,073 separation events
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that satisfy the above. Using these restrictions I estimate the following distributed lag model





−kD−kit + εit . (2.1)
sit is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the individual reports to be searching and 0 if not.
αi and γt are individual and time fixed effects, respectively. Xit contains observables - a quartic in
age. D−k takes the value of 1 if the individual is laid off in k quarters and 0 otherwise. The stream
of δ−k gives the percentage change in search incidence k quarters before the layoff event relative
to their search incidence four quarters before layoff and that of the control group. As previously
mentioned the LFS also asks participants the reason that they are searching.17 I concentrate on one
answer: “I think my current job may end”. To assess whether the changes in search are primarily
driven by this factor, I also run (2.1) with the dependent variable being an indicator taking a value
of 1 if the worker reports to be searching because they think their job may end and 0 otherwise. I
will call this insecure search. Figure 2.2 shows the results for both searching and insecure search.
There is a significant and strong rise in search incidence prior to job loss. During the period
before workers lose their jobs, the percentage of workers who report to be searching increases
by around 20pp relative to four quarters before layoff. As we can see from the dotted line, this
increased search incidence is predominantly due to workers thinking their job may end. This is
clear evidence that workers are able to foresee job loss, and respond by searching harder to avoid
unemployment spells.
Next I assess whether the prevalence of pre-layoff search is stronger for high-skill relative to
low-skill workers as suggested in Table 2.1. I run the same as in (2.1), but split by skill types.
Figure 2.3 shows the results. Pre-layoff search is stronger for high relative to low skill workers.
The percentage of high skill (low skill) workers who report to be searching increases by around
32pp (17pp) relative to four quarters before layoff.
Finally, I assess four further possible factors that may result in different levels of pre-layoff
search: tenure, firm size, age and sex. As already discussed, in the UK, firms must give mandatory
advanced notice of layoff, or pay the staff in lieu but this must be written in the contract, and the
length of mandatory advanced notice is increasing in tenure. One would expect, that when we
compare workers who lose their job with less than three years tenure to workers who lose their job
with more than three years tenure, the high tenure group would show stronger levels of pre-layoff
search. Figure 2.4 shows that, surprisingly, the level of tenure does not seem to play a particularly
important role. While this suggests that government mandated notice periods are not necessarily
17See Appendix A.2 for the possible reasons workers give.
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Think job may end
FIGURE 2.2: Pre-layoff search
Note: The vertical axis gives the change in the proportion of workers who report to be searching on the job or insecure
searching, relative to the percentage searching 4 quarters before job loss, and the changing proportion of search for
workers who do not lose their job. -1 refers to the quarter before job loss. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Source: Data from the UK Labour Force Survey.
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FIGURE 2.3: Pre-layoff search by skill level
Note: The vertical axis gives the change the proportion of workers who report to be searching on the job, relative to
the percentage searching 4 quarters before job loss, and the changing proportion of search for workers who do not
lose their job. High skill workers are those with qualifications greater than A levels.
Source: Data from the UK Labour Force Survey.
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FIGURE 2.4: Pre-layoff search by tenure, firm size, age and sex
Note: The vertical axis gives the change the proportion of workers who report to be searching on the job relative to
the percentage searching 4 quarters before job loss, and the changing proportion of search for workers who do not
lose their job. -1 refers to the quarter before job loss.
Source: Data from the UK Labour Force Survey.
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the main explanation, those who have differing levels of tenure are likely to have differing gains
from search due to factors unrelated to tenure, such as their current level of savings or human
capital level. As previously stated, I will not take a stance on why we observe pre-layoff search in
the data. Figure 2.4 also shows that the size of the firm, and the age and sex of the individual does
not seem to play particularly important role in determining workers search before job loss.
2.2.5 Wage changes
The previous subsections have demonstrated a clear rationale for involuntary job switching -
job-to-job transitions following layoff occur because workers catch wind of job loss, and respond
by changing search behaviour. One would expect that involuntary job switching is more likely
to result in wage cuts because workers are willing to forgo some of their wages for job security.
Jolivet et al. (2006) documents that downward wage change for job switchers is a common aspect
of many economies across Europe and the US. Here I provide evidence that, indeed, involuntary
job switching on average results in wage cuts, whereas voluntary job switching on average results
in wage increases.
A subset of participants of the LFS provide wage information during the first and fifth quarters.
I analyse workers who provide wage information in both quarters, were employed during the first
and fifth quarters, and made exactly one job-to-job transition between the first and fifth quarters
or made no transition during the five quarters. I also remove the top and bottom five percent of
wages in each period. The regression I run takes the following form
log(wit+1)− log(wit) = α + γt +Xitβ +δ iJJiit +δ vJJvit + εit , (2.2)
where Xit contains controls (sex, age, education and job tenure), JJi is an indicator variable taking
a value of one if the worker made a job-to-job transition and described it as involuntary and zero
otherwise, and JJv is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the worker made a job-to-job
transition and described it as voluntary and zero otherwise. Table 2.2 shows the results.
The results clearly show that, relative to remaining at the same employer, voluntary job switching
on average results in wage gains (3.2%) and involuntary job switching results in wage cuts (-10.3%).
This result holds true when analysing high and low skill workers separately.
The basic story that underlies the results in this section is simple and intuitive. Using pre-layoff
search and job security elicitations, I have provided strong evidence that workers can correctly
anticipate job loss, and respond by increasing search to avoid unemployment. This naturally
results in involuntary job-to-job transitions. These transitions are more likely to result in wage
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All Low skill High skill
∆ log(wit) ∆ log(wit) ∆ log(wit)
δ i -.103∗∗ -.096∗∗ -.126∗∗
(.008) (.009) (.003)
δ v .032∗∗ .032∗∗ .034∗∗
(.003) (.004) (.006)
N 146,053 102,709 43,344
TABLE 2.2: Wage change following involuntary and voluntary job-to-job transitions
Note: The top left coefficient reads, those making involuntary job-to-job transitions on average experience a 10.3%
wage fall relative to those who remain at their employer. Standard errors in parentheses. The top and bottom 5 percent
of wages were removed in quarter one and quarter five. All regressions include sex, age, tenure, and time dummies as
controls, and the first also includes education. 1995Q1 - 2016Q1.*, ** indicate statistical significance at 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
Source: Data from the UK Labour Force Survey.
falls, plausibly because workers forgo wages for job security. In Section 2.3 I build a model of the
labour market that incorporates these features.
2.3 A job ladder model with a job insecurity shock
I embed pre-layoff search into an incomplete markets model with endogenous search, human
capital accumulation, risk aversion, and an exogenous distribution of firm productivity. The model
is set in partial equilibrium - firms are fictitious. I choose to leave firm behaviour for future work.
While this is a simplification, in this work I am interested in the behaviour of workers before and
after job loss and the importance of the acquisition of information regarding job insecurity for the
worker, and, while this is also very interesting, not about why this transmission of information
necessarily occurs.
2.3.1 Environment
Time is at a weekly frequency and workers live forever, discounting the future with a common
discount factor β . There are three labour market states: secure employment (S), layoff employment
(L), and unemployment (U). I next describe all features of the model split into the following
sections: preferences and decision making, wages, human capital, changes in job security, and
timing of events and transitions.
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Preferences and decision making. Workers are ex-ante homogeneous within two skill groups,
and risk averse with preferences given by
ψ(c,s) = u(c)−κ(s), (2.3)
where c is consumption, s is search effort, u(c) is the utility from consumption, and κ(s) is the
cost of search effort. u(c) and κ(s) have the following standard properties u′(c)> 0 and u′′(c)< 0,
and κ ′(s)> 0 and κ ′′(s)> 0. The individual chooses to invest in a single risk free asset with rate
of return equal to r. The consumption of the worker, c, in any period is c = a(1+r)+ i−a′, where
a and a′ are current and future asset holdings, and i is the wage or unemployment benefit. The
objective of the worker is to pick their search effort s and future asset holdings a′ to maximise the
expected present discounted value of the match or unemployment.
Wages. All the unemployed receive a flat rate b in line with the UK labour market. The wage
of the worker is equal to the product of the productivity of the fictitious firm, p ∈ [0,1], and the
human capital level of the worker, z
w(p,z) = pz. (2.4)
This implies that the wage only changes throughout the match following changes in human capital.
Other more sophisticated and common wage setting protocols with on-the-job search include
Nash bargaining as in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model, see Pissarides (1994), or the
sequential auctioning model shown in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc et al. (2006),
where incumbent and poaching firms bid for workers where the incumbent firm is able to raise the
wage of the worker in order to try and retain them, which in turn results in increased wages with
job tenure.18 These protocols require modelling the firm which I abstract from in this work. While
the wage function I adopt in this paper is simplistic, Hubmer (2018) shows that a similar model
with the same wage function is able to closely replicate new estimates on higher order moments
of the wage distribution documented by Guvenen et al. (2015).
Human capital. I model human capital accumulation following Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998).
Workers have some initial level of human capital z ∈ {z, ...,z}. When employed, the workers’
human capital increases from z to min{z+∆z,z} with probability ωE , and when unemployed falls
from z to max{z−∆z,z} with probability ωU . I will clearly explain the associated grid and value
18Shimer (2006) discusses why the standard Nash bargaining solution is not applicable in the
Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model with on-the-job search. Gottfries (2021), however, shows that Nash bargaining
is applicable when wages can be renegotiated.
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∆z in Section 2.5.
Changes in job security. Motivated by the results in Section 2.2, prior to a worker being fired,
the worker may catch wind of impending layoff. With probability δ (1− φ) a match in secure
employment is destroyed and the worker becomes unemployed. With probability δφ the worker
receives some information that the job will end. The information provided to the worker is that
the job destruction rate has increased to a new level δL, where δL > δ . I do not take a stance
on why the worker receives this information. This may be due to mandatory advance notice,
negotiated contractual advance notice, simply catching wind of job loss, or, perhaps most likely,
some combination of the three.
Timing of events and transitions. At the start of the period in each of the states, the human
capital level is revealed and the individual decides how much to search and consume. In secure
employment, after making these decisions, the worker either: finds and moves to new secure
employment with probability sSλ [1−F(p)] (where sS is the optimal search effort in secure employment),
receives a shock and moves to layoff employment with probability δφ , receives a shock and
moves straight into unemployment with probability δ (1−φ), or nothing happens with probability
1− sSλ [1−F(p)]−δ . The wage does not change following a transition to layoff employment.
In layoff employment, the worker either: moves into unemployment with probability δL,
moves into secure employment with probability sLλ [1−F(pL)] (where sL is the optimal search
effort in layoff employment, and pL is reservation productivity that I define in the next subsection),
or nothing happens with probability 1−sLλ [1−F(pL)]−δL. I define all transitions into unemployment
or out of layoff employment as a layoff, whether they are subsequently employed or unemployed.
Those in unemployment either transition to secure employment with probability sU λ [1−F(pU)]
(where sU is the optimal search effort in unemployment, and pU is reservation productivity that I
define in the next subsection) or remain in unemployment with probability 1− sU λ [1−F(pU)].
2.3.2 Value functions
We can conveniently describe the above environment in recursive form, of which I outline next.
Let the present discounted value of unemployment, secure employment and layoff employment
be, respectively, given as VU(z,a), VS(p,z,a) and VL(p,z,a). Where again p, z, and a are the
productivity of the firm, the worker’s general human capital level, and the worker’s asset level,
respectively. The reservation productivities for workers in unemployment, pU(z,a), and layoff
23










Let z′ and a′ denote the following periods human capital and optimally chosen future asset
level. The present discounted value of unemployment, secure employment and layoff employment






















































The values are equal to the net flow utility, plus the discounted continuation value, plus the
discounted net returns from making job switches and, when in employment, the discounted net
returns from being forced to layoff employment or unemployment following an exogenous shock.
Notice that in secure employment, the final term includes a linear combination of the value of
moving to layoff employment and unemployment. This is the key feature in the model that, as I
will discuss later, allows the model to replicate pre-layoff search documented in Section 2.2.
Optimal search and asset accumulation. The first order conditions for optimal search gained
from equations (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) equate the marginal benefit from search with the marginal
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cost of search for each state - the gains from an increase in search are equal to the increased cost,
where the convexity of the cost function ensures that a solution exists. The optimal levels of search
































where γ is the inverse function of the marginal cost of search.
Like search effort, a′ is chosen by matching marginal costs with marginal benefits. The
following Euler equations describe this for unemployment, secure employment and layoff employment







































cU , cS and cL represent next period’s optimally chosen level of consumption in unemployment,
secure employment, and layoff employment, respectively. The decision is intertemporal. The
conditions state that the utility foregone in sacrificing a unit of consumption now (LHS), should
be equivalent to the expected marginal benefit of additional consumption in the future (RHS). The
third terms in (2.13) and (2.14) on the right hand side, describe the marginal gains of a unit increase
in assets associated with switching employers. The first and seconds terms in (2.13) and (2.14)
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on the right hand side describe the marginal gains of a unit increase in assets associated with not
receiving a shock and receiving a shock, respectively. As the precarity of the job increases (δL >
δ ), a higher weight is placed on the marginal returns of consumption in future unemployment.
Next I discuss three fundamental properties of acceptance, search and savings in the economy.
2.3.3 Inspecting the search and savings mechanisms
Motivated by the evidence in Section 2.2, workers are fed with information regarding impending
job loss. Here I discuss how the realisation that a workers job insecurity has increased impacts
optimal behaviour. Proposition 1 describes the optimal behaviour of the worker in layoff employment
relative to an identical worker in secure employment.
Proposition 1 (i) pL(p,z,a) ≤ p, (ii) sL(p,z,a) ≥ sS(p,z,a) and (iii) without stochastic human
capital a′L(p,z,a)≥ a′S(p,z,a) in all acceptable matches.
Proof See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 1 describes three inequalities that are all natural and intuitive. In any worker-firm
match, the value of layoff employment to the worker is lower than secure employment because
of the increased risk of unemployment. The worker in layoff employment is, therefore, willing
to forego wages for job security. And since the returns from searching are larger in the layoff
employment state - the worker is not just searching with the possibility of increased wages, but
also to regain job security - the optimal intensity of search is weakly greater than search in the
secure state. Also, the marginal returns from asset accumulation in unemployment are larger than
that for employment. Workers in layoff employment, weight this possibility greater than those in
secure employment. The optimal behaviour of the worker is to, therefore, increase assets (weakly)
more in layoff employment relative to secure employment, but only when workers are not subject
to human capital losses in unemployment.19
The level of search and level of assets taken by the worker are decided on jointly. Interesting
is the interaction between these two functions. (2.13) and (2.14) reveal an intuitive insight first
described by Lise (2013). Notice that the last terms in both (2.13) and (2.14) are negative because
of the concavity of the utility function. The implication being, that when the incentive to search is
large (sSλ is large), this reduces the incentive to save, alternatively, when the incentive to search
is low (sSλ is low), this increases the incentive to save.
19Because of human capital depreciation in unemployment, the unemployed are willing to accept lower wages than
in a model without human capital. The result here is that the marginal utility of consumption is higher in these low
wage jobs than unemployment. I find this quantitatively to be second order though.
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Secure employment
























FIGURE 2.5: Optimal search in the secure employment (left) and layoff employment states (right)
Note: search effort is s(p,z,a = 50). p is the firm productivity. z is human capital level. The worker has an asset
level with approximately two lots of the average annual income, a = 50. Search effort calculated using the estimated
parameters in Section 2.5. Note that search effort is higher for the secure employed at the bottom left. These jobs are
not accepted by anyone in the model.
Secure employment































FIGURE 2.6: Optimal asset levels in the secure employment (left) and layoff employment states
(right)
Note: next period asset holdings is a
′
(p,z,a = 50). p is the firm productivity. z is human capital level. The worker
has an asset level with approximately two lots of the average annual income, a = 50. Asset levels calculated using
the estimated parameters in Section 2.5.
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More relevant to this study is the interaction between search and asset accumulation in layoff
employment. In the model, workers save because of the possibility of unemployment spells in the
future - the motive to save is precautionary. When a worker transitions into layoff employment,
search is now also precautionary - search effort can increase job security. When the worker
transitions into layoff employment, they choose a combination of these two precautionary mechanisms
optimally to mitigate the increased probability of unemployment. Which of these mechanisms is
most important will be quantified in Section 2.7.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show graphically how workers change their search effort and asset holdings,
respectively, when they are in secure employment (left) and when they are in the layoff employment
(right). In the Figures, we can see that workers increase search effort and asset accumulation in
layoff employment.20 Following the realisation of increased job insecurity, there are clear changes
in the workers behaviour. These changes are optimal intuitive decisions taken by the worker in
order to mitigate, as much as possible, the costs associated with job loss.
2.4 Dynamics of pre-layoff search in the model
Before we move on to the estimation of the model, it is important to discuss the dynamics
of pre-layoff search through the lens of the model, and assess why a model with a jump in job
insecurity is able to replicate the changing search behaviour documented in Section 2.2.
Before I do so, I first outline how I will relate information on search at the extensive margin
from the data, to the continuous measure of search in the model. I use the following straight
forward procedure to map search in the model to the data. I determine a threshold search intensity
where those searching with greater intensity will be deemed as searching, and those below will be
deemed as not searching. The threshold will be set such that the proportions who are “searching”
and “not-searching” match those seen in Table 2.1. See Appendix A.4 for a graphical explanation
of this.
Instead of using this threshold method with continuous search, we could have specified a
model with binary on the job search. In a model with binary search, we would estimate a scalar
cost of search such that the proportion that are searching in the model is equal to the same
proportion in the data. Implicitly a threshold method is used such that those who have the greatest
20There is a slight difference at lower wages with regards to saving. Workers are willing to accept lower wages
than unemployment benefits in the model. The marginal utility of consumption is higher in these low wage jobs than
in unemployment. This results in workers reducing savings more when in layoff employment compared to secure
employment. The reason for these jobs being accepted by workers is due to the incorporation of differing human
capital dynamics in employment and unemployment.
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returns from searching begin to search. The model of continuous search with the threshold method
I use will result in the same individuals being deemed as searching as those searching in a binary
model, ignoring any differences in the population distributions in these two environments. The
continuous search approach is attractive as it allows for workers to receive job offers without
“reporting to be searching” - a reality in the data. I will assess whether the model is able replicate
the proportion of job-to-job transitions that proceed an incidence of search, and, therefore, whether
this is an adequate method in Section 2.5.
We can write down pre-layoff search in period t− j, given a layoff in period t, relative to the
baseline period t−T (where T > j) as
PLSt− j,T = P(Searcht− j|LOt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
proportion searching j periods before layoff
− P(Searcht−T |LOt),︸ ︷︷ ︸
proportion searching in the baseline period
(2.15)
where LOt refers to layoff in period t, and throughout I am conditioning on workers not being
unemployed, inline with how I estimate pre-layoff search in the data.21 Pre-layoff search in period
t− j, is equal to the probability of searching in period t− j conditional on being laid off in period
t, relative to the same probability in the baseline period t−T . Using the different employment
states in the model, coupled with the threshold method described above, P(Searcht− j|LOt) can be
written as
P(Searcht− j|LOt) = P(Searcht− j|LOEmpt− j)P(LOEmpt− j|LOt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
proportion of those who are in layoff employment and searching j periods before layoff
+ P(Searcht− j|SecEmpt− j)P(SecEmpt− j|LOt),︸ ︷︷ ︸
proportion of those who are in secure employment and searching j periods before layoff
(2.16)
where LOEmpt− j refers to layoff employment, and SecEmpt− j refers to secure employment, both
in period t− j. The probability of searching in period t− j given a layoff occurs in period t, is
equal to the probability of searching conditional on being in layoff employment in period t− j,
multiplied by the probability of being in layoff employment given that a layoff will occur in period
t, plus the same for secure employment. As said previously, any transition into unemployment or
out of layoff employment is described as a layoff.
Next, make the following assumption, P(LOEmpt−T |LOt) = 0. We will soon see that this is
true as long as T is sufficiently large - the further back before t we go, the less likely that a worker
21Here I am ignoring the control group of workers who do not lose their job. This is not an issue in the model as
workers are hit with shocks at an exogenous rate, so the control group and treatment group would have behaved the
same, if we were not conditioning on the treatment group losing their job at time t.
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in layoff employment will survive until period t. Note also that whether a worker is searching in
a state is independent of time. Using the fact that 1−P(LOEmpt− j|LOt) = P(SecEmpt− j|LOt),





difference in search propensity between layoff employment and the baseline
×
P(LOEmpt− j|LOt).︸ ︷︷ ︸
probability of being in layoff employment before layoff
(2.17)
Pre-layoff search in period t− j is equal to the difference in the probability of searching between
those in layoff employment in period t− j and those in the baseline period t−T , multiplied by
the probability of being in layoff employment in period t − j conditional on being laid off in
period t. The difference within the brackets, P(Search|LOEmp)−P(Search|SecEmp), is positive
(following from Proposition 1) and is independent of j. It should be made clear that this difference
is determined by the model and, therefore, dependent on the parameterisations I use. What will
drive the dynamics of pre-layoff search is solely due to how P(LOEmpt− j|LOt) changes with j. I
show in Appendix A.3 that there is a neat categorisation for this probability, and is given as





where sL is the average search effort, and F(pL) = 1−F(pL) is the average acceptance probability,
both in layoff employment. P(LOEmpt− j|LOt) is equal to the product of, the proportion moving
into layoff employment following the shock with probability δ , φ , and the probability of remaining
in layoff employment for j− 1 periods,
(
1− δL − sLλF(pL)
) j−1. There are some important
properties. Firstly, PLS, is dependent on φ and δL, and the average probability of moving from






> 0 and lim
j→∞
PLSt− j,T = 0
when φ > 0 and δL > 0 or sLλF(pL)> 0. (2.19)
As we move further away from the layoff event, the proportion of workers who are in layoff
employment decreases, and tends towards zero as j tends to infinity. Another way of describing
this, as I have previously said, is a worker who is in layoff employment one year prior to the layoff
at time t is unlikely to last in layoff employment until time t. This justifies the assumption made
previously that P(LOEmpt−T |LOt) = 0 as long as T is sufficiently large.
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The categorisation of P(LOEmpt− j|LOt) allows us to make important identification arguments






= 1−δL− sLλF(pL). (2.20)
Given the probability of making an involuntary job-to-job transition each period (sLλF(pL)),
which I measure in the data, the ratio of pre-layoff search at consecutive periods pins down δL.
There are two important points here: i) the ratio of pre-layoff search at consecutive periods is
constant, and any deviation from this in the data will be evidence that the model is not correctly
specified; ii) this identification argument relies on information on PLSt− j at different values of j,
and that both of these values do not equal zero.22 Second, notice that
P(LOEmpt−1|LOt) = φ . (2.21)
As we approach a specified layoff event, the probability that a worker is in the layoff employment
state increases up to φ . The parameter φ , therefore, plays an important role in allowing the model
to replicate the changing proportion of workers who are searching in the periods that immediately
precede job loss.
Putting all these points together, the one off rise in unemployment risk that workers face in the
model is able to generate the gradual increase in the incidence of search prior to layoff, where φ
and δL pin down the observed levels and shape of the schedule.
2.5 Estimation
I now proceed to estimate the model by skill level, making the assumption that low and high
skill workers partake in different labour markets. Before I do, I make some simplifying parametric
assumptions. I assume that firm level heterogeneity, p, follows a beta distribution, p∼ β (σa,σb).












22Suppose that the measured level of pre-layoff search 2 quarters before job loss was zero. The ratio would,
therefore, not pin down δL, and would instead only provide a lower bound on the estimate. One requires a panel with
a short enough frequency in the data to pin down δL, under the model environment.
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where α , κ0, κ1 > 0. I model human capital accumulation following Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1998). Workers have some initial level of human capital on the following grid z ∈ {z, ...,z} that,
along with the productivity of the firm, determines the wage that the worker receives. When
employed, the workers’ human capital increases from z to min{z+∆z,z} with probability ωE ,
and when unemployed falls from z to max{z−∆z,z} with probability ωU . I choose z = 1, z = 2,
and ∆z = 0.2, resulting in six unique points on the human capital grid. To ensure that a worker’s
human capital moves up as fast as it moves down, I estimate ωU and set ωE such that it solves,
ωE(1−u) = ωU u.
I can now proceed to estimate the model. I predefine β = 1/1.051/48 to be equivalent with
an annual 5% social discount rate. I let b = 0.25, which corresponds to a replacement rate of
approximately 0.5 in the estimated model. This is inline with the UK replacement rate estimated
by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (see OECD (2018a)). The job
finding probability with intensity equal to 1 is normalised to λ = 0.05. Finally, I set α = 1 which
implies logarithmic utility at the limit. This leaves the following vector containing the remaining
nine structural parameters to estimate θ =
{
κ0,κ1,σa,σb,δ ,φ ,δL,ωU ,r
}
. I estimate the model
by indirect inference. That is, I numerically solve for the model policy functions, simulate a panel
of data and generate moments, ms(θ), from the simulated data to fit moments from “true” data
described in Section 2.2, m. The indirect inference estimator is given in (2.23). See Appendix A.5






2.5.1 Moments and identification
The model is highly non-linear and moments from the data are impacted by more than just
one parameter. Here I provide arguments for why specific moments provide information for
parameters in θ .
Identification of δL and φ . Two of the key parameters in the model are δL and φ . Following from
the previous section, I identify the reciprocal of the average length of layoff employment, δL,
and the proportion who move into layoff employment, φ , using the levels and shape of pre-layoff
search documented in Figure 2.3 - δL and φ determine the ratio of pre-layoff search between two
consecutive periods, and pre-layoff search just before job loss. Figure 2.7 shows this graphically
23The optimal weighting matrix, W, is equal to the inverse of the covariance matrix of the data moments. In practice
I use the identity matrix multiplied by the vector of the reciprocals of the empirical moments. This re-weights smaller
moments to be as important as larger moments when minimising the criterion function.
32
- how does the pre-layoff search schedule change as φ (left) and δL (right) are increased and
decreased? A change in φ and δL change the shape of the schedule differently.
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FIGURE 2.7: Identification of φ and δL
Note: Pre-layoff search for high skill workers. The bold line shows the actual pre-layoff search and the dotted lines
show how pre-layoff search changes in response to 20% increase and decrease in the parameters as described by the
legend.
As well as fitting the shape and levels of pre-layoff search, I also ask if the model can jointly
replicate the proportion of job-to-job transitions that proceed layoff. I define an involuntary
job-to-job transition in the model as a job-to-job transition that occurs in layoff employment. This
is an important objective of the estimation process to see whether the model can map changes in
the behaviour in search before job loss with outcomes after.
Finally, to assess whether the outcomes of workers who are deemed searching in the model
match the same outcomes in the data, using the described threshold effort that determines “search”
and “no-search”, I also ask the model to fit the proportion of all job-to-job transitions that proceed
a reported incidence of on-the-job search. This is important as we may be concerned that the
method to assign whether a worker is searching in the model, which is used to calculate pre-layoff
search in the model, does not translate into overall search and job-to-job transitions as seen in the
data.
Identification of the scale parameter of the cost of search, κ0, and the curvature parameter

























Search effort in layoff employment and unemployment are categorised in a similar manner to
search in secure employment, as seen in (2.24), but where the lower bound of the integral is from
pL(p,z,a) and pU(z,a), respectively. Holding the other parameters constant, κ0 is identified by






We can see that unemployment duration is increasing in κ0.24 Intuitively, unemployment duration
pins down κ0 since, an increase (reduction) in κ0 increases (reduces) the cost of search for each
intensity and so increases (reduces) unemployment duration.
The curvature of the cost of search, κ1, is a key parameter in the model. As we can see from
(2.24), κ1 largely determines the curvature of search function along the productivity distribution.
Notice that search effort in secure employment is also a function of search in layoff employment.
I inform the parameter of the curvature of the cost of search with information on the voluntary
job-to-job and involuntary job-to-job transition rates conditional on wages, as they tell us about










The job-to-job transition probabilities for a worker in state (p,z,a) is equal to the product of the
job contact rate, s(p,z,a)λ , and the job acceptance rate, F . I estimate the following models using
the BHPS
JJvit = αvi + γ
v
t +Xitβ + τ




t +Xitβ + τ
iwit + ε iit . (2.27)
JJvit and JJiit represent indicator variables, taking the value of 1 if the worker switches jobs
and describes the switch as voluntary and involuntary and 0 if they remain at their employer,













)κ1 = sU (z,a). Given a value for λ and κ1, ulength pins down κ0.
25Lise (2013) uses a very similar method to identify the curvature of the cost of search.
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for individual i at time t. Only transitions that are reported to be direct to a new employer are
counted as from job-to-job. wit is the log of the wage for individual i at time t. τv and τ i provide
information on how search effort changes along the wage distribution, and so is used to pin down
κ1.26 The point estimates for the high skill workers are τ̂v = −.055 and τ̂ i = .002. There is a
much stronger response for voluntary transitions than for involuntary transitions. The model is
able to replicate this difference because a worker’s search effort is less responsive to productivity
when they are in layoff employment compared to secure employment as seen in Figure 2.5.
Identification of the human capital depreciation parameter, ωU . I inform the human capital
depreciation parameter, which in turn determines the human capital appreciation parameter, with
information regarding the relationship between workers’ hiring wage and the preceding unemployment
spell length. Following Jarosch (2021) and Burdett et al. (2020), I estimate the following model
on data from the BHPS by skill level
wit = γdurt +Xitβ + τ
durudurit +βwwi + εdurit . (2.28)
The model contains time fixed effects and the logarithm of the workers average wage to address
issues surrounding selection - those who experience longer unemployment durations may also
have lower wages on average. udur is the length of the unemployment spell that preceded the job
with logarithmic hiring wage, wit . Through the context of the model, τdur is directly related to the
speed of skill loss in unemployment, and so used to pin down ωU .
Identification of the risk free interest rate, r. Given a fixed value for β , r is pinned down by
the wealth to annual income ratio, which I estimate using data from the BHPS. In the data, an
individual’s wealth is determined by their liquid and illiquid assets. This includes their savings,
investments and home value, minus outstanding debt including the mortgage. This is inline with
wealth measures used in Low et al. (2010), and I use the same procedure to estimate wealth from
the BHPS as in Crossley and O’Dea (2010).
Remaining parameters. Since φ and δL are separately identified, δ is identified with the level of
employment tenure. Finally I inform the distribution parameters, σa and σb, with the variance and
skewness of the wage distribution estimated from the BHPS, where I strip out individual, time and
age effects.27
26Ideally, I would also use information on how job-to-job transitions change along the asset distribution since
∂ s(p,z,a)
∂a 6= 0. Quantitatively, I find that the response of search along the productivity distribution is far stronger
compared to along the asset distribution. I currently do not incorporate information on assets.










. Without on the job search, the variance and skewness of the offer distribution would be the same
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2.5.2 Model fit
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the moments and estimated parameters for the model. In general the
model fits the data well.
Firstly, the model importantly does a good job at hitting pre-layoff search documented in the
data (see Figure 2.8), whilst simultaneously matching the reality of involuntary job switching.
This suggests that the changes in behaviour before job loss as measured by pre-layoff search
reflect well the actual changes in search behaviour before job loss. The change in search prior to
layoff identify φ and δL. The results reveal that 62% of high skilled workers receive a warning
to job loss, compared with just 42% for low skilled workers. When workers are provided with a
warning, the average amount of time that a worker has to increase search and increase saving prior
to losing their job, 1
δL
, is on average slightly longer for the high skilled workers relative to the low
skilled, but both approximately equal to three months. If a worker is lucky enough to be warned
about an upcoming layoff as opposed to being dismissed right away, the amount of time they have
to change their behaviour is large, and can help the worker prepare for and mitigate the costs of
job loss.
Moving to the spell length moments, the spell length of unemployment is longer for the low
skill workers. This should correspond to a higher scale parameter for the cost of search for the
low skilled. The cost of search lower for the low skilled. Why is the model able to generate
differences in the length of the average unemployment spell between skill groups? The reason
is because of the difference in the expected offer from the productivity distribution - high skilled
workers will receive more productive job offers on average than low skill workers. The incentives
to search are, therefore, lower for low skilled workers and so results in longer unemployment
spells. Employment tenure is longer for high skilled workers relative to low skilled workers.
Initially one may think that this is all reflected in higher job security for high skill workers.
The ratio of employment tenure between skills in the model is approximately 1.35. To fit the
difference between employment tenures, without pre-layoff search, the ratio of δ would also be
1.35. However, the ratio is approximately 1.25. The reason for this is that high skill workers
are more likely to make an involuntary job-to-job transitions as opposed to a transition into
unemployment than low skill workers, because of the magnitude and length of pre-layoff search.
The differences in pre-layoff search between high skill workers can, therefore, partially explain
differences in employment outflows between skill levels.
as the sampling distribution. Wage change information for job-to-job transitions, and experience, provides further
information for how job-to-job transitions impact the underlying offer distribution.
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Low skill High skill
Data Model Data Model
Transition moments
u length (months) 7.466 7.779 5.950 6.749
job tenure (years) 7.283 6.921 7.049 7.688
e tenure (years) 11.95 11.13 15.41 15.00
inv JJ/JJ .2528 .2597 .1964 .2205
o js JJ/JJ .3015 .4362 .3154 .4296
Wage moments
τv -.0466 -.0492 -.0548 -.0581
τ i .0001 .0018 .0018 .0044
τudur -.0031 -.0051 -.0051 -.0084
∆ log(w)JJ .0670 .2130 .0782 .1512
∆ log(w)JJi -.0460 -.0663 -.0425 -.1129
∆ log(w) .0141 .0158 .0198 .0131
var(log(w)) .0563 .0785 .0706 .0729
skew(log(w)) .1618 -.0785 -.0455 -.2047
wealth/anninc 1.644 1.415 1.826 1.581
Pre-layoff search
δ−1 .1693 .1766 .3155 .3191
δ−2 .0295 .0304 .0854 .0857
δ−3 .0032 .0037 .0243 .0213
TABLE 2.3: Model fit
Note: Transition moments and pre-layoff search moments are estimated from the LFS. Wage moments are estimated
from the BHPS where I strip out age effects, individual fixed effects and time fixed effects. Wealth includes an
individual’s savings, investments and home value, minus outstanding debt including the mortgage.
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FIGURE 2.8: Pre-layoff search: data vs model
The model does a good job at fitting τv and τ i, which are measures for how prevalent voluntary
and involuntary job-to-job transition are along the wage distribution. The related parameter κ1 -
the curvature of the cost of search - is 4.0595 and 2.7048 for the low and high skill workers,
respectively. A typical value found in the literature is between 1.5 and 3, and so the estimated
levels of the curvature of the cost of search are not unreasonable.28
The log wage distribution is more negatively skewed for high skill workers which is relatively
well fit by the distribution parameters, where the growth in wages following a job-to-job transition
is currently overstated in the model. With regards to human capital depreciation, the rate at which
workers lose human capital in unemployment is 0.0212 and 0.0272 for low and high skilled
workers, respectively. This means that it takes on average about a year and three-quarter of a
year for a low and high skilled worker, respectively, to fall down one rung in the human capital
distribution. Finally, turning to wealth, in the data, workers have between 1.5 and 2 times their
annual income in wealth on average (this includes household wealth). Where the ratio is slightly
larger for high relative to low skill workers. The model is able to replicate this magnitude and
difference in magnitude in wealth, and is reflected in a slightly higher estimated real interest rate
for the high skilled.
28Lise (2013), Bagger and Lentz (2019), Liu (2019) and Faberman et al. (2020).
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Parameters Description Low skill High skill
Values Values
Predefined parameters
α relative risk aversion 1 1
β discount factor 1/1.051/48 1/1.051/48
λ job offer arrival rate per unit of search 0.05 0.05
b unemployment benefits 0.25 0.25
Estimated parameters
δ shock rate .00212 .00169
(.0000) (.0000)
κ0 scale parameter 4.2447 4.7622
(.0794) (.0263)
κ1 curvature parameter 4.0595 2.7048
(.1285) (.2680)
σa productivity distribution 8.2978 7.8850
(.1252) (.3274)
σb productivity distribution 19.4773 13.7122
(.2501) (.4474)
δL search period length .0882 .0772
(.0013) (.0023)
φ percent warned .4209 .6248
(.0069) (.0190)
r interest rate .00106 .00109
(.0004) (.0006)
ωU human capital depreciation .0212 .0272
(.0000) (.0000)
ωE human capital appreciation .0011 .0009
TABLE 2.4: Estimated parameters
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Time period is one week. α = 1 implies log utility at the limit. For
the low skill 1
δL




2.5.3 Consumption changes in the model and data
As well as increasing search, workers may also increase their savings to mitigate unemployment
spells. Is this change in behaviour economically important? There is mixed evidence regarding
changes in consumption before job loss. Benito (2006) finds evidence that consumption is related
to job insecurity in the UK. Stephens Jr (2004) and Hendren (2017) both find that workers have
private information regarding their own job insecurity in the US, yet find conflicting evidence on
whether this results in reduced consumption before job loss.
I assess how consumption changes before job loss in the UK using the available consumption
information in the BHPS. Individuals are asked how much they spent on food inside and outside
of the home in the last week. This is a common consumption measure used in other studies, see
Gruber (1997) for a prominent example. Using this information, I estimate average consumption
changes in the year before and after job loss, and the average change over an employment spell.
Table 2.5 shows the results. We find that the model overstates the consumption declines after job
loss. The changes in consumption before, however, are small in the data and model. Despite
workers realising their job insecurity has increased, their change in consumption is very small.
This suggests that the dominant force that workers use to mitigate the costs of job loss is to
increase their search effort.
Over employment spell Year before job loss Year after job loss
Low skill
Model 1.4% 1.3% -12.5%
Data 3.0% 1.3% -6.9%
High skill
Model 1.1% .7% -16.7%
Data 2.0% 4.7% -5.7%
TABLE 2.5: Consumption changes in the model and data
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2.6 The cost of job loss
I now move to testing a key aspect of the model - can the model fit the large losses associated
with job loss, and is it able to replicate the earnings losses for those workers who lose their job
but do not experience unemployment? This is an important piece of the data to replicate if one
aims to conduct appropriate welfare analysis (Jarosch (2021) and Cozzi and Fella (2016)), and in
particular, put a value on the pre-layoff information workers receive.
I study the consequences of job loss in the data using the BHPS in line with Upward and
Wright (2017). As already described, the BHPS follows individuals from 1991 to 2009, and ask
detailed information regarding their employment, including the reason for separation. For period
t ∈ {1992, ...,2008} I assign a job loss if workers separated from their job into unemployment or
described the transition, perhaps to another job, as involuntary.29 As the control group, I pick
workers who remain at their employer in the same period. To conform to the literature, the
treatment and control groups both must have at least 3 years of consecutive tenure at the firm
they are in at time t and must be between 25 and 55 years of age. The tenure restriction, joint with
fixed effects, addresses issues of selection on unobservables into the control group.
For both the separators and the control group, I drop observations after t +10 and before t−5.
This leaves me with a specific cohort of separators and controls at time t. I replicate this for all
t ∈ {1992, ...,2008} leaving me with 17 cohorts. I then stack the cohorts together which gives
me my sample dataset. It is possible that workers are in a treatment cohort and several control
cohorts.
Using this dataset I run the standard distributed lag model found in the literature, see Jacobson
et al. (1993). It takes the following form




δkDkit +uit , (2.29)
where yit is the earnings for individual i at time t, ai and γt are person and time fixed effects,
respectively, and Xit is a set of controls (a quartic in age). Like in (2.1), Dkit are dummy variables
taking the value of one if the individual will separate from their job in k periods, and zero
otherwise. δk, therefore, gives the earnings change relative to 5 years before job loss and of
that of the control group.
29See appendix A.2 for how I categorise separations as involuntary.
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To compare the model earnings losses with the data, I turn the weekly simulated dataset into
an annual dataset by taking the earnings of the worker during the final week of the year. I stack
cohorts in the exact same way in the simulated data as I do in the empirical data, and perform
the same regression. Figure 2.9 shows how the model earnings losses compare to those estimated
from the BHPS, where I compare all layoff events and only those who transition directly to a new
job. In general, the model does a relatively good job at fitting the earnings decline from job loss,
on average, and also for only those who manage to switch employers.
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Layoff -> E model
Layoff -> E data
FIGURE 2.9: Earnings losses: data vs model
Davis and Von Wachter (2011) show that many of the off the shelf job search models find
difficulty in reproducing these earnings losses. Following from this, a significant amount of
recent work has been dedicated to augmenting job search models in order to explain the short and
long-run losses. Krolikowski (2017) and Jarosch (2021) aid the job ladder model by, in different
ways, incorporating slippery bottom rungs. This results in separations more likely preceding
further separations, therefore, increasing the cost of the initial job loss. Jung and Kuhn (2018)
argue that the loss of a particularly good job at the top of the wage distribution is the main
explanation for the large losses. Burdett et al. (2020) build a model with a job ladder and skill loss
in unemployment (Jarosch (2021) also incorporates skill loss in unemployment). They are able to
replicate the cost of job loss, arguing that, human capital loss is the main long run cost of job loss.
The present model follows this theme with skill loss in unemployment.
One may worry that comparing workers who manage to find new employment and those
who do not may be invalid because of selection. Those who immediately find new employment
following the layoff may be systematically different to those who do not. While this is likely to
be true, the mechanisms in the model that result in persistent costs of job loss on average, are
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able to also replicate the differences in the losses for each destination. In other words, while
systematic differences likely exist, the economic forces in the model alone are able to fit the
differing schedules.
2.6.1 Decomposing the differences in the losses
The previous subsection showed that the model can replicate the costs of job loss for those
transitioning to unemployment and employment. We can decompose these costs of job loss in
to the model contributing factors. First, the job ladder effect (JL), the worker loses the high
productive firm and must spend time climbing the job ladder. Second, the employment effect
(Emp), the worker loses out on earnings due to experiencing unemployment. Finally, the human
capital effect (HC), the worker loses out on foregone human capital increases in employment, and
experiences falls in human capital in unemployment. To fix ideas, I begin by writing down the








HCt where x ∈ {lo,eu, j ji}. (2.30)
lo, eu and j ji represent overall job loss, job loss into unemployment, and job loss to another
job, respectively. I estimate the three components numerically by switching off the underlying
factors one by one. First, I estimate the employment effect by only considering those who are in
employment. Second, I estimate the job ladder effect by estimating the change in the productivity
of the firm for those who find employment. Finally, the human capital effect is the residual.
Figure 2.10 shows the costs of overall job loss (lo) decomposed into the constituent components
over the 10 years post job loss for low (left) and high (right) skill workers. There are a three main
points. First, for both the high and low skilled, the employment effect quickly dissipates. Second,
the job ladder effect is stronger for the high skilled, which is reflected in the higher efficiency of
search effort. Finally, the costs ten years post job loss, are almost completely due to losses in
foregone human capital. This picture is qualitatively similar to that shown in Burdett et al. (2020).
We can also decompose the differences in the cost of job loss between destinations. For
example, the contribution of job the ladder to the difference in earnings losses for those transitioning
into unemployment relative to those who avoid unemployment is given as
CeuJLt−C
j ji
JL t . (2.31)
Figure 2.11 shows the contributions to the differences in the costs of the losses. We can see
the job ladder effect contributes very little to the differences in losses. In the short run, the
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FIGURE 2.10: The decomposed costs of job loss
Note: Here, I include all those who lose their job, COJLlot . The contributions are estimated using the following
method. First, I estimate the employment effect by switching off any period of unemployment. Second, I estimate the
job ladder effect by estimating the change in productivity for all those who are employed. Finally, the human capital
effect is the residual. One can switch the second and third step in this procedure, but the results are quantitatively
similar.
differences in employment rates and human capital dynamics, explains the differences in earnings
losses. In the long run, the differences in earnings losses are all due to foregone human capital
accumulation for those who experienced unemployment. The main benefits for a worker to search
and find new employment before becoming unemployed are to avoid the possibility of skill loss
in unemployment.
It is important to briefly discuss why the job ladder is not important in explaining the differences
in the losses between the destinations in the model. When workers enter layoff employment from
secure employment, they reduce their reservation productivity, as seen in Proposition 1. The
size of this change determines the contribution of the job ladder to the differences between the
destinations. If workers reduce their reservation productivity only slightly, the average accepted
job out of layoff employment will be more productive than those accepted out of unemployment.
If workers reduce their reservation productivity significantly, the average accepted job out of layoff
employment will be closer to those accepted out of unemployment. The fact that job ladder effect
is negligible, shows that workers in the layoff employment state behave almost as though they are
unemployed. Notice that an implication of this is that, a simple way of incorporating these types
of transitions into a model to understand wage dynamics, that is consistent with this picture, is to
invoke reallocation or “godfather” shocks, as is traditionally done in the literature.
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FIGURE 2.11: The decomposed difference in the costs of job loss for those transitioning into
unemployment relative to those managing to switch jobs
Note: Here I compare between those who transition to new employment relative to unemployment, COJLeut −
COJL j jit . The contributions are estimated using the following method. First, I estimate the employment effect by
switching off any period of unemployment. Second, I estimate the job ladder effect by estimating the change in
productivity for all those who are employed. Finally, the human capital effect is the residual. One can switch the
second and third step in this procedure, but the results are quantitatively similar.
2.7 Implications of anticipating job loss for the aggregate economy:
putting a value on advanced knowledge
I now ask how do welfare and other labour market aggregates change when workers are unable
to anticipate job loss?
2.7.1 Labour market quantities and welfare
To understand how the ability to anticipate job loss impacts welfare, I force employed individuals,
who are in the layoff employment state, to search and consume as though they are in secure
employment, and compare overall welfare to workers in the baseline model. Welfare in the
economy is the expected present discounted value of utility net of search costs. The welfare















where c̃ and s̃ are consumption and search in the economy without job loss anticipation. ψ
describes how much consumption would have to change in order for individuals in the economy
with job loss anticipation to be as happy as those without job loss anticipation. This is traditionally
described as consumption equivalent variation (CEV ).30
Table 2.6 shows the impacts on welfare and other labour market aggregates for the economy
as a whole and split by high and low skill workers. Column one shows ψ for all workers and split
by education group. If workers are unable to anticipate job loss, CEV is -1.60% for all workers,
-1.89% for high skill workers, and -1.31% for low skill workers.
As described in the model in Section 2.3, workers have two mechanisms that they can use to
mitigate the costs of job loss when job insecurity has increased. The worker can either increase
their search effort, or increase savings. Which of these endogenous responses is most important
for worker welfare? In column two, I report the proportion of consumption losses from not being
able to anticipate job loss into those attributable to the increased search channel. The gains from
increased search far outweigh those from the increased savings channel. For the low skill, the
ability to smooth consumption prior to job loss provides virtually no benefits, and the benefits are
slightly larger but still very small for the high skill. Through the context of the model, changes
in savings behaviour following an increase in job insecurity is second order in importance with
regards to welfare, with the most important behavioural change that the worker makes being to
increase search.
To put these welfare measures into a different context, in column three I report how much
unemployment benefits would have to increase if workers cannot anticipate job loss, at no cost to
the workers, for welfare to be equivalent to the world with job loss anticipation. For the low skill,
unemployment benefits would have to increase from 0.25 to 0.37, or 48%, and from 0.25 to 0.4,
or 60%, for the high skilled. If the government were to increase unemployment benefits by this
much, it would cost at least £600 million.31
The final five columns show the impact on unemployment, employment tenure, and the wage
distribution. Endogenous decisions taken by the workers to find new employment in response
to the increased unemployment risk has significant impacts on the aggregate unemployment rate,
and the length of an employment spell. Overall the unemployment rate is reduced by 16%, and an














31See Statista (2018) for information on spending on unemployment benefits in the UK in 2020.
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employment spell is increased by 2.2 years. The impact is unsurprisingly stronger for high skill
workers (19% reduction in unemployment and 3.0 year increase in the length of an employment
spell) relative to low skill workers (13% reduction in unemployment and a 1.5 year increase in the
length of an employment spell).
Welfare Aggregates
ψ% b % due u eten w var skew
(CEV ) to PLS
All
Anticipation 0 .25 4.67 13.07 .536 .0781 -.1831
No Anticipation -1.60 .39 97.9 5.52 10.83 .529 .0790 -.1612
Low skill
Anticipation 0 .25 5.63 11.13 .486 .0785 -.0732
No anticipation -1.31 .37 98.7 6.45 9.66 .482 .0793 -.0511
High skill
Anticipation 0 .25 3.71 15.00 .585 .0729 -.2047
No anticipation -1.89 .40 96.8 4.58 12.00 .576 .0743 -.1818
TABLE 2.6: The impact of anticipating job loss
Note: ψ is calculated using (2.32), and describes how much consumption would have to change in order for workers in
the baseline model with anticipation to have the same present discounted utility as those without job loss anticipation.
PLS refers to pre-layoff search. b does not represent the unemployment replacement rate. The replacement rate at a
value of b = 0.25 is approximately 0.5. Column (1) shows how much lifetime consumption would have to change for
workers who can anticipate job loss to be as happy as workers who cannot anticipate job loss. Column (2) asks what
he unemployment benefit level would have to be in order for workers in an economy without job loss anticipation to
be as happy as those with job loss anticipation. Column (3) shows the percentage of welfare gains that are due to
pre-layoff search. Columns (4)-(8) describe the changes in the relevant variables.
Switching off job loss anticipation has interesting effects on the wage distribution. Workers
in layoff employment have greater reservation wages than workers in unemployment, implying
that the average accepted wage for a worker in layoff employment is greater than for a worker in
unemployment. Switching off anticipatory behaviour implies more workers experience unemployment,
which in turn reduces the mean accepted wage out of these two states, which reduces wages. On
the other hand, those in layoff employment are willing to accept wage falls, and, if workers in
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unemployment do not find jobs, switching off anticipatory behaviour can reduce the average wage.
Overall, I find that the average wage falls, the wage skewness falls and variance of wages increase,
when workers cannot anticipate job loss.32
2.8 Lessons for policy
I use the model to study the implications of job loss anticipation for two policies: advance
notice and unemployment benefits. It should be made clear that the model is in partial equilibrium,
and so any conclusions should be made with this in mind. The importance of incorporating firm
entry into a model to study optimal unemployment benefits, for example, was shown in Krusell
et al. (2010) - higher unemployment benefits raise the reservation wage of workers, forcing firms
to increase wages, disincentivising vacancy creation.
2.8.1 Notice
As has been shown in the previous sections, the main long run benefit of switching employers
without a spell of unemployment following job loss, is to avoid human capital depreciation. It is
natural, therefore, to ask, what are the implications for welfare if workers were given more time
to find a new job whilst still employed.
Here I ask the following question. Are workers willing to pay the wages of those workers
who would have otherwise become unemployed for a certain number of weeks. I formulate
this experiment by allowing the government to move money from those in employment, to the
employed who have received a job destruction shock, and would otherwise be unemployed. I
model this in a straight forward way. Those who are in secure employment now move into
notice employment with probability (1− φ)δ , as opposed to unemployment. Those who are
in layoff employment, now move into notice employment with probability δL, as opposed to
unemployment. The only way a worker can enter unemployment is following the culmination
of notice. I show the changes to the value functions from introducing notice into the economy in
Appendix A.3.
Of importance is the job destruction rate in notice, δN . This tells us the average length of
notice schemes currently in place in the economy, 1
δN
. The government can increase and reduce
32The fact that incorporating involuntary job-to-job transitions into a job ladder model reduces the variance of
wages is inline with work by Tjaden and Wellschmeid (2014). They show that incorporating exogenous job-to-job
transitions where the reservation wage is unemployment, the godfather shock, results in reducing the contribution of
frictional wage dispersion to the variance of wages.
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the average length financed by taxing labour income. The government budget constraint is
eN(1− τ)
∫ ∫
w(p,z)gN(p,z)d pdz = (1−u− eN)τ
∫ ∫
w(p,z)g(p,z)d pdz, (2.33)
where eN is the proportion of the population in notice, τ is the tax rate, gN(p,z) is the proportion
of workers in a firm with productivity p and human capital z where the worker is on notice, and
g(p,z) is the proportion of workers in a firm not on notice with productivity p and human capital
z. Instead of worrying about transitional dynamics, I focus on comparing steady states.
I plot ψ relative to no changes in the notice length, and compare three scenarios. First the
baseline economy where workers are able to change their behaviour prior to notice and prior to job
loss. Second, where workers cannot anticipate job loss prior to notice but are able to change their
search behaviour in notice. Finally, where workers do not change search effort when transitioning
into layoff employment or notice employment. In all these experiments, workers human capital in
notice employment evolves as though they are employed. Figure 2.12 plots the schedules.
When workers can can choose their search effort on notice, extending the length up to approximately
four months provides welfare gains to workers, with the benefits plateauing after. Interestingly,
when workers are unable to change their search effort during notice, extending the length of the
scheme only damages workers. Providing workers with longer time to search prior to job loss is
only beneficial when workers choose search endogenously. Figure A.16 explains why. The Figure
shows the notice employment rate eN , and the tax rate that is required to finance the scheme
under the assumption that the government balances the budget constraint. If workers do not use
the notice period to increase search, the employment rate in notice and, therefore, the tax rate
increases very quickly. The costs of financing such a scheme then increase very quickly, which
creates a gulf in the schedules as the length of the scheme approaches a year, as is seen in Figure
2.12.
This experiment is clearly stylised, and there would plausibly be a host of obstacles that would
impede such a policy. The main aim here is not to highlight the best policy to implement in the
economy, but instead to highlight the gains from advance knowledge to workers. Workers are
more than willing to reduce wages in order to be provided with more information of impending
job loss. This is because it allows workers a better chance at mitigating the costs of job loss, which
are mostly due to losses in human capital.
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FIGURE 2.12: The value of knowledge of job loss and the importance of endogenous search




Finally, I study the implications for unemployment benefits, where I revert back to the baseline
model without advance notice. Again, the government wants to maximise welfare. To do so they
are able to move money from one agent in employment to another agent in unemployment through





Again, instead of worrying about transitional dynamics, I focus on comparing steady states.
Figure 2.13 presents how the welfare gains associated with anticipatory behaviour are impacted
by the level of unemployment benefits in the economy. As unemployment benefits increase,
anticipating job loss becomes less valuable to the worker but this impact is only slight. This
is intuitive; when unemployment becomes better (worse), the gains from avoiding it decrease
(increase).
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FIGURE 2.13: The welfare losses from not anticipating job loss at different unemployment
benefits.
Note: ψ is calculated using (2.32). b does not represent the unemployment replacement rate. The replacement rate at
a value of b = 0.25 is approximately 0.5.
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2.9 Conclusion
Understanding the entirety of the impacts to workers when they lose their jobs is undoubtedly
an important task. Despite the immense literature studying workers actions and outcomes post job
loss, comparatively little work has studied how workers react and change their behaviour before
job loss. This paper takes an in depth look at how workers change their search behaviour before
job loss in the UK labour market.
I show that search incidence increases significantly during the quarter before job loss for
low and high skill workers, respectively, but that the increase is stronger for high skill workers.
This information provides clear evidence that workers are able to correctly anticipate job loss.
Motivated by this empirical finding, I build a job search model in which workers receive information
of increased job insecurity before job loss, and identify key parameters that govern the changes in
average workers information set regarding their own job security. The model estimates reveal that
around two-fifths and three-fifths of low and high skill workers know of impending job loss, on
average three months before becoming unemployed. Using the estimated model, I show that the
ability to anticipate job loss provides large welfare benefits for workers, with the most important
behavioural change being to increase search.
I use the model to study the implications for the costs of job loss. There has been a significant
effort to augment search models in order to replicate the earnings declines following job loss. I
show that the proposed model in this paper is able to replicate the average costs of job loss, but
also the differences in earnings losses for those workers who manage to immediately switch jobs
following layoff, and those who take the plunge into unemployment. I decompose the differences
in earnings losses and show that the main benefits of switching employers following job loss is to
avoid skill loss in unemployment.
There are important implications of these results for the coronavirus crisis in 2020. Many
countries have adopted furlough schemes in order to mitigate the individual costs to workers. As
the furlough schemes unwind, however, there is real concern over the possibility of a large number
of workers experiencing job loss. Workers have clear knowledge regarding the end of the furlough
scheme, and, therefore, possible unemployment. As shown in this paper, workers do not sit idly
by, waiting to fall off the edge into the abyss. They take action, most importantly by increasing
their search for new employment prior to job loss, and so reducing the number of workers who
experience a period of unemployment. Future work that seeks to appropriately appraise these
schemes should take the changing search for new employment into account, which seems like a
promising route for future work.
Chapter 3
Job-to-job transitions, job finding and the ins of unemployment
3.1 Introduction
Why does the unemployment rate rise during recessions? A large body of literature has
decomposed unemployment variations into components attributed to the inflows into and outflows
from unemployment. The main conclusions being that the ins and outs of unemployment are
both important to varying degrees.1 Analysing the ins and outs of unemployment is, however, not
necessarily informative with regards to the contribution of layoffs and job finding. In particular,
there are two main channels by which employment to unemployment transitions rise: first, an
increase in layoffs; and second, a fall in job finding of potential job-to-job transitions.2 This
presents an issue when attempting to understand the importance of layoffs and job finding using
an inflow outflow analysis - attributing the contribution of the ins of unemployment to layoffs
may be inaccurate. In this paper, I estimate which of these two channels is most important in
driving changes in employment to unemployment transitions, and the unemployment rate, over
the business cycle.
Previous work that has addressed this issue has studied the problem in steady-state, assumed
a two-state economy and, most importantly, has not split separations into layoffs and quits.3 As is
well known, layoffs and quits behave very differently over the business cycle, and so grouping
these fundamentally different reasons for separation together will mask important features of
1The influential work of Shimer (2012) and Hall (2005) conclude that outflows are far more important than inflows.
This result was contrary to conventional wisdom (Darby et al. (1985), Darby et al. (1986) and Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992)) and was challenged by Fujita and Ramey (2009) and Elsby et al. (2009) who conclude that the role of inflows
was understated by Shimer and Hall.
2This point was originally made by Perry (1972b) and reemphasized by Hall (2005), Bachmann (2005) and
Nagypal (2008). Perry (1972b) discussing the inflows: It consists of persons about to enter the labour force, and
of workers about to leave one job to look for another, either at their own initiative (quitting) or at their employer’s
(layoff or firing). These additional job seekers can be conceived of as holding lottery tickets just as the unemployed
do. These tickets define the probability that, when they make the transition into the labour force or out of their present
jobs, their numbers come up and they have new jobs. If their numbers do not come up, they become this week’s newly
unemployed.
3See Bachmann (2005) and Nagypal (2008).
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recessions.4 Using data from the US and UK over a period of two decades, I find that fluctuations
in job finding of potential job-to-job transitions are at least as important as layoffs, in explaining
the contribution of fluctuations in employment to unemployment transitions to the dynamics of
unemployment. I show that these results are not driven by changes in observable characteristics
over the business cycle, and robust to an adjustment for time aggregation.
In order to estimate which of these two forces is most important in driving changes in the ins
of unemployment over the business cycle, I begin by decomposing the ins of unemployment into
distinct components, following Nagypal (2008). In particular, the employment to unemployment
transition is decomposed into a job separation component - whether a worker separates from
their job - and a job finding component - whether the worker has a job lined up following the
separation. Using information on the reason for separation, I split separations into layoffs and
quits to assess their dynamics separately. In line with the literature, I find that layoffs rise and quits
fall in recessions. This increase in layoffs gives rise to increased employment to unemployment
transitions. As well as the increase in layoffs, workers who separate from their jobs, whether it be
due to a quit or a layoff, are less likely to have a job lined up in recessions. This in turn results in
greater increases in employment to unemployment transitions in recessions.
I build the decomposition of the ins of unemployment into a three state framework of worker
flows, and assess the contribution of changes in the flow probabilities to the dynamics of unemployment
out of steady state.5 I find that, inline with recent literature, employment to unemployment
transitions are important in both the UK and US, contributing to around a third of unemployment
dynamics. I find, however, that fluctuations in job finding of potential job-to-job transitions are at
least as important as fluctuations in layoffs, at explaining this contribution. An interesting feature
of business cycles is also the role of procyclical quits, which play a moderating role in recessions
as fewer workers voluntarily leave their jobs.
The main reason for these results is the prevalence of quits into unemployment, and layoffs
directly to another job. When some workers quit their jobs, they don’t always move to new
employment, and many workers manage to line up jobs to transition straight into following the
layoff. Chapter 2 shows that workers increase search prior to layoff in the UK, with the predominant
rationale being that workers “think their job may end”. This suggests that workers are able to
foresee job loss approaching. When job finding falls in recessions, less of this precautionary job
search will be matched with an employer, increasing employment to unemployment transitions.
4See Slichter (1919), Akerlof et al. (1988), Anderson and Meyer (1994) and Davis et al. (2012), who show that
layoffs are countercyclical and quits are procyclical
5I do this using a non-steady state variance decomposition as in Elsby et al. (2015).
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In this paper, I show that, in the UK, workers also significantly increase search incidence prior
to a quit to new employment, but also a quit to unemployment. And that the rationale for this
increased search is solely due to worker dissatisfaction with their current job, for both voluntary
job-to-job and employment to unemployment transitions. When recessions hit, less job search is
matched with new employment, increasing the probability that a worker will take the plunge into
unemployment.
This observation that search incidence increases before workers separate from their jobs for
any reason and remain in the labour force, suggests that employment to unemployment and
job-to-job transitions are inherently interrelated through the ability to find jobs. Some employment
to unemployment transitions would have instead resulted in a switch to a new job if the worker
was lucky enough to line up a new job prior to the dissolution of the match.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the conceptual framework,
and outlines the decomposition of the ins of unemployment. Section 3.3 discusses the data and
presents important time series. Section 3.4 shows how it is possible to assess the fluctuations of
the decomposed ins of unemployment in a three-state system, presents the results and spells out
the results from the heterogeneity analysis. Section 3.5 provides further discussion and evidence
for the relationship between employment to unemployment and job to job transitions using on the
job search. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Conceptual framework
Workers leave their jobs for many different reasons, but these reasons can be broadly narrowed
down to two distinct categories: because of layoff, or because of a quit. The first reason, a
layoff or involuntary separation, is naturally thought of as synonymous with an employment to
unemployment transition. However, many workers in the US and UK are fired from their jobs
but also move directly to new employment without an intervening spell of unemployment. This
suggests that workers are able to foresee that job loss is approaching, and respond by changing
their search behaviour to avoid unemployment. Chapter 2 shows clear evidence of this in the
UK, and that incorporating this into a job ladder model can replicate the level of involuntary job
switching in the labour market. It follows that, when job finding falls in a recession, those who
have information of impending job loss are less likely to have a suitable replacement job lined up,
which in turn increases the likelihood that a layoff will result in unemployment.
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The second reason, a quit or voluntary separation, is often described as synonymous with a
job-to-job transition. However, many workers in the US and UK quit their jobs and move into
unemployment to continue the search for another job. Workers who quit their jobs to move to
unemployment, know that they are about to leave and so likely start searching for new jobs before
the job has ended. When job finding falls in a recession, those who are about to quit their job are
less likely to have a replacement job lined up, which in turn increases the likelihood that a quit will
result in unemployment. The reality of both involuntary job switching and voluntary employment
to unemployment transitions suggests that the fall in job finding during a recession contributes to
the increase in employment to unemployment transitions.
The above story suggests that the level of employment to unemployment transitions in an
economy is, in part, impacted by the job finding rate. We can see this by decomposing the
employment to unemployment transition probability using the accounting identity following Nagypal
(2008),
peu = psept p
l f |sep
t (1− p
j j|l f &sep
t ).
6 (3.1)
The employment to unemployment transition probability is split into three components, (i) the
probability of separating from ones job (ii) the probability of remaining in the labour force upon
separation, and (iii) the probability of not having a replacement job lined up. I will refer to
component (iii) as the job finding component.7 Under this setting changes in the job finding
rate can result in changes in the job finding component, and changes in the employment to
unemployment probability.
Is this the correct way to think about transitions from a job to unemployment? The common
feature of the story in this section is on the job search. Increased on the job search precedes
separations into unemployment and to a new job, be it due to a quit or layoff. When job finding
falls, it is less likely that search is matched with a firm, and so the worker is more likely to
experience unemployment. Chapter 2 shows a significant increase in the incidence of search prior
to layoff, where the main rationale for this search is that the worker “thinks their job may end”.
In Section 3.5, I present evidence that, not only does increased on the job search occur prior to
voluntary separations into unemployment and a new job, but the magnitude and the rationale for
the increased search are very similar.
6The components of equation (3.1) are calculated by: psept =
Sept
Et−1
, pl f |sept =
LFSept
Sept




constitutes the stock of all those who separate from their employer between t−1 and t. LFSept constitutes the stock
of all those who separate from their employer between t−1 and t and are in the labour force at t. JJLFSept constitutes
the stock of all those who separate from their employer between t−1 and t and are in employment at t.
7See a flow diagram of the decomposition in Appendix B.4.
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3.3 Empirical evidence on labour market flows
In this section I will present the main evidence regarding the relationship between the ins of
unemployment and the job finding rate. Before I do so, I will briefly describe the data, and paint
the basic picture of worker flows in the US and UK.
3.3.1 Data
Current Population Survey
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is household-based survey used for US government
labour force statistics. Entrants are surveyed consecutively for four months, dropped for eight
months, and then surveyed again for a further four months. The longitudinal nature of the CPS
allows for estimation of monthly labour force flows. I use the period between 1978m1 and
2016m12. I use the available weights provided by the US Census Bureau to bring the estimates to
a population level.8
While flows between the three labour market states can be estimated from the CPS going as
far back as 1978, job-to-job transitions cannot. However, in 1994 the CPS underwent a redesign.
A particular new question asked survey participants whether they were still working for the same
employer they had last month. This allows for the estimation of monthly job-to-job transitions.
While the CPS is a comprehensive survey, it does not provide users with the reason that survey
participants switched employers. I use the next data set to overcome this issue.
The Survey of Income and Program Participation
The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is a longitudinal survey of US households.
The survey is split into panels. Each panel features a nationally representative sample interviewed
over a multi-year period lasting approximately four years. I analyse the 1996, 2001, 2003 and the
most recently completed panel in 2008. During the first month of a panel, a quarter of the entire
sample, described as a rotation group, give detailed information regarding their exploits in the last
four months. This is the beginning of the first wave. A month later the second rotation group
give detailed information regarding their exploits in the last four months. This then continues for
a further two rotation groups. In the fifth month, the second wave begins and rotation group one
8Further details of the weights can be found by looking at the corresponding guides that accompany the CPS, SIPP
and LFS.
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is interviewed again, and so on. The rolling nature of the survey allows for the calculation of
monthly labour market transitions in the US, which I again weight using the longitudinal calendar
year weights provided by the US Census Bureau.
During each interview, individuals give information on as many as two jobs and as many as
two businesses they have held during the preceding four months. Each job or business is given a
unique identifier that remains the same for the entire panel. Attached to each job or business is
information on when the individual started working for the employer or started the business, and,
if the relationship ended during the preceding four months, information on when the individual
ended working for the employer or ended the business. Using this information it is possible to
construct monthly job-to-job transitions using the SIPP.9
The SIPP provides the reason for separation from a workers previous employer. I categorise
the reason for separating, r, in the following way.
Involuntary (I) - On layoff, discharged/fired, employer bankrupt, employer sold business,
job was temporary and ended.
Voluntary (V)

Quit (Q) - Quit to take another job, slack work or business
conditions, unsatisfactory work conditions.
Personal (P) - Retirement or old age, childcare problems,
other family/personal obligations, own illness, own injury,
school/training.
Other (O) - Left work for some other reason.
The UK Labour Force Survey
Like the CPS for the US, the LFS is a household-based survey that is used as the backbone for
UK government labour force statistics. While the survey was originally used for cross-sectional
analysis, in 1992 the survey introduced a longitudinal component.10 Following this reform, survey
9This information is based on recalling past labour market spells. Perry (1972a) shows that recall over short
periods like those used here are unlikely to significantly impact the flows.
10A longitudinal component, at a lower frequency, implicitly exists preceding this period by the use of retrospective
data, see Elsby et al. (2016). The retrospective technique used in that paper cannot be used to estimate each separation
type by reason or the job-to-job probability.
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participants are sampled for five consecutive quarters. This reform allows for the estimation of
quarterly labour market flows. I use the period between 1996q1 and 2016q4.11
I follow Gomes (2012) and assign job-to-job transitions using a tenure approach. A job-to-job
transition occurs when an individual is employed at time t− 1 and, since the survey is quarterly,
has less than three months tenure at time t.
Like the SIPP, the LFS provides the reason why the worker has separated from their previous
employer for both currently employed and non-employed workers. I categorise the reasons for
separating, r, in the following way.
Involuntary (I) - Dismissed, made redundant, temporary job finished.
Voluntary (V)

Quit (Q) - Resigned, took voluntary redundancy.
Personal (P) - Took early retirement, retired, gave up work
for health reasons, gave up work for family or personal reasons.
Other (O) - Left work for some other reason.
The LFS also provides rich information regarding on the job search. Workers are asked
whether they are searching for another job, the number of methods used, and the reason for
searching. I categorise the reason for search as follows
Uncertain - Present job may come to an end, and present job is to fill time before you find another.
Unsatisfactory - Pay unsatisfactory in present job, journey unsatisfactory in present job, wants
longer hours than in present job, wants shorter hours than in present job and other aspects of
present job unsatisfactory.
Other - Other reasons.
See Appendix B.3 for further details of each of the data sets. See Appendix B.1 for a discussion
and adjustments for time aggregation, margin error and seasonality. The main results, and figures
in this section, are adjusted for margin error and seasonality. I provide additional results where I
also adjust for time aggregation.
11I begin in 1996q1 because this is the period where the reason for separation was introduced, which takes center
stage in my analysis.
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3.3.2 Worker flows in the UK and US
It is instructive to first describe the dynamics of worker flows in the US and UK. The probability





where IJt represents the stock moving from state i to state j between t−1 and t, and It−1 represents
the stock in state i at t−1. Appendix B.6 shows the US and UK worker flows.
As is well documented, the job-to-job and unemployment to employment transition rates are
procyclical, and the employment to unemployment rate is countercyclical.12 As well as this,
transitions into the labour force exhibit clear cyclicality. Recessions come with rises and falls in
transitions from inactivity into unemployment and employment, respectively.
3.3.3 Decomposing the ins of unemployment
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t ). (3.3)
Component (i) is the Separation probability. Component (ii) is the LF |Sep probability. Component
(iii) is the JJ|LFSep probability. As well as transitions from employment to unemployment,
inactivity to unemployment transitions can be decomposed in a similar manner. Workers who
move into the labour force during recessions are more likely to find themselves unemployed
because of the drop in the job finding rate. In the same vein, the inactivity to unemployment






Component (a), the Entry probability, represents the probability of entering the labour force.
Component (b), the E|Entry probability, represents the probability of moving into employment
12See Fallick and Fleischman (2004) and Shimer (2005b) for job-to-job transitions in the US and Gomes (2012)
for job-to-job transitions in the UK.
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conditional on entering the labour force.13 See Section B.4 for a flow diagram of the overall

















































































1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
FIGURE 3.1: The job separation and labour force entry probabilities in the US (left) and UK
(right).
Note: Probabilities adjusted for margin error and seasonality. Shaded areas denote officially defined US and UK
recessions. Source: Author calculations using the CPS and Two Quarter LFS. Ages 16-64/59. US 1994m1-2016m12
(left) and 1978m1-2016m12 (right), UK 1996q1-2016q4, respectively.
Figure 3.1 shows the separation, (i) and (ii), and entry, (a), components of the ins of unemployment
in the US and UK. As can be seen, these probabilities vary little over the cycle. While employment
to unemployment and inactivity to unemployment transitions are countercyclical, the overall rates
at which workers separate from their employer or enter the labour force are comparatively acyclical.
Figure 3.2 shows the job finding, JJ|LFSep and E|Entry, components of the ins of unemployment
in the US and UK, accompanied with the respective unemployment to employment transition






. Entryt constitutes the
stock of all those who enter the labour force between t−1 and t. EEntryt constitutes the stock of all those who enter





















































































1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
E|Entry
UE (right)
FIGURE 3.2: The job finding rates conditional on separating from a job and remaining in the
labour force or entering the labour force in the US (left) and UK (right).
Note: Probabilities adjusted for margin error and seasonality. Shaded areas denote officially defined UK and US
recessions. Source: Author calculations using the CPS and Two Quarter LFS. Ages 16-64/59. US 1994m1-2016m12
(top) and 1978m1-2016m12 (bottom). UK 1996q1-2016q4.
probabilities. The job finding components closely track the respective unemployment to employment
transition probabilities. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 suggest that the fall in job finding is the main driver
behind the increased ins of unemployment during recessions. The next section argues that this
conclusion may be premature.
3.3.4 Accounting for reasons for separation
From the previous evidence it is tempting to conclude that the separation component of the
employment to unemployment probability is unaffected by the cycle. This would be inaccurate.
As documented by Akerlof et al. (1988), Anderson and Meyer (1994) and Davis et al. (2012)
among others, voluntary separations fall in recessions and involuntary separations rise in recessions.
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Elsby et al. (2010) points out that not accounting for compositional changes in the reason for
separation can lead one to overstate the role of the job finding component of the employment
to unemployment probability.14 It is also important to assess the overall role of layoffs in the
economy, as cyclical differences in voluntary and involuntary separations may dampen the role of
layoffs when focusing on overall separations. Using the categorisations of reasons described in
Section 3.3.1, I can account for compositional changes in the reason for separation, and assess the








j j|l f sepr
t ).
15 (3.5)
Figure 3.3 shows the time series of each component of (3.5) for the US and UK. The top
row of Figure 3.3 plots the time series of the involuntary separation and voluntary separation
probabilities. What we see is a clear reduction in voluntary separations and a clear increase in
involuntary separations during each recession. Figure 3.1 simply points out that these two types
of separations offset each other, resulting in an overall acyclical separation probability.
The second row plots the time series of the involuntary and voluntary LF |Sep probabilities.
They largely confirm the conclusions made in the aggregate - following a voluntary or involuntary
job separation, the probability that a worker will subsequently remain in the labour force is
independent of the cycle.
14See Elsby et al. (2010) Section IIc.
















Seprt constitutes the stock of all those who separate from their employer between t− 1 and t for reason r. LFSept
constitutes the stock of all those who separate from their employer between t− 1 and t for reason r and are in the
labour force at t. JJLFSeprt constitutes the stock of all those who separate from their employer between t− 1 and t

































































1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
Voluntary JJ|LFSep
Involuntary JJ|LFSep
FIGURE 3.3: The US (left) and UK (right) voluntary and involuntary: separation, labour force
given separation and job-to-job given labour force separation probabilities.
Note: Probabilities adjusted for margin error and seasonality. Shaded areas denote officially defined US and UK
recessions. Source: Author calculations using the SIPP and Two Quarter LFS. Ages 16-64/59. US 1996m4-2013m5.
UK 1996q1-2016q4.
The final row plots the time series of the involuntary and voluntary JJ|LFSep probabilities.
Notice that voluntary separations that remain in the labour force are more likely to subsequently
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be in future employment than involuntary separations. This observation, coupled with the fact
the involuntary separations rise in recessions and voluntary separations fall, will result in the
changing composition of the reason for separation contributing to reductions in the JJ|LFSep
probability. Because of these two facts, a procyclical aggregate JJ|LFSep probability, as seen
in Figure 3.2, does not necessarily imply that the JJ|LFSep probability disaggregated by each
reason is procyclical. If this changing composition effect explained all the drop of the aggregate
JJ|LFSep probability during a recession, then the JJ|LFSep probabilities disaggregated by reason
would be acyclical. As we can see from Figure 3.3, this is not true. We see clear reductions in the
probability of subsequently finding employment, for each reason for separation.
I now turn to the decomposition of unemployment variation to quantitatively assess the role of
the decomposed ins of unemployment.
3.4 Decomposition of unemployment variation
In this section I explain how it is possible to assess the impact of the fluctuations of the
decomposed ins of unemployment on overall labour market state rate dynamics. To do this, I
adapt a non-steady state variance decomposition described by Elsby et al. (2015).
3.4.1 Methodology
The following first-order Markov process describes the evolution of the three state variables
where: e is the employment-to-population rate, u is the unemployment-to-population rate and n is
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Substituting in for the decomposed employment outflow and labour force entry probabilities
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The limiting distribution, or steady state, of the Markov process is then given as
st = (I−Pt)−1qt . (3.8)
To see how the changes in steady state rates are affected by changes in the flow probabilities, I
take a first order approximation around the previous periods flows giving
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Elsby et al. (2015) show that4s and4s are related through
4st = At4st +Bt4st−1, (3.10)
where At = (I −Pt) and Bt = (I −Pt)Pt−1(I −Pt−1)−1. Iterating back, equation (3.10) can be














Using equations (3.9) and (3.11) we can now run a non-steady state decomposition because






























The percentage of the fluctuations of the unemployment-to-population ratio that can be accounted
for by fluctuations in the total JJ|LFSep probability, for example, can be calculated using
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The decomposition above applies to the contribution of worker flows to the dynamics of the
unemployment-to-population ratio. To estimate the impact of the worker flows to the dynamics of









Table 3.1 shows the results of the decomposition of the unemployment rate using the system
described by (3.7) (III) for the US (left, SIPP) and UK (right). I compare the decomposition
of this system with two others: (I) a standard three-state system and (II) an extension of the
standard system that splits the employment outflow probabilities by type of separation (middle).
Beginning with (I), this is perhaps the logical progression to understand unemployment dynamics
using worker flows. I use this progression to highlight the differences in interpretation that one
would glean from each system. The interpretation of the top left cell is: the past and present
fluctuations in the employment to unemployment probability contributes to 37.8% of the dynamics
of the US unemployment rate.17
System (I) shows that variations in the flows between employment and unemployment and
between unemployment and inactivity contribute to around two-thirds and a third of unemployment
dynamics, respectively. These results are broadly consistent with recent worker flow analyses for
the US and UK.18 From this system, it is difficult to understand the overall importance of layoffs
and job finding. In particular, we may, possibly inaccurately, conclude that layoffs contribute to
around a third of unemployment variation in the US and UK.
Next, system (II) splits the employment outflow probabilities by voluntary and involuntary
reasons. We find that involuntary and voluntary employment to unemployment flows both contribute
positively to unemployment variation, with the larger contribution coming from the involuntary
transition. This may lead us to conclude that increased involuntary separations is the main driver
behind increased employment to unemployment flows, and that recessions come with a mass of
workers quitting their jobs in order to move into unemployment. The latter result is contradictory
to evidence from Figure 3.3 that shows that voluntary separations fall in recessions. These
conclusions can only be made by ignoring job-to-job transitions.
16See Appendix B.1 for details.
17I will sidestep the issue of time aggregation here but will address this in the next subsection.
18See Elsby et al. (2015) and Razzu and Singleton (2016) for the US using the CPS and Smith (2012), Gomes
(2012), Elsby et al. (2016), Singleton (2017) and Lale and Borowczyk-Martins (2018) for the UK.
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Finally, system (III) shows the results after incorporating the decomposed ins of unemployment.
Much like in system (II) involuntary separations contribute positively to unemployment dynamics
(US 21.6% and UK 13.8%) but unlike in system (II) voluntary separations contribute negatively
to unemployment dynamics (US -5.3% and UK -15.9%). The LF |Sep probability, component (ii),
is cyclically unimportant. And the job finding component of the employment to unemployment
probability contributes significantly to unemployment variation (US 19.4% and UK 30.9%). These
results suggest that job-to-job transitions are critical in the story of unemployment dynamics.
I find that entry into the labour force is mildly procyclical contributing negatively to unemployment
variation (US -3.1% and UK -4.1%), and job finding at the participation margin contributes
significantly to unemployment dynamics (US 16.4% and UK 22.7%).
Changes in the job finding components of the ins of unemployment may be due to other forces
that are not necessarily due to fluctuations in the job finding probability. If we do make this
assumption, however, we find that the role of job finding changes significantly as move from
system (I) to system (III), as shown in the final two rows. The contribution of job finding at least
doubles.
Time aggregation
Part of the contribution that comes through the JJ|LFSep and E|Entry probabilities would be
attributed to fluctuations in the unemployment to employment probability if we could observe each
individuals labour market status every second. This is because some of those who I categorise
as making a job to job or inactivity to employment transition may have experienced a spell of
unemployment in between. We expect, therefore, to see a reduction in the contributions of the
JJ|LFSep and E|Entry transitions, and an increase in the contribution of the unemployment to
employment transitions. Table B.51 shows the continuous time analog of column (III) in Table
3.1, and confirms this expectation. The differences in the contributions of the Sep, LF |Sep,
JJ|LFSep, Entry and E|Entry rates in the continuous time environment compared to the discrete
time environment are small, however.
Heterogeneity
As suggested by Darby et al. (1985), reductions in the job finding probability during a recession
may be contributed to by compositional shifts in the pool of individuals looking for employment
- from individuals who are more effective at finding work, to individuals who are less effective
at finding work. In Appendix B.2 I assess the role of compositional changes in worker type
including: age, sex, education, relationship to head of household, whether searching on the
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US UK
Probability I II III I II III
e to u 37.8 33.5
e to n 0.1 -1.1
e to uv 8.5 9.4
e to ui 31.2 20.4
e to nv -0.8 -1.1
e to ni 1.3 0.6
sepv -5.3 -15.9
sepi 21.6 13.8
l f |sepv 0.2 1.1
l f |sepi 3.1 1.2
j j|l f sepv 11.9 20.8
j j|l f sepi 7.5 10.1
u to e 32.4 32.4 32.4 30.9 30.9 30.9
u to n 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5
n to e -0.7 -0.7 4.6 4.6
n to u 14.0 14.0 14.2 14.2
entry -3.1 -4.1
e|entry 16.4 22.7
Residual -2.0 -1.1 -2.4 -0.4 -3.5 -0.7
∑r j j|l f sepr 19.4 30.9
u to e + n to e 31.7 31.7 35.5 35.5
u to e + e|entry 68.2 85.5
+ ∑r j j|l f sepr
TABLE 3.1: Contribution to unemployment rate variation - standard vs extended systems.
Note: Calculations based on margin error and seasonally adjusted probabilities. I: standard system. II: employment
outflows by reason. III: system described by (3.7). sepv, for example, refers to the voluntary separation probability.
sepi, for example, refers to the involuntary separation probability. The interpretation of the top left cell is: the past
and present fluctuations in the employment to unemployment probability contributes to 37.8% of the dynamics of
the unemployment rate. Source: Author calculations using the SIPP and Two-Quarter LFS. Ages 16-64/59. US
1996m4-2013m5. UK 1996q1-2016q4.
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job, the reason for searching on the job, and the reason for separation. I find no evidence
that compositional shifts in observable characteristics, other than the reason for separation, are
contributing to fluctuations in the job finding components of the ins of unemployment.
3.5 Further discussion
This section provides evidence for the story detailed in this paper, discusses possible other
stories, and outlines the relevance of this work to past and future empirical and theoretical analyses.
3.5.1 Evidence using on the job search
The story of Section 3.2 argues that evidence that job finding impacts employment to unemployment
transitions would show that workers increase search before becoming unemployed. Chapter 2
shows this for involuntary separations, and that the reason for the increased search is because
the worker “thinks their job may end”. Here I show evidence for increased search for workers
who separate voluntarily, both into a new job and to unemployment. And that the increased
search is almost entirely due to workers being “dissatisfied” for both the voluntary job-to-job and
employment to unemployment transitions.
I first show that on the job search is a good indicator for both job-to-job and employment to
unemployment transitions, and this remains for workers who separate involuntarily and voluntarily.
I estimate the following linear probability model using the on the job search information in the
UK LFS.
Transitionit = αt +Xitβ + γOJSit−1 + εit , (3.16)
where Transitionit is a binary variable, taking the value of zero if the worker remains in the current
job and one if the individual moves into a new job/unemployment/inactivity. αt is a time fixed
effect, Xit contains controls, and εit is the error. OJSit−1 takes a value of zero if the individual
declares to be searching and zero otherwise. Table 3.2 shows the results.
We can see that job search is a good indicator for whether a worker will make a job to job
transition or move into unemployment, be it voluntarily or involuntarily. Workers are 7.56 and
2.58 percentage points more likely to switch jobs voluntarily and involuntarily, respectively, if they
are searching; and 1.73 and 2.50 percentage points more likely to transition into unemployment
voluntarily and involuntarily, respectively, if they are searching. We see a similar pattern for
transitions into inactivity, but with a much smaller magnitude. Those who are looking for new
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jobs are in employment relationships that are more likely to dissolve the next period, whether the
worker is pushed out or the worker quits.
All Voluntary Involuntary
j j eu en j j eu en j j eu en
OJS .1212∗∗ .0450∗∗ .0036∗∗ .0756∗∗ .0173∗∗ .0021∗∗ .0258∗∗ .0250∗∗ .0025∗∗
(.0010) (.0006) (.0004) (.0008) (.0004) (.0003) (.0005) (.0005) (.0002)
N 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
(mil.)
TABLE 3.2: On-the-job search and separations.
Note: Each regression includes controls for sex, age, job tenure, skill (two types) and time. Standard errors in
parentheses. 1996Q1 - 2016Q1. *, ** indicate statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
As is shown in Chapter 2, workers increase search before they are fired, which results in job
switching following layoffs. How does on the job search change before workers quit to a new job,
and to unemployment? To answer this, I follow a similar technique in the job loss literature and
Chapter 2, and compare workers who separate to a control group. The control group consists of
workers who never separate from their job during the entire five quarters of the survey. Between
1995 and 2016, this leaves me with 288,821 individuals in the control group. It is important to note
that some of the control group may experience a separation in quarter six. The experimental group
consists of workers who remain at their job from quarter one to quarter four, and quit during the
final quarter. This leaves me with 1,482 quit events that satisfy the above. Using these restrictions
I estimate the following distributed lag model.





−kD−kit +uit . (3.17)
sit is an indicator variable representing three variables. It takes the value 1 if the individual reports
to be searching, searching because they think their job may end (Uncertain search), or searching
because they are Unsatisfied and 0 if not. I have categorised these two broad motives using the
reported reasons described in the previous subsection. αi and γt are individual and time fixed
effects, respectively. Xit contains observables - a quartic in age. D−k takes the value of 1 if the
individual quits in k quarters and 0 otherwise. The stream of δ−k gives the percentage change in
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search incidence k quarters before the quit relative to their search incidence four quarters before
the quit and that of the control group.
Table 3.3 shows the results. In columns one and two, we find that search during the quarter
prior to the quit increases significantly for both workers who quit into unemployment (17.4 percentage
points), and for workers who quit to a new job (13 percentage points). Columns three and four
show the same regression for workers searching because they think their job may end. The
increase in search is far smaller and almost negligible. Finally, columns five and six show the
results for unsatisfied search. Unsatisfied search is the main explanation for the rise in search
prior to voluntary employment to unemployment or voluntary job-to-job transitions. These results
show that the search patterns before the quit are very similar for those who move to a new job or
into unemployment.
All Uncertain Unsatisfied or other
eu j j eu j j eu j j
δ−1 .174∗∗ .130∗∗ .023∗∗ .009∗∗ .136∗∗ .126∗∗
(.015) (.006) (.005) (.002) (.013) (.006)
δ−2 .055∗∗ .067∗∗ .014∗∗ .005∗∗ .028∗ .065∗∗
(.015) (.007) (.005) (.002) (.013) (.0006)
δ−3 .059∗∗ .008 -.004 .001 .032∗∗ .008
(.015) (.007) (.005) (.002) (.013) (.006)
N 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16
(mil.)
TABLE 3.3: Search before the quit.
The top left coefficient reads, the proportion of workers who report to be searching is 17.4 percentage points higher
for those who quit their job in one quarter relative to those who do not and the proportion searching four quarters
before the quit. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include a quartic in age, and time and person
fixed effects. 1995Q1 - 2016Q1. *, ** indicate statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The implication being that if job finding falls, as it does in a recession, search is less likely
to be matched with new employment and so more likely to result in unemployment. We can see
direct evidence of this by augmenting (3.16). I run the following for workers in the recessionary
period in the UK (2008Q3 - 2009Q2) and not in a recessionary period (2006Q3 - 2007Q2, 2010Q3
- 2011Q2).
Transitionit = αt +Xitβ + γ1OJSit−1 ∗Rt + γ2OJSit−1 + γ3Rt + εit , (3.18)
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Table 3.4 shows the results. Firstly, recessions reduce job-to-job transitions, increase employment
to unemployment transitions, and slightly increase employment to inactivity transitions, as documented
in the previous subsection. If the worker is searching in a recession, however, the job-to-job
transition probability falls more and the employment to unemployment transition increases more.
Similar results emerge when splitting the transitions by reason. Relative to those searching out
of a recession, those who are searching on the job in a recession are more likely to quit into
unemployment and less likely to quit to a new job. Those who are searching on the job in a
recession are also more likely to be sacked and move into unemployment, and less likely to move
into new employment, although the last coefficient is imprecisely estimated.
All Voluntary Involuntary
j j eu en j j eu en j j eu en
OJS .1095∗∗ .0465∗∗ .0059∗∗ . 0602∗∗ .0146∗∗ .0038∗∗ .0223∗∗ .0241∗∗ .0032∗∗
(.0016) (.0011) (.0014) (.0010) (.0006) (.0009) (.0006) (.0008) (.0006)
R -.0038∗∗ .0034∗∗ .0003 -.0024∗∗ .0001 .0009 .0006 .0041∗∗ .0009∗∗
(.0006) (.0004) (.0005) (.0004) (.0002) (.0004) (.0146) (.0003) (.0002)
OJS∗R-.0148∗∗ .0155∗∗ -.0052∗ -.0160∗∗ .0040∗∗ -.0036∗ -.0007 .0184∗∗ -.0020
(.0027) (.0019) (.0024) (.0018) (.0011) (.0019) (.0011) (.0014) (.0011)
N 323 318 320 318 315 318 315 316 315
(thous.)
TABLE 3.4: On-the-job search and separations during a recession.
Each regression includes controls for sex, age, job tenure, skill (two types) and time. Standard errors in parentheses.
Recessionary period is 2008Q2 - 2009Q2, and the non-recessionary period is 2006Q2 - 2007Q2 and 2010Q2 -
2011Q2. *, ** indicate statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
These results argue that job-to-job transitions and employment to unemployment transitions
are related through the job finding rate. More search prior to an employment to unemployment
transition suggests that the lack of job finding, in part, resulted in the employment to unemployment
transition. As job finding falls in recessions, those workers who were searching prior to the job
finishing, are more likely to experience an unemployment spell.
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3.5.2 Other stories
While I have presented a story that reductions in the job finding rate can contribute to the
increase in the ins of unemployment during recessions, inferring causality without the aid of a
model would be incorrect.
One possible reason for the drop in job finding of potential job-to-job transitions could be due
to differences in the type of layoff during recessions and expansions. If layoffs are more likely
to be unforeseen in recessions, workers are more likely to experience unemployment, not just
because of the drop in job finding, but because workers have less time to find new employment
whilst still employed. This mechanism is present in Garibaldi (2004). He shows that, in a model
of advance notice, in the style of Pissarides (2000), firms are more likely to opt for fixed firing
costs in recessions as opposed to providing advance notice. This is due to the reduced job finding
rate in recessions, increasing the likelihood that the firm must pay the worker for the entire length
of notice.
It may also be the case that workers who have separated in recessions are unobservably
different than those have separated in expansions. If those who separate in expansions are better
at finding jobs than those who separate in recessions, this will give rise to procyclical job-to-job
transitions conditional on separation. Ahn and Hamilton (2016) argues that unobserved heterogeneity
is a particularly important feature of business cycles.
3.5.3 Empirical
Understanding the driving forces behind the fluctuations in unemployment has become a
controversial issue. Do movements out of unemployment or into unemployment drive unemployment
dynamics? Darby et al. (1986) wrote in their title “... The Ins Win" - the ins drive unemployment
fluctuations. Contrary to this, Shimer (2012) argues that the outs win. In some sense both of these
conclusions could be true, if the outs of unemployment in fact describe the overall job finding
probability (the terms ‘outs’ and ‘job finding’ are often used interchangeably). To understand this,
I will very briefly discuss the methodology pioneered by Shimer (2012). In his framework he
developed novel methods to estimate the ins and outs of unemployment using aggregate data.19
19There is a vast number of studies that attempt to understand the dynamics of unemployment in a two state
framework. These include Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008), Elsby et al. (2009), Elsby et al. (2010, 2013) and Smith
(2012)
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He shows that the evolution of unemployment can be described as
ut = (1−Ft−1)ut−1 +ust , (3.19)
where F is the probability of finding a job and us is the percentage of the labour force who are in
short term unemployment. The short term unemployed proxy the ins of unemployment. He finds
that the ins of unemployment are much less important than the outs. Using a similar technique,
Elsby et al. (2013) analyse the ins and outs of unemployment for thirteen OECD countries.20 They
find that the ins of unemployment in some countries contribute more to unemployment variation
than the outs.
The results of this paper show that the fluctuations in the percentage of short term unemployed,
the ins, are impacted by fluctuations in the job finding probability. This is because, during
recessions, the reductions in the job finding probability drives an increased number of the employed
and inactive to transition into unemployment following job separation or labour force entry and
inflate the impact of the ins. In other words, the ins are important, not just because of an increase
in layoffs during a recession, but also because of a reduction in the job finding probability of
potential job-to-job and inactivity to employment movers.
The analysis in this paper is superior to preceding literature that has decomposed the employment
to unemployment transition for four main reasons. First, I have shown direct evidence using on
the job search in the UK, that search increases significantly before workers quit their job and
move to a new job, but also to move to unemployment. And I have shown that the rationale
for the increased search is consistent across these two destinations of the quit. Second, I have
disaggregated separations into layoffs and voluntary separations. This has allowed me to account
for compositional changes in the reason for separation, but also to assess the individual role that
layoffs play in the story of unemployment dynamics. Third, I have studied the problem in a
three state world, and noted that transitions into the labour force are susceptible to fluctuations
in job finding in a similar manner as separations, showing that overall entry into the labour
market changes very little over the business cycle, but that job finding conditional on entry
changes considerably. Finally, I have conducted the analysis out of steady-state and provided
significant evidence that these results are not driven by compositional shifts in demographic or
job characteristics.
20They extend Shimer’s analysis to assess the dynamics of the ins and outs of unemployment out of steady state.
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3.5.4 Theory
In the standard model of on-the-job search, workers switch employers if they find a new
employer who offers a sufficiently high wage.21 Once they have found an employer who is
willing to offer a sufficiently high wage they will separate and make the transition. Evidence
from the SIPP suggests that approximately a third of job-to-job transitions are due to a worker
“quitting to take up a new job”, and that a non-trivial fraction of job-to-job transitions actually
proceed involuntary, firm driven, separations. Ahn and Shao (2017) document that the intensity of
on-the-job search increased during the Great Recession as workers insured themselves against the
increased probability of losing a job.22 This evidence suggests that job-to-job transitions do not
occur only as a means to increase wages, but also through an inadequate relationship breaking and
the worker finding a job quickly enough to avoid a spell of unemployment. This paper pushes for
a bigger emphasis in modelling the job-to-job transition as not just a method to climb the waged
job-ladder, but also through a mechanism to allow a worker to escape a spell of unemployment
following the worker-firm match dissolution.23
Krusell et al. (2017) build a model of the labour market that includes transitions across the
three labour market states. Their model predicts countercyclical inactivity to unemployment
transitions. The reason is precisely because of procyclical job finding: During good times the
increase in job opportunity arrival rates implies that marginal N workers are more likely to receive
offers that take them into E, thus decreasing the flow of these workers into U. In this paper, I have
decomposed inactivity to unemployment flows, to capture this feature.
3.6 Conclusion
Recent worker flows analyses have studied the variations in transitions between employment,
unemployment and inactivity, in order to understand the cyclical nature of unemployment. In
21See Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
22Krause and Lubik (2010) have shown that procyclical on-the-job search can help search models replicate the
observed volatility of unemployment and vacancies (Shimer (2005a)).
23An example of a model that shows that a fall in job finding can result in an increase in separations into
unemployment is shown in Nagypal (2005). Workers lose their job when the match hits a lower threshold, but before
this threshold is reached, search much harder to avoid unemployment spells. She shows that, unlike the standard job
ladder model, this model is able to capture the extent of job-to-job transitions. This mechanism can also help models
predict job-to-job transitions with wage cuts. See Jolivet et al. (2006) and Tjaden and Wellschmeid (2014) for an
adaptation of the standard model to include this observation. The setup is that workers can make three transitions:
(i) a shock that forces the individual into unemployment, (ii) on-the-job search that gives the individual the option of
making a job-to-job transition, and (iii) another shock that forces a worker to make a job-to-job transition independent
of whether the wage increases or decreases. The intuition of (iii) is often described as a notice shock.
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this paper, I argue that analysing the ins and outs of unemployment is not necessarily informative
for understanding the relative contributions of job finding and job separations. To address this, I
decompose the ins of unemployment into distinct job separation/labour force entry and job finding
components and assess their cyclical dynamics separately, where I importantly take into account
the different reasons for separations. I find that changes in the job finding probability of potential
job-to-job transitions, is at least as important as layoffs in driving the increase in employment
to unemployment transitions during recessions, while procyclical quits play a moderating role in
recessions.
Finally, I provide evidence using information regarding on the job search in the UK, that
employment to unemployment transitions and job-to-job transitions are intimately related through
the ability to find jobs. Workers increase search incidence before separating from their jobs for
any reason - some employment to unemployment transitions would have instead resulted in a job
switch if they had been lucky enough to line up a new job before the separation occurred.
Chapter 4
The ins and outs of the gender unemployment gap in the OECD
Note: This paper is joint work with Reamonn Lydon. He has agreed that this paper represents
a significant contribution on my part and can appear in this thesis. The views expressed in this
paper are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Central Bank of
Ireland or the ESCB.
4.1 Introduction
Why do recessions impact males and females differently? This question drew a lot of attention
in the media in the US following the Great Recession, as the unemployment rate rose significantly
more for males over females.1 A stronger increase in male unemployment is not unique to
the Great Recession in the US and, in fact, similar patterns, but to varying extents, seem to be
present in many other developed economies.2 For example, over the last 4 decades, for Australia,
Denmark, France, Spain and the US, the variance of the percentage change in unemployment is
over twice as large for males than for females, but only slightly larger for Japan and New Zealand
(see Table 4.1).
The disparity in unemployment dynamics between genders may be due to two forces, differences
in the variations of the flows into unemployment (variations in the inflow gap), or differences in the
variations of the flows out of unemployment (variations in the outflow gap). Understanding which
of these forces is most important, can help highlight the underlying causes for the asymmetric
impact that recessions have by gender, and may inform future gender-based analysis of labour
markets and policy making. In this paper, we quantify the role of both of these forces for a large
group of countries over a long period using publicly available data.
We use harmonised data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) to estimate the ins and outs of unemployment by gender for 18 countries over the last
1See articles from the Economist and The New York Times.
2A large amount of studies, predominantly in the US and UK, have noted that the male unemployment rate is
significantly more volatile than the female unemployment rate. See Clark (1980), Blank (1989), Peiro (2012), Hoynes
(2012), Razzu and Singleton (2016) and Albanesi and Sahin (2018) for examples.
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) 2.97 1.64 1.93 2.87 2.17 1.39 1.58 1.71 1.27








) 0.96 1.60 1.24 1.58 1.91 2.30 1.37 1.75 2.10
TABLE 4.1: Variance of male unemployment change relative to female unemployment change.
Source: OECD (2018b). Annual data over the last 4 decades. See Table 4.2 for the exact periods.
4 decades or so. Using the unemployment flows, we perform a non-steady-state decomposition
of unemployment variation for both genders and for variations in the gender unemployment rate
gap (the percentage change in the male unemployment rate minus the percentage change in the
female unemployment rate). The results indicate that for all countries, the dynamics of the gender
unemployment gap can be predominantly explained by variations in the inflow gap. To understand
why male unemployment rates tend to rise proportionately more in recessions, therefore, one
must pay close attention to why the percentage increase in the male inflow rate is greater than
the percentage increase in female inflow rate. We provide evidence that gender composition by
sector is a prominent explanation for this result. There has been a tendency to treat unemployment
inflows, or separations, as irrelevant in the US following the influential work of Hall (2005) and
Shimer (2012). Yet, when concerning the dynamics of the gender unemployment gap, in fact the
opposite is true for all countries under study.
In Section 4.2, we outline the derivation of the aggregate unemployment flows using data on
unemployment duration from the OECD. When constructing unemployment flows using OECD
data following Shimer (2012), the estimates can become very noisy for countries with slow
moving labour markets, especially when splitting the data by gender. To rectify this issue, following
Elsby et al. (2013), we make use of all the available data on unemployment duration provided by
the OECD, to create a weighted average of derived flow rates.3 The gender unemployment flows
show interesting commonalities by country. For all countries, apart from Germany and Norway,
inflows into unemployment are on average larger for females than for males, but the relative size
of the outflows are varied. In all English speaking countries, females experience higher rates of
movements out of unemployment compared to males. This is not true, however, for Continental
European and Nordic countries with some experiencing faster movements out of unemployment
for women and some for men. On average, among all countries, females have higher transition
3The OECD provides information on the stocks of the unemployed with duration of less than one, three, six and
twelve months.
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rates into and out of unemployment. Concerning changes in the unemployment flows between
2007 and 2009, for all countries apart from France, the percentage increase in the unemployment
inflow is larger for males than for females, but the percentage fall in the unemployment outflow
does not follow a similar clear pattern.
Using the estimated flows, we perform a non-steady-state variance decomposition of unemployment
variation by gender, which allows us to decompose variations in the gender unemployment gap.
In line with Elsby et al. (2013), who focus on all workers, we find that the relative contributions
of the ins and outs differ markedly between countries. For example, for Netherlands and Italy,
the outs of unemployment for males drive 14% and 76% of unemployment variation, respectively.
The ins (outs) of unemployment contribute more (less) to unemployment variation for males than
for females for two thirds of the sample. The only countries that clearly depart from this pattern
are either Continental European or Nordic. As an example of how different the picture can be
between genders, in the UK, the inflow:outflow contribution for males and females is 43:57 and
83:21, respectively - for males, the ins and outs are equally important, while for females the outs
of unemployment drive the vast majority of unemployment dynamics. The results indicate that
male and female unemployment dynamics can be very different.
Despite the fact that we find different contributions of ins and outs for the variation in unemployment
of males and females between different countries, when we look at the dynamics of the gender
unemployment gap a clear and consistent pattern emerges between all countries in our sample.
Variations in the inflow gap, drives the majority of the dynamics of the gender unemployment gap.
In fact, more than 80% of dynamics of the gender unemployment gap is explained by variations in
the inflow gap for 14 of the 18 countries. Focusing on the Great Recession, the percentage rise in
unemployment relative to 2007 is larger for males than for females for almost all countries. Using
the decomposition framework, we show graphically, that the rise in the gender unemployment gap
is predominantly due to a larger increase in inflows for males than for females for most countries.
In Section 4.5 we take a step back and ask what the underlying story is behind these results.
We focus on the role of the male-female sector composition, asking, are male dominated sectors
hit harder in recessions relative to female dominated sectors? To be precise, we ask the following
question: What is the relationship between the male sector share, and the cyclicality of that sectors
output? We compile sector specific data from the OECD (and BLS for the US) on output and
sectoral composition, and find a consistent fact for all countries. There is a positive relationship
between the male sector share and the correlation of sector output with overall output. This fact
provides a candidate explanation for the results documented in this paper. Males tend to sort into
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sectors that are more susceptible to economic swings, which in turn increases the average precarity
of male jobs in recessions relative to females.
A large body of work has focused on understanding the changes in the ins and outs of unemployment
from the perspective a representative worker.4 Despite a lot of media attention regarding changes
in the disparity in gender unemployment during the Great Recession, the literature is relatively
sparse when it comes to the ins and outs of unemployment by gender.5 Albanesi and Sahin
(2018) study changes in the gender unemployment gap in the US. They show that (among other
things) approximately half of the increase in the gender unemployment gap during recessions
can be attributed to differences in industry composition by gender. This final observation clearly
squares well the results described in the previous paragraph, albeit applied to a much larger set of
countries.
Razzu and Singleton (2016) study the dynamics of UK and US unemployment using a flows
based approach. They show that differences in the variations of transitions at the participation
margin explain a non negligible proportion of the dynamics of the unemployment gap. In this
paper, we only consider a two-state world which disallows us to asses differing participation
decisions. Analysing a two-state world, however, allows for the study of a larger group of
countries over a longer period, using harmonised OECD data. We also show in Section 4.6,
using data on flows at the participation margin from a sub-sample of countries in this study, that
avoiding non-participation is not likely to significantly affect the results. Another related study
is Koutentakis (2015), who estimates the ins and outs of unemployment for ten OECD countries
by gender in a similar manner as we do in this paper.6 He does not focus on the dynamics of
unemployment over the business cycle, but instead asks why the unemployment rate is greater
for females than males in some countries. He argues that the steady-state female relative to male
unemployment rate is positive for some countries predominantly because of larger unemployment
inflows for females. Azmat et al. (2006), however, argues that both employment to unemployment
and unemployment to employment transitions are important in explaining differences in unemployment
rate across countries in the OECD, especially the Mediterranean countries. While this is very
important, it does not say anything with regards to the origins of the asymmetric impact that
recessions have by gender, to which this study is focused.
4Perry (1972b), Darby et al. (1985), Darby et al. (1986), Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), Hall (2005), Bachmann
(2005), Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008), Nagypal (2008), Elsby et al. (2009), Elsby et al. (2010), Fujita and Ramey
(2009), Elsby et al. (2011), Smith (2012), Shimer (2012), Gomes (2012) and Chapter 3 to name a few.
5There is clearly a vast literature studying gender disparities in other labour market variables, such as the wages
and hours worked, and how these vary over time and between countries. See Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008, 2014,
2016) for a review of and examples of the fantastic work in this area.
6Although he does not make use of all available data on unemployment durations.
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We provide a discussion of any inaccuracies with the analysis. In particular, the baseline
decomposition measures the contribution of the underlying flows to logarithmic deviations in
the unemployment gap. A modest change to the decomposition method allows us to assess
non-logarithmic deviations in the unemployment gap. We find that the two decompositions provide
qualitatively similar results. We also provide evidence that ignoring the participation margin is
unlikely to significantly affect the conclusions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the derivation of the
flow rates. Section 4.3 describes the non-steady-state variance decomposition of unemployment
and the gender unemployment gap, and Section 4.4 describes the results. Section 4.5 shows that a
candidate explanation for differing dynamics of male and female unemployment is due to sector
composition. Section 4.6 provides presents robustness tests and a discussion. Finally, Section 4.7
concludes.
4.2 Estimating unemployment flows with aggregate data
In this section we outline the derivation of the unemployment flows following Elsby et al.
(2013). We focus on 18 OECD countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, and the United States, over all the available data. The data covers the last 4
decades or so, ending in 2018 for all countries (see Table 4.2 for the start year for each country).
The derivation makes use of two different pieces of information. (i) annual unemployment
rates, OECD (2018b), and (ii) the annual percentage of the unemployed with less than d months of
unemployment duration, given as u<dt , OECD (2018c). To begin, consider the following two-state
world of unemployment variation:
u̇t = st(1−ut)− ftut , (4.1)
where ut is the unemployment rate at time t, u̇t is the change in the unemployment rate over one
month at time t, st is the monthly unemployment inflow rate from employment at time t, and ft is
the monthly unemployment outflow rate into employment at time t. Solving (4.1) forward twelve







+ e−12(st+ ft)ut−12. (4.2)
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This describes a recursive relationship between unemployment now and unemployment one year
ago. Notice that, 1− e−12(st+ ft) converges to one as the flow rates increase, which results in the
unemployment rate at time t approaching steady-state.7 This is because the speed of convergence
to the limiting distribution of the Markov process is faster the larger the joint level of flow rates.
Using information provided by the OECD on what percentage of the unemployed have been
in unemployment for less than one month, u<1t , we can also write a recursive relationship of
unemployment as:
ut+1−ut = u<1t+1−Ftut , (4.3)
where Ft is the monthly outflow probability. Rearranging, the monthly unemployment outflow





Assuming that workers leave and enter unemployment following a Poisson point process, the
monthly unemployment outflow rate is:
ft =−ln(1−Ft). (4.5)
Finally, using (C.16), st can also be solved for numerically.
The problem with estimating unemployment flows using the OECD data in this manner, as
noted by Elsby et al. (2013), is that for many countries in the sample, few workers are in their
first month of unemployment at any one point in time. Or u<1t can be very small. This can
result in noisy estimates of the flow rates for countries with slow moving labour markets. This is
especially problematic when splitting the flows by gender as we do in this paper, which reduces
the sample sizes. To counteract this, we follow Elsby et al. (2013) and use all the available data on
unemployment duration provided by the OECD. See Section C.3 for further information regarding
the full estimation process.
4.2.1 The unemployment flows by gender
Figure 4.1 shows the unemployment rates over time for each country. There has been a clear
convergence in unemployment rates for Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands and Spain, during the
end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty first centuries. The country that stands out with
regards to the experience during the Great Recession by gender is Ireland. The unemployment
rate rose to 18% for males and 13% for females. These disparities in unemployment dynamics are
7See Section C.4 for further details.
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our focus in this paper. Which flow is driving these differences in labour market experience by
gender over time?
Figure 4.2 shows the estimated inflow and outflow rates for each country. In Table 4.2, we
present the main points in order for ease of exposition. Table 4.2 shows the average estimated
inflow and outflow rates by gender for all the countries under consideration. The magnitudes are
very similar to the estimated unemployment flows, not by gender, in Elsby et al. (2013). In line
with the findings of Koutentakis (2015), we find that for almost all countries, apart from Germany
and Norway, inflows into unemployment are on average larger for females than for males. We do
not observe such a clear pattern for the outflows - in Spain, the outflow is on average 28% larger
for males than for females and in Ireland, the outflow is on average 37% lower for males than for
females. Notice that the for English speaking countries and Japan, there are faster movements for
females relative to males in both directions, but that for Continental Europe and Nordic economies
the picture is varied. In general, on average, females experience both faster movements into
unemployment and faster movements out of unemployment. This an interesting result, but one
should not take this to mean that, on average, females are fired at a faster rate than males. There
are other reasons as to why workers move into unemployment. Workers may enter the labour
force or voluntarily leave their employer. We cannot disentangle between these different types of
inflows using the OECD data.
On the right side of Table 4.2, we report the average annual percentage change in the unemployment
flows between 2007 and 2009, in order to gauge which flows responded more during the Great
Recession. We find stark differences between males and females. For all countries, apart from
France, the percentage increase in the inflow was larger for males than for females. This is
epitomised by Ireland, where males experienced a 46 percentage point (pp) larger increase in the
unemployment inflow relative to females. In fact, on average, the change in the inflow during the
most recent recession was actually slightly negative for females, but large and positive for males.
With regards to outflows, however, we do not observe a common pattern. The fall in outflows
was larger for ten out of the eighteen countries for females and on average the difference in the
percentage changes in the outflows is close to zero. Table 4.2 is suggestive evidence that variations
in the inflows into unemployment play a larger role for male unemployment dynamics relative to
female unemployment dynamics, and is perhaps the main driver behind different variations in the
unemployment gap between countries. These results square well with Hoynes (2012), who shows
that males experienced larger increases in the rates of layoff during the Great Recession in the
US. In the next section, we formally decompose the dynamics of the gender unemployment gap
into components attributed to differences in the variations of the flows into unemployment, and to
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In this section we outline how it is possible to decompose the non-steady-state variations of
unemployment into components attributed to variations in the two unemployment flows, following
Elsby et al. (2013). By taking a log-linear approximation of (C.16), the non-steady-state logarithmic








+ εt , (4.6)
where λ =(1−e−12(st+ ft)). (4.6) describes a recursive relationship regarding variations in logarithmic
unemployment out of steady-state. Notice that, as λ converges to one, the second term within
the braces converges to zero and (4.6) collapses to its steady-state counterpart. The steady-state
approximation is used in many papers including Elsby et al. (2009) and Fujita and Ramey (2009).
Why do we need a non-steady-state decomposition here? The reason is two-fold. First, assuming
that countries with slow flows into and out of unemployment, like many in the sample in this paper,
are in steady-state, results in large errors from the decomposition. Second, because unemployment
flows are, in general, slightly larger for females than males, the convergence to steady-state
should be faster for females and so the errors for males are likely to be larger. In Section C.5
we show that both of these assertions are broadly true in the OECD data. To draw comparisons of
unemployment dynamics between genders across many countries, therefore, requires a decomposition
out of steady-state. Using (4.6), the following measures describing the percentage contributions




































C0t−12 with C00 = ∆ln(u0).
Cst and C ft describe the contributions of the contemporaneous and past variations of the ins
and outs of unemployment to unemployment variation, respectively. C0 describes deviations
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FIGURE 4.2: The percentage estimated monthly inflow and outflow rates by gender across the
OECD
Note: Unemployment outflows on the left hand axis. Unemployment inflows on the right hand
axis. Axes are in logarithmic scales.
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FIGURE 4.2: The percentage estimated monthly inflow and outflow rates by gender across the
OECD continued
Note: Unemployment outflows on the left hand axis. Unemployment inflows on the right hand
axis. Axes are in logarithmic scales.
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FIGURE 4.2: The percentage estimated monthly inflow and outflow rates by gender across the
OECD continued
Note: Unemployment outflows on the left hand axis. Unemployment inflows on the right hand
axis. Axes are in logarithmic scales.
Source: Author calculations based on data compiled from OECD (2018b) and OECD (2018c).
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of the contemporaneous and past deviations in the ins and outs of unemployment to unemployment
variation, respectively. β0 describes the percentage contribution of initial deviations to unemployment
variation, which tends to zero as the length of time increases. βε is the percent of unemployment
variation left unexplained.
To decompose the percentage variations in the gender unemployment gap, begin with the
gender unemployment gap as:
ln(ut)Gap = ln(uMt )− ln(uFt ). (4.8)
The deviations in the unemployment gap can, therefore, be written as:
∆ln(ut)Gap = ∆ln(uMt )−∆ln(uFt ). (4.9)
This gap reads, to a close approximation, the percentage change in the male unemployment
rate minus the percentage change in the female unemployment rate. It is a simple extension
to decompose the unemployment gap using the above methodology. For example, the percentage
contributions of differences in the proportionate variations in the ins, the inflow gap, to fluctuations













st . It is worth noting that this decomposition of the unemployment gap
pertains to differences in the percentage deviations in unemployment between genders. That is,
if the male unemployment rate rose from 0.05 to 0.0505, and the female unemployment rate rose
from 0.1 to 0.11, 4ln(ut)Gap = 0. In Section 4.6, we present a decomposition and results for
deviations in unemployment rates as opposed to logarithmic deviations in unemployment rates,
and show that the results remain qualitatively similar. In the next section, we present the results
of the decomposition for all eighteen countries over the last 4 decades or so.
4.4 Results
Table 4.3 shows the results for the decomposition of unemployment rate variation by gender
and of the gender unemployment gap. For clarification on interpretation, for male unemployment
in Australia, the results read: variations in the inflows contribute to 37% of unemployment variation,
variations in the outflows contribute to 66% of unemployment variation, 0% of unemployment
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variation can be attributed to initial deviations from steady-state, and changes in the error contribute
to -2% of the variations in the unemployment rate. In line with Elsby et al. (2013), the first
observation is that countries in the OECD experience very different labour market dynamics. For
example, concentrating on males, for Netherlands and Italy, the outs of unemployment drive 14%
and 76% of unemployment variation, respectively. A complete understanding of unemployment
dynamics across countries, therefore, requires that we pay close attention to both the unemployment
outflow and the unemployment inflow.
We can see clear differences in how different countries’ labour markets operate, but what
about differences between genders within countries? The column β Ms -β
F
s , shows the male relative
to female contributions of the ins to unemployment variation.8 For two thirds of the countries,
variations in the ins of unemployment contribute more to male unemployment variation than to
female unemployment variation. Two economies that clearly divert from this trend are Japan and
Luxembourg - in the latter, the ins contribute to 31% and 89% of male and female unemployment
variation, respectively. On average, the ins of unemployment contribute 6% more to male unemployment
variation than to female unemployment variation. As an example of how different the picture can
be between genders, for the UK, the inflow:outflow contribution split to unemployment variation
for males and females, respectively, is 57:43 and 21:83. These are drastically different. For males,
inflows and outflows are equally important, and for females, changes in the outflows drive the
vast majority of unemployment dynamics. There is clear heterogeneity in the ins and outs of
unemployment between genders and by country.
The main purpose of this paper is to understand which flows contribute more to the dynamics
of the unemployment gap, to which we now turn. Again, the gap that we refer to here is,
differences in the logarithmic deviations in the unemployment rates between males and females.
To be clear on interpretation, β Gapf for Australia reads, variations in the the outflow gap (differences
in the variations of the outflows between gender) contribute to 24% of the variations in the
unemployment gap. Notice that, for all countries, the contribution of variations in the inflow gap
is greater than 50%. In fact, more than 80% of dynamics of the unemployment gap is explained by
variations in the inflow gap for 14 of the 18 countries.9 This is a remarkable result. When trying to
understand why male and female unemployment rates change disproportionately over the cycle,
one generally need only understand why the inflow is more volatile for one gender over the other.
8Notice that this would be the negative of the relative outflow measure when initial deviations from steady-state
and the error play no role.
9The negative values associated with contributions of variations in the outflow gap, means that if the outs behaved
identically for males and females, then the unemployment gap would be more volatile.
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4.4.1 Focus on Recessions
Given the period of data, containing many downturns in some countries, the results do not
necessarily hold when looking at any single sub-period. Using the framework described in Section
4.3, we can focus in on sub periods in the data, to see which of the flows contributed to any
disproportionate changes in the unemployment rates for males and females during salient time
periods. Figure 4.3 shows graphical analysis of the 1990-1995 and 2007-2012 periods using the
framework described in Section 4.3. The solid lines in Figure 4.3 show the change in the gender
unemployment gap relative to 1990 and 2007 for each country. More precisely, the solid line
shows, the percentage change in the unemployment rate for males minus the percentage change in
the unemployment rate for females relative to 1990 and 2007. A reading of 20, for example, means
that the percentage increase in the male unemployment rate was 20 pp larger than the percentage
increase in the female unemployment rate. The long dashed line shows the contribution to the
unemployment gap of variations of the inflow gap, or Cst , and the short dashed line shows the
contribution to the unemployment gap of variations of the outflow gap, or C f t . The two dashed
lines should approximately sum to the solid line since the contributions of initial deviations and
the errors are in general small.
Looking at the solid line in Figure 4.3, for the majority of countries, we can see that the
unemployment rate rose proportionately more for males than for females during the 1991 recession
and the Great Recession. There is clear heterogeneity in the strength of the rise by country,
however. In Ireland and Spain, the percentage rise in the male unemployment rate was almost 60
pp larger for males than for females in the Great Recession. For Japan and France, however, the
proportionate difference in the rise between males and females was relatively small in the Great
Recession.
Moving to the contributions, the larger rise in the ins for males is the main explanation for the
rise in the gender unemployment gap during the 1991 recession and the Great Recession for most
countries. Interestingly, the contribution of the outs is often negative, as we saw in general in the
previous subsection. This means that, if the outflows for males followed the same pattern as the
outflows for females, all else the same, then the rise in the gender unemployment gap during the
1991 recession and Great Recession would have been larger.10
10These results square well with Hoynes (2012) who shows that the layoff rate rose more for males than for females




























FIGURE 4.3: The contributions of changes in the unemployment flows to changes in the
unemployment gap during the 1990-1995 and 2007-2012 periods
Note: The bold line represents the cumulative change in the unemployment gap, ∆ln(ut)Gap = ∆ln(uMt )−∆ln(uFt ),
relative to 1990 (top) and 2007 (bottom). The long dashed line shows the contributions of changes in the inflow gap
to changes in the cumulative unemployment gap. The short dashed line shows the contributions of changes in the
outflow gap to changes in the unemployment gap.




























FIGURE 4.3: The contributions of changes in the unemployment flows to changes in the
unemployment gap during the 1990-1995 and 2007-2012 periods continued
Note: The bold line represents the cumulative change in the unemployment gap, ∆ln(ut)Gap = ∆ln(uMt )−∆ln(uFt ),
relative to 1990 (top) and 2007 (bottom). The long dashed line shows the contributions of changes in the inflow gap
to changes in the cumulative unemployment gap. The short dashed line shows the contributions of changes in the
outflow gap to changes in the unemployment gap.




























FIGURE 4.3: The contributions of changes in the unemployment flows to changes in the
unemployment gap during the 1990-1995 and 2007-2012 periods continued
Note: The bold line represents the cumulative change in the unemployment gap, ∆ln(ut)Gap = ∆ln(uMt )−∆ln(uFt ),
relative to 1990 (top) and 2007 (bottom). The long dashed line shows the contributions of changes in the inflow gap
to changes in the cumulative unemployment gap. The short dashed line shows the contributions of changes in the
outflow gap to changes in the unemployment gap.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.5 Towards understanding the underlying mechanism
We have shown that the cyclical changes in the gender unemployment gap appear to be
predominantly, in a lot of cases entirely, explained by differing volatilities of flows into unemployment.
What is the underlying explanation for this result? In this section we document a key consistent
fact across all countries: There is a positive relationship between the share of males in a sector,
and the correlation of that sectors output with aggregate output.
In the US Albanesi and Sahin (2018) show that if you assign the male industry composition to
the female labour force, then the rise in the gender unemployment gap during recessions would fall
by about a half. That is, males tend to be in jobs that are more susceptible to economic swings than
females. This suggests that output in male dominated sectors shows more cyclicality than output
in female dominated sectors. To assess whether this fact is true for all countries, we compile data
from the OECD on male-female sector shares, a time series of output in those sectors, and output
in the aggregate.11
We detrend the output data using a Hodrick Prescott filter on quarterly data. We then correlate
the cyclical components of sector and aggregate output, and plot these against the percentage
of males by sector. Figure 4.5 shows the results of this exercise, where we have grouped all
Continental European countries into one figure, and English speaking countries and South Korea
into another. We find a clear positive relationship between these two measures. A regression of
the correlation of sector output with overall output on the male sector share with country fixed
effects, reveals a coefficient of 0.69 with a standard error of 0.11 - a 1 percentage point increase in
the share of males in a sector is associated with a 0.69 percentage point increase in the correlation
of a sectors output with overall output.
Figure 4.6 shows the the figure for the UK and US, with the points representing the sectors
named. Again, we see a clear positive association between the two measures.12 Output in
male dominated sectors, such as Construction and Manufacturing, show a strong correlation with
aggregate output. Whereas output in female dominated sectors, such as health care and education,
show a weaker correlation with aggregate output over the cycle. These observations suggests
an underlying story for the results on the gender unemployment gap for all countries that are
documented in this paper, and reaffirms the sector story made by Albanesi and Sahin (2018) in
11Sectors that we adopt in the OECD data are, Agriculture, forestry and fishing; Industry; Manufacturing;
Construction; Distribution, trade, accommodation and food services; IT and communications; Finance and insurance;
Real estate; Scientific and administration; Public admin, health and education.
12In the Appendix we show a clear positive association for almost all countries included in Figure 4.5.
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.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Male sector share
Anglo Saxon and South Korea
FIGURE 4.5: Relationship between male share and the correlation of sector output with overall
output for Continental European (top), and English speaking and South Korea (bottom).
Note: Countries included in the top figure are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. Countries included in the bottom figure
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.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Male sector share
UK
Accommodation and food services
Arts, entertainment and recreation
Education services
Finance and insurance
Health care and social assistance
Management of companies and enterprises
Professional, scientific, and technical services
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.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Male sector share
US
FIGURE 4.6: Relationship between male share and the correlation of sector output with overall
output for UK (top), and US (bottom).
Note: Excluded Agricultural sector.
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the US: males are hired into sectors that are more susceptible to economic swings, which in turn
means the average precarity of male jobs falls more in recessions relative to females.
4.6 Further discussion and robustness
The preceding sections have demonstrated that the differing cyclicality of the inflow between
males and females is the main explanation for the dynamics of the unemployment gap, and that
one of the underlying explanations for this is the male-female composition by sector. In this
section, we discuss whether any simplifications from the analysis may affect these results, and
provide recent related statistics regarding the 2020 crisis.
Logarithmic vs non-logarithmic (levels) decomposition
The baseline decomposition is one of differences in logarithmic deviations in the unemployment
rates by sex. What if we were instead interested in differences in deviations in the unemployment
rates by sex. We can assess whether an analysis of levels results in any clear differences using a
slight modification of the decomposition in Section 4.3. We write down changes in the unemployment
rate as
∆ut = (1− e−12(st+ ft))∆u∗t + e−12(st+ ft)∆ut−12 + εt . (4.11)
As with the logarithmic decomposition, changes are equal to a distributed lag of changes in the
steady state level, and also an initial condition. Notice that







where uGapt = uMt − uFt . This, therefore, allows us to determine the contributions of deviations
in inflow gap and outflow gap to changes in unemployment gap.13 Table C.11 shows the results
using this decomposition compared with the logarithmic decomposition described in Section 4.3.
The results are very similar.
The participation entry margin
The analysis in this paper has been conducted from a two state perspective, employment
and unemployment. Elsby et al. (2015) show that flows at the participation margin, into and
out of inactivity, are important for understanding the overall dynamics of unemployment. It is
13We provide further mathematical details in Section C.4.
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plausible, therefore, that the results documented previously are due to flows between participation
and non-participation.
In Section 4.2, the main piece of information used to estimate the unemployment flows is
unemployment by duration, in particular the percent of the labour force who have been unemployed
for less than one month. This stock contains workers who have just left their job and moved
into unemployment, but also workers who have just entered the labour force and moved into
unemployment. Taking into account flows into and out of the labour force, we can write the



























where λ i jt represents the monthly transition probability from state i to state j at time t, and e and n
refer to employment and inactivity rates at time t. The separation and job finding rates are inflated
by flows from inactivity. It is possible that some of the contributions of the inflows to the dynamics
of the unemployment gap, should be attributed to variations of transitions at the participation entry
margin.
Here we assess whether the percentage increase in the inactivity to unemployment rate during
recessions is stronger for males than for females for a select few countries. The reality of the added
worker effect would suggest the opposite (see recent work on the added worker effect in Mankart
and Oikonomou (2016)) - females are more likely to enter unemployment from inactivity during
recessions to mitigate the consequences of spousal job loss. This would mean that the contribution
of employment to unemployment transitions is actually downward biased.
We collect data on inactivity to unemployment transitions from Ireland, the UK and the US.
Figure 4.7 shows the log changes in the inactivity to unemployment transition probability from
2007 - 2012, relative to 2007, for each country. If the dynamics of the unemployment gap are
driven by differences in variations of the inactivity to unemployment transitions between genders
as opposed to employment to unemployment transitions, we would expect to find larger percentage
increases in inactivity to unemployment transitions for males over females. There is no clear










Ire                                    UK                                    US
dlogNU male
dlogNU female
FIGURE 4.7: The percentage change in the inactivity to unemployment probability between
2007-2012, relative to 2007.
Source: Data compiled from the Irish LFS and UK LFS, author calculations. US data taken from
BLS (2018).
Time aggregation
Using the OECD data, we are only able to estimate annual flows, a relatively low frequency.
Estimating flows with low frequency data may create issues of time aggregation - one may miss
many transitions between survey dates. Shimer (2012) shows, however, that the technique used for
estimating the inflow in this paper corrects for this bias. It is possible, however, that the outflow
measure misses some exits from unemployment. This is likely to be negligible for two reasons.
First, any biases will be significant if inflows back into unemployment are large. As we have seen
in Table 4.2, the inflows are very small and so the number of outflows that are missed is likely
small. Second, because we are focusing on differences between genders, any small biases will
affect both males and females in a similar way. It is likely, therefore, that the impact of time
aggregation is very small.
Cross country comparison
Because of the difference in available data, some countries in the sample have longer periods,
and some short. Unemployment flows for the US can be estimated for 5 decades, and unemployment
flows for New Zealand can only be estimated for just over 3 decades. It is of interest to see if
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the results are similar when looking at a more recent period that is common to all, for example
2000-2018.14 Table C.12 shows the results for the entire period and the 2000-2018 period accompanied
with the ratio of unemployment flows between males and females. First, focusing on the unemployment
flows, the difference in the size of the inflows has reduced in recent times on average suggesting
a convergence in the trend of males and female outcomes in recent times (Albanesi and Sahin
(2018)). The contributions to changes in the unemployment gap, however, are very similar. The
results described in Section 4.4 are not driven by any one sub-period in the data and seem to persist
even when the average inflows between males and females converge.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper has assessed why the variance of unemployment is so markedly different between
genders in many labour markets. The disparity is due to either, differences in the variations of
flows into unemployment, or differences in variations of flows out of unemployment. Using
publicly available harmonised data from 18 OECD countries over the last 4 decades or so, we
have shown that the variations in the gender unemployment gap are mostly due to differences in
the variations of the inflows for males relative to females. In fact, more than 80% of dynamics
of the unemployment gap is explained by differences in the variations of the ins for 14 of the 18
countries. Using data on output by sector and male sector share, we have also found that sectors
that employ more males, seem to more susceptible to economic swings. Which is a consistent
result across all countries.
These results paint a clear and simple picture behind the dynamics of the gender unemployment
gap across countries in the OECD. Males tend to sort into sectors where output declines more in
recessions. This in turn increases the average precarity of a male’s job more than for a female.
Which increases unemployment inflows more for males then for females.
Sectoral composition, however, is undoubtedly not the only explanation behind why males
tend to experience greater increases in inflows during recessions. Avenues for future work should
be to uncover further asymmetric features behind male and female unemployment inflow dynamics.
14The OECD has gone to great lengths to harmonise the statistics, precisely so cross-country comparisons can be
made. In particular, for unemployment, the OECD have created a blanket criteria to assign a survey participant as
unemployed, precisely the information used in this paper.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis presents three essays, each related to aspects of labour market dynamics. Chapter
2 provides considerable evidence that workers can anticipate job loss in the UK labour market,
and respond by changing search behaviour to avoid unemployment. The chapter then proceeds
to develop a job ladder model where workers may receive information of impending job loss.
The model estimates reveal that between a half and two-thirds of workers have knowledge of
impending layoff, on average about three months in advance of unemployment. Counterfactuals
show that the ability to anticipate job loss provides sizeable welfare gains to workers, with the
most important behavioural change being to increase search. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 both study
questions related to unemployment dynamics using the flows approach. Chapter 3 argues that
to understand why the unemployment rate rises during recessions and falls during expansions,
incorporating job-to-job transitions is paramount for a full understanding of the role of changes
in job finding and changes in layoffs. Finally, Chapter 4 studies why variations in unemployment
rates are so markedly different between genders across a large group of countries over the last
four decades. The results reveal that larger rises in unemployment inflows for males is the main
driver. The chapter then proceeds to show that a candidate explanation for this result is gender
composition by sector: males tend to be in sectors that are more susceptible to economic swings,
which in turn increases the average precarity of male jobs more than females in recessions.
To focus on Chapter 2, more work is needed into understanding how workers change their
behaviour before job loss. Displacement is one of the most fundamental features of a well
functioning economy, that on average provides significant hardship to whomever it falls upon.
But not all workers fare so badly following layoff. Those who find work quickly, without even
transitioning into unemployment, seem to experience much smaller earnings losses in the short
and long run, as shown in Chapter 2. Policies devoted to promoting faster reallocation to new
employment may be extremely beneficial to workers, whilst maintaining labour market dynamism.
Studying these policy questions in a context where workers can anticipate unemployment seems
like a fruitful direction for further study.
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Appendix A
A.1 Further empirical details
Subjective elicitations
Here I provide more information regarding anticipatory behaviour using subjective elicitations
in the BHPS. In waves 2, 4, 6 and 8, workers are asked how likely they are to lose their job in
the next year. Possible answers are, Very Unlikely, Unlikely, Likely, and Very Likely. Table A.11
shows the proportions of each answer given for all workers and those who subsequently do lose
their job. Around 8% of individuals think they are likely or very likely to lose their job in the next
year. Inline with Figure 2.3, for workers who lose their job in the subsequent 12 months, more
high skill than low skill workers report that they are very likely to lose their job.
Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely
All employed
All 54.50 37.78 5.69 2.03
Low skill 53.16 38.72 6.10 2.02
High skill 55.93 36.78 5.25 2.04
Within 12 months of layoff
All 28.19 34.75 17.55 19.50
Low skill 31.31 34.09 17.51 17.09
High skill 23.65 35.71 17.61 23.03
TABLE A.11: Answer by percentages to job security question
Note: Question - in the next 12 months, how likely do you think it is that you will become unemployed? High skill is
defined as those who have more than A levels.
Source: Data from the BHPS.
How are these elicitations connected to actual job insecurity? While elicitations are clearly
subjective and likely imperfect, we can use these measures to assess whether workers have valid
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information of impending job loss, and to see whether workers who declare that their job is
insecure are also more likely to switch jobs involuntarily. To do so I run the following linear
probability model
yit = αi + γt +Xitβ +δUUit +δLLit +δV LV Lit + εit , (A.1)
where yit is either, an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the individual moves to unemployment
between periods t and t+1 and 0 if the worker remains at their employer, or taking the value 1 if
the individual moves to a new employer involuntarily between periods t and t+1 and 0 if the
worker remains at their employer. αi and γt are individual and time fixed effects, respectively. Xit
contains observables - a quartic in age. The variables of interest are whether a worker describes
the likelihood of losing their job in the next 12 months as, Unlikely (U), Likely (L), and Very
Likely (VL). The coefficients, should be interpreted as relative to saying that the likelihood of
your job terminating is Very Unlikely.
All Low skill High skill All Low skill High skill
eu eu eu j ji j ji j ji
δU .004∗∗ .005∗∗ .004∗∗ .002∗ .001 .005∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
δL .032∗∗ .033∗∗ .033∗∗ .024∗∗ .022∗∗ .028∗∗
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002)
δV L .163∗∗ .169∗∗ .160∗∗ .175∗∗ .170∗∗ .182∗∗
(.004) (.006) (.005) (.003) (.005) (.004)
N 126,766 61,861 64,905 125,799 61,365 64,434
TABLE A.12: Job security elicitations and outcomes
Note: The top left coefficient reads, those who report their job to be unlikely to end in the next twelve months are 0.4
percentage points more likely to lose their job in the next twelve months than those who report that their job is very
unlikely to end. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include a quartic polynomial in age, person dummies,
and time dummies as controls. High skill is defined as those who have more than A levels. *, ** indicate statistical
significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Data from the BHPS.
Table A.12 shows the results for both transitions and by education. Focusing on columns
1 to 3, workers subjective reading of their own job insecurity has important explanatory power.
The probability that a worker will move into unemployment for those who report that they are
very likely to lose their job is around 16 percentage points larger than those who report that their
job is very unlikely to end. Moving to columns 4 to 6, the probability that a worker will switch
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jobs involuntarily for those who report that they are very likely to lose their job is around 17.5
percentage points larger than those who report that their job is very unlikely to end.
These results provide two insights, firstly workers have clear private information of impending
job loss and respond by increasing the likelihood of switching a job involuntarily. Second,
ignoring involuntary job-to-job transitions will result in significantly underestimating the explanatory
power of a worker’s subjective reading of their own job insecurity.
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The costs of job loss and pre-layoff search in numbers
All layoffs Layoffs to employment
y y y y
δ−4 .024 δ6 -.128∗∗ δ−4 .032 δ6 -.031
(.017) (.021) (.026) (.032)
δ−3 .020 δ7 -.105∗∗ δ−3 .031 δ7 -.034
(.017) (.022) (.026) (.035)
δ−2 .027 δ8 -.115∗∗ δ−2 .025 δ8 -.022
(.017) (.023) (.025) (.038)
δ−1 .010 δ9 -.086∗∗ δ−1 .005 δ9 .011
(.017) (.025) (.025) (.041)
δ0 -.413∗∗ δ10 -.061∗∗ δ0 -.149∗∗ δ10 -.024
(.017) (.027) (.025) (.043)
δ1 -.274∗∗ age .231∗∗ δ1 -.143∗∗ age .235∗∗
(.017) (.040) (.026) (.041)
δ2 -.211∗∗ age2 -.008∗∗ δ2 -.082∗∗ age2 -.009∗∗
(.018) (.002) (.027) (.002)
δ3 -.176∗∗ age3 .000 δ3 -.082∗∗ age3 .000
(.018) (.000) (.028) (.000)
δ4 -.143∗∗ age4 -.000 δ4 -.023 age4 -.000
(.019) (.000) (.029) (.000)
δ5 -.127∗∗ δ5 -.036
(.020) (.031)
N 355,494 348,424
TABLE A.13: The empirical costs of job loss for all job losers and those who switch jobs
following layoff
Note: The top left coefficient reads, workers who will be laid off in four years time earn 2.4% more than those who
will not be laid off in four years time. Standard errors in parentheses. Both regressions include individual and time































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FIGURE A.11: Value functions with zero assets: secure employment and layoff employment
Note: Showing values for Vi(p,z,a = 0). p is the firm productivity. z is human capital level. The worker has zero
assets, a = 0.
Secure employment
















FIGURE A.12: Value functions with significant assets: secure employment and layoff
employment
Note: Showing values for Vi(p,z,a = 100). p is the firm productivity. z is human capital level. The worker has an
asset level with approximately four lots of the average annual income, a = 100.
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Unemployment













FIGURE A.13: Value functions: unemployment
Note: Showing values for Vu(z,a). z is human capital level. a is the asset level.









FIGURE A.14: Changes in non-financed unemployment benefits
Note: These figures are used to calculate unemployment benefits in column 3 in Table 2.6. The dotted lines represent
the welfare in the baseline economy for low skill at the bottom, and high skill at the top.
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Switching off human capital dynamics
Figure A.15 shows the model losses in Section 2.6 without stochastic human capital compared
to those with stochastic human capital. The overall earnings losses, shown in the left hand panel,
quickly dissipate when workers do not lose human capital in unemployment. As argued by the
majority of the literature, stochastic human capital is an important feature to incorporate in models
that aim to replicate the unemployment scar.
We can also see that the costs of job loss for those who switch jobs is not affected by variations
in human capital. This highlights that the incorporation of human capital in the model raises the
value of anticipating job loss, since the costs of unemployment are increased.
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Layoff model without human capital
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Inv JJ model
FIGURE A.15: Earnings losses: model with and without stochastic human capital
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Further figures on notice periods
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FIGURE A.16: The employment rate on notice and the required tax rate to finance the scheme
Note: τ is required tax rate that the government must use in order to finance the three schemes and balance the budget.




Does this distortion impact the optimal level of benefits? In Figure A.17, I present how welfare
in the economy changes relative to the estimated model with unemployment benefits equal to 0.25,
for all, low and high skill workers separately. The model suggests that aggregate welfare is always
falling in unemployment benefits taxed through labour income. The distortion in the schedule
brought on by pre-layoff search is small.
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FIGURE A.17: Optimal unemployment benefits
Note: b does not represent the unemployment replacement rate. The replacement rate at a value of b = 0.25 is
approximately 0.5.
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A.2 Survey questions and categorisations
In the text, I make use of information on the reasons for separation provided by the worker.
Here I describe how I categorise whether a worker leaves their job voluntarily or involuntarily,
and also why a worker is searching on the job.
LFS
In the LFS I use information on the reported reason for separation for the last job to estimate
the pre-layoff search in the data, and also as moments to fit with the model. I define separations
as involuntary and voluntary using the following categorisations.
Question: Why did you leave your last job?
Involuntary - Dismissed, made redundant
Voluntary - Resigned, took voluntary redundancy.
Workers also provide other answers that I ignore when calculating the ratio of involuntary separations
to overall separations as a moment in the data. The ignored answers are
Temporary job finished, took early retirement, retired, gave up work for health reasons, gave
up work for family or personal reasons, left work for some other reason.
I also make use of information on why a worker is searching. In Figure 2.2, I describe how
the proportion of workers who report to be working because they think their job may end. We can
see this highlighted in the following list.
Question: Why are you searching for a new job?
Present job may come to an end, present job to fill time before finding another, pay unsatisfactory,




To estimate the cost of job loss for those making involuntary job to job transitions, as seen in
Figure 2.1, I need to categorise involuntary separations in the BHPS. I do so using the following
categorisations that are consistent with those in the LFS
Question: Which of the statements on the card best describes why you stopped doing that
job?
Involuntary - Made redundant, dismissed/sacked
Other reasons that workers give are
Temporary job ended, promoted, left for a better job, took retirement, health reasons, left to have




Proof of Proposition 1(i) and (ii)
In order to show that pL(p,z,a) ≤ p and sL(p,z,a) ≥ sS(p,z,a), from (2.10) and (2.11), we
must show that
VL(p,z,a)≤VS(p,z,a) ∀ p ∈ [pU(z,a),1]. (A.2)
I first show that pU(z,a) is unique. By taking the derivative of (2.7) and (2.8) and two applications








































d p > 0, it follows that (A.3) and (A.4) are both positive.
1 Since ∂VU (z,a)
∂ p = 0, there
must be a unique productivity that a worker in unemployment is willing to accept. So ∀p ∈
(p∗U(z,a),1], VS(p,z,a) > VU(z,a). In layoff employment a higher weight is placed on the value
of unemployment, which implies that ∀p ∈ (pU(z,a),1], VS(p,z,a)>VL(p,z,a). ‖
Proof of Proposition 1(iii)
Lemma 1: when w(p,z) = pz, without stochastic human capital, pU(z,a) = b/z.



































Looking at (2.9) and (2.10), and assuming that at this point the asset choice is independent of the










Looking at (2.12) and (2.13), and assuming that at this point the search effort is the same, a′S(pU(z,a),z,a)=
a′U(z,a). (A.5) again, collapses to (A.6). ‖






∀ p ∈ (b/z,1]. (A.7)












































Since, the LHS of (A.8) and (A.9) are of the same functional form, it follows that a′L ≥ a′S if the
RHS of (A.9) is weakly greater than the RHS of (A.8) - if the RHS is greater in (A.9) than (A.8),
it will result in a movement up the marginal cost line.
From lemma 1, a′S(b/z,z,a) = a
′
U(z,a). The exact same process implies that a
′
S(b/z,z,a) =
a′L(p/z,z,a). Because of (A.7), and δL > δ , p > b/z implies that the RHS of (A.9) is greater than
the RHS of (A.8). ‖
Derivation of (2.19) and further discussion of pre-layoff search dynamics
Here I describe how to derive (2.19). As stated in the text, we are interested in the following
probability
P(In layoff employment at time t− j | Laid off at time t) = P(LOEmpt− j|LOt). (A.10)
2It is sufficient to show the case when φ = 1, as I have shown in (A.8).
122
This probability tells us the proportion of workers who are in layoff employment during the period
j periods prior to losing their job. Using Bayes’ rule we have
P(LOEmpt− j|LOt) =
P(LOt |LOEmpt− j)P(LOEmpt− j)
P(LOt)
. (A.11)
Inline with the pre-layoff search documented in the paper, all these probabilities should be interpreted
as given that a worker is employed in either secure or layoff employment states between t−T and
t. The probabilities on the right hand side can be derived in steady state. P(LOt |LOEmpt− j) is
equal to the probability of not leaving layoff employment for j−1 periods, (1−δL−sLλF(pL)) j−1,
multiplied by the probability of being laid off, δL + sLλF(pL) (remembering that any transition
out of layoff employment is defined as a layoff)
P(LOt |LOEmpt− j) = (1−δL− sLλF(pL)) j−1(δL + sLλF(pL)), (A.12)
where sLλ denotes the average job finding probability for all workers in layoff employment,
and F(pL) denotes the average job acceptance probability. We can derive the proportion of
the employed in layoff employment, P(LOEmpt− j), by writing the markov chain describing the
dynamics of the three labour market states and then solving for the limiting distribution. The





 1−δ sLλF(pL) sU λF(pU)δφ 1− sLλF(pL)−δL 0









Since ˆP(SecEmp)t + ˆP(LOEmp)t + ˆP(Unemp)t = 1, we can reduce the matrix and solve for
steady state. The steady state probability of being in layoff employment as a percentage of the
employment pool is given as
ˆP(LOEmp)
ˆP(LOEmp)+ ˆP(SecEmp)
= P(LOEmp) = P(LOEmpt− j) =
δφ
δφ +δL + sLλF(pL)
. (A.14)
Finally, the probability of being laid off, P(LOt), in steady state is given as
P(LOt) = P(LOEmp)(δL + sLλF(pL))+P(SecEmp)δ (1−φ) (A.15)
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Incorporating the steady state rate probabilities, one can arrive at the following layoff probability
P(LOt) = P(LO) =
δ (δL + sLλF(pL))
δφ +δL + sLλF(pL)
. (A.16)
Combining these probabilities, it is straight forward to see that
P(LOEmpt− j|LOt) =
P(LOt |LOEmpt− j)P(LOEmpt− j)
P(LOt)
= (1−δL− sLλF(pL)) j−1φ . (A.17)






We know that P(Search|LOEmp)−P(Search|SecEmp) is positive, since sL(p,z,a) ≥ sS(p,z,a),
where this difference essentially determines how many workers actually react “enough” to the
realisation of increased job insecurity such that they would deem themselves as actually searching
on the job - P(Search|LOEmp) is not necessarily equal to 1. The level of P(Search|LOEmp) is
determined by the model structure, parameterisations, and the cutoff rule that is used to match
the proportion of the employed who are searching in the data. The probability is particularly





Notice that, as the denominator decreases - fewer workers in layoff employment respond enough
to the increased likelihood of unemployment to be deemed as searching - φ must increase in order
to match the level of pre-layoff search just before job loss, PLSt−1T .
Finally, note that the pre-layoff search documented in Section 2.2 is at a quarterly frequency,
while the model frequency is a week. There is, therefore, a slight discrepancy between pre-layoff
search in the data and that derived here. Let us assume that layoffs are equally likely across all
weeks in a quarter, and that a quarter is equal to 12 weeks. Pre-layoff search i quarters before job


















Notice that the ratio of pre-layoff search at consecutive quarters can be simplified to
PLSt−(i−1)
PLSt−i
= (1−δL− sLλF(pL))12. (A.21)
The ratio of pre-layoff search between two consecutive quarters is equal to probability of remaining
in layoff employment, raised to the power of the number of periods within the quarter.
Derivation of search effort
Here I derive search effort in secure employment as a function of the model parameters. Begin
with search effort as a function of the value functions, and evaluate the underlying integral by























The second equals sign is true under the assumption that, if VU(z,a) = VS(pU(z,a),z,a), then
EVU(z′,a′)=EVS(pU(z,a),z′,a′). In reality this is only approximately true because human capital
falls in unemployment and increases in employment. Now all we need is the derivative of the value
function with respect to productivity. Under the same assumption, we can rearrange equation (A.3)






















The derivative of the value function with respect to p in secure employment is a function of the
same derivative in layoff employment. This reflects the increased security gained from anticipatory
behaviour, which increases the gains from an increase in productivity in secure employment.
Substituting (A.24) into (A.23), and then into (A.22), and using the parameterised cost of search
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Under the same assumptions, search effort for the unemployed and those in layoff employment
have the same functional form but are instead integrated over the respective reservation productivities,
pU(z,a) for the unemployed and pL(p,z,a) for the layoff employed.
Including notice in the model
To include notice in the model, now only those who are in notice can transition into unemployment,
where the notice ends with probability δN . There is no change to the value function for the



























































When determining welfare, the cost of search function plays an important role, especially
when determining the value of realising job insecurity has increased. c0 should, therefore, play
an important role in the value of welfare. This is true but imprecise. What really matters is the










)κ1 . Using this representation,







. Notice that the first ratio on the right hand side is related to the
















, which I pin down with
c0, given a value for λ and κ1.
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A.4 Threshold
The method that is used to determine which workers are “searching” and which are “not
searching”, is shown graphically in Figure A.41. Those who I deem as searching are greater than
a determined threshold such that the proportion searching is equal to that shown in Table 2.1. The
threshold search intensities are 0.1359 and 0.2062 for low and high skill workers, respectively. If
we take these numbers seriously, despite search incidence being lower for low skill workers, they
have a lower threshold by which search effort would translate into a reported incidence of search.










FIGURE A.41: Threshold search effort in the model
Note: The threshold search effort determines the point through which workers are described as “searching” and “not
searching”. This is set such that the shaded region in the figure is equal to the proportion of the employed who are
searching with effort greater than this point are equal to the proportion of the employed who are searching in Table
2.1. Those below are deemed “not searching” but can still receive job offers.
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A.5 Details on the numerical solution and estimation process
The challenge of solving a model with assets is that one cannot solve a function with an
asset space of infinite length. Discretisation is necessary, where the number of grid points in the
asset space must be sufficiently large to allow individuals to change their asset holdings. I solve
the model numerically using a combination of iterative and interpolation techniques of which I
outline next.
I choose a sparse grid of 100 points for p ∈ [0,1], 6 points for z ∈ [1,2] and, 1501 points
for a ∈ [0,150]. There are, therefore, 100 ∗ 6 ∗ 1501 = 900,600 points on the grid. I pick an
initial parameter set, and values for the three value functions, V 0j and, optimally chosen search
efforts, s0j . I choose initial value functions with four arguments, p, z, a and a
′. a is set to be 4
equally distanced points on the grid, whereas a′ takes 1,501. Using (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8), I can
then calculate V 1j = Tv(V
0
j ) for all possible combinations of optimally chosen assets, which has
100∗6∗4∗1501 = 3,602,400 points. This procedure is inefficient since workers cannot increase
their assets by much each period if they would like to since consumption must be positive. We
can, therefore, look at a smaller amount of points around a for a′. In the computation, I choose 12
points around a, meaning that the number of points to be solved is just 100∗6∗4∗24 = 57,600,
speeding the algorithm by a factor of approximately 60. I then pick a′j such that it maximises V
1
j
at all 100∗6∗4 = 2,400 points.
Using the Piecewise Cubic Hermite Interpolating Polynomial (PCHIP), for each unique productivity
and human capital combination, I interpolate each value function for intermediate asset values for
a. One could opt for a different interpolating procedure. The benefit of using the PCHIP procedure
is to maintain monotonicity of the value functions, with no overshoots and less oscillation. Performing
the interpolation leaves me with value functions with three arguments, p, z and a, and optimally




∣∣∣V t+1j −V tj ∣∣∣< εv, where Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for the Contraction Mapping Theorem
apply, and a unique solution for the value functions exist, see Stokey and Lucas (1989). Once the
value functions have converged, using (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11), I calculate new search efforts,
s1j = TS(s
0
j). I then loop back over the calculation of the value functions until
∣∣∣V t+1j −V tj ∣∣∣< εv and∣∣∣st+1j − stj∣∣∣< εS. The above description can be summarised by the following six step procedure.
1. Begin with numbers for value functions and search efforts where value functions have four
inputs: p, z, a and a′
2. Calculate new values over all inputs and pick the optimal asset level a′
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3. Interpolate intermediate numbers for dimension a over the entire grid of possible assets
4. Repeat steps 2 to 3 until the value functions convergence
5. Calculate search efforts
6. Repeat steps 2 to 5 until value functions and search efforts converge
Using the solution method described above, it is possible to estimate the parameters of the
model using the simulated method of moments. To do so, I choose salient moments from the
data described in 2.5, solve the model using the above procedure, and simulate 20,000 worker
histories over 30∗48 weeks. I then calculate the same moments as in the data from the simulated
panel. Following this, I choose optimisation procedures to pick parameter values to minimise
the criterion function, shown in equation (2.23). I use the Nelder-Mead simplex directed search
algorithm to search for a local minimum given the chosen initial set of “sensibly” chosen parameter
values. The above description can be summarised by the following six step procedure.
1. Make “sensible” guesses for the parameter values
2. Numerically solve the model using the above procedure
3. Simulate a dataset of 20,000 individuals over 30∗48 weeks
4. Calculate the same moments as in the empirical data using the simulated data and calculate
the criterion function, shown in equation (2.23)
5. Pick new parameter values using optimisation procedures
6. Iterate over steps 2 to 5 until the criterion is minimised
Once the parameters are recovered, the associated standard errors are calculated in the following








where J = ∂m(θ)
∂θ
and Σ is the variance covariance matrix of the empirical moments. I calculate the
variance covariance matrix using bootstrapping with 2000 iterations with N = 100,000. I report
standard errors based on the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix N−12Var(θ̂). Elements of
the jacobian matrix, ∂m(θ̂)
∂ θ̂
, are estimated numerically by perturbing the parameter values and
estimating the resultant slope.
Appendix B
B.1 Data adjustments and mathematical details
I remain consistent with recent literature and implement an adjustment for margin error. Margin
error is an inaccuracy that describes the differences in the actual changes in the labour market state
rates and those explained by the probability measures. To make the adjustment I follow Elsby et al.
(2015) and minimize the weighted squared difference between the raw and margin error adjusted
probabilities.
Shimer (2012) claims that time aggregation can significantly impact the measured cyclicality
of flows data. Time aggregation is the issue that observed transitions from the data miss transitions
between periods. To describe this idea for the job-to-job mover, imagine that an individual is
employed and interviewed at time t − 1, moves into unemployment immediately following the
interview, and then finds a job immediately prior to their interview at time t. I would define
this as a job-to-job transition, which is incorrect. To account for this measurement error, I make
the standard adjustment shown by Shimer (2012) coupled with an adjustment for the job-to-job
probability shown by Mukoyama (2014).1
I adjust the transition probabilities for seasonality by applying the commonly used X13 Arima
SEATS procedure provided by the US Census Bureau, and then smooth the data using a centered
yearly moving average.
Margin error
The results throughout this paper are based on margin error adjusted flows. The adjustment
changes the probabilities to be consistent with the changes in the labour market stocks. I follow
1While the Shimer (2012) adjustment for time aggregation has become common practice in the dynamics
literature. Gomes (2015) shows the inconsistencies between the implementation of this adjustment procedure on data
with different frequencies - continuous time hazards derived using quarterly data (divided by 3) and monthly data are
not equal, which is of direct importance in my analysis for comparison between the UK and US results. Fortunately,
the author finds that the contribution to unemployment fluctuations of the continuous time hazards derived at different
frequencies are quantitatively similar.
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(pt− p̂t) :4st = Xt−1 pt . (B.1)
This minimises the weighted squared distance between the adjusted probability vector, p,
from its counterpart derived from the data, p̂, subject to the changes in the stocks equalling those
explained by the adjusted transition probabilities. In my analysis I keep the job-to-job probability
unadjusted for margin error.
To calculate the adjusted components of the employment to unemployment decomposition for
each reason, I make sure the ratio of each reason for the unadjusted case is the same for adjusted









Time aggregation: adjustment and methodology
For robustness, I assess the impact of the fluctuations of the corresponding hazard rates to the
dynamics of unemployment. I outline the adjustments and decomposition method below.
Adjustment
To estimate the continuous time hazard rates, I apply the standard time aggregation adjustment
shown by Shimer (2012) accompanied by an adjustment for the job-to-job probability shown by
Mukoyama (2014). I firstly outline the Shimer (2012) adjustment.
The aim is to recover the instantaneous transition matrix, Ft+τ : τ ∈ [0,1], from it’s discrete
time counterpart. It is possible to see the relationship between Ft and Pt by solving the following
differential equation
˙̃st+τ = F̃t+τ s̃t+τ . (B.3)
This has solution
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s̃t+1 = eF̃t+1 s̃t . (B.4)
Since
s̃t+1 = P̃t+1s̃t , (B.5)
we therefore have
eF̃t+1 = P̃t+1. (B.6)
If Pt+1 can be represented in this way - the matrix exponential of another matrix - then it is
described as being embeddable. Pt+1 is only embeddable if its eigenvalues are; real, positive and
distinct (which is fortunately always the case for my data). If these conditions are satisfied, F̃t+1
is then just the matrix logarithm of its corresponding discrete time transition matrix, P̃t+1.
Mukoyama (2014) develops a method to adjust the job-to-job probability for time aggregation
which I describe here. Let E0t+τ be all those who remain in employment and do not move from job

















where E0t = 1.
Next, consider the fraction of workers who have moved from job to job exactly once and
have never changed their labour market state between time t and t + τ . Call this fraction of the


























where E1t = 0. It is then possible to form the following relationship




+ peet+1−E0t+1−E1t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
.2 (B.11)
A, as said above, corresponds to all those who move from job to job just once and do not leave
employment. B corresponds to all those who move from job to job more than once and switch
states more than once ending back up in employment. Using (B.8), (B.10) and (B.11), λ j j can
then be solved for analytically as
λ
j j
t =− log(peet − p
j j
t )−λ eut −λ ent . (B.12)
To estimate the instantaneous transitions disaggregated by reason, I assume the proportion
of each type of instantaneous separation is the same as that seen in the data. For example, the
job-to-job hazard for reason r is
λ









It is possible to assess the impact of the fluctuations of the derived hazard rates (shown above)
in a continuous time environment, where the changes in the labour market state rates evolve by











(1−λ sepr λ l f |sepr λ j j|l f sepr)]−λ entryλ e|entry λ ue−λ entryλ e|entry
∑r∈R[λ
sepr λ l f |sep
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, λ entryt = λ net +







. The interpretation of the three ratios are slightly different than there
corresponding discretised counterparts. λ l f |sep
r
t represents the proportion of separations (into
another job, unemployment or inactivity), that transition directly into employment or unemployment.
λ
j j|l f sepr
t represents the proportion of separations that remain in the labour force (into another
job or unemployment), that transition directly to another job without an intervening spell of
unemployment. λ e|entryt represents the proportion of entrants that transition directly into employment.
The steady state of the above system is equal to
st = (−Ft)−1ht . (B.15)
The decomposition is then identical to the discrete case from here.
Decomposing ∆uratet




























To assess the changing composition effect, I follow the same method as Shimer (2012) and






where g corresponds to the type of the individual and wdg,t corresponds to the percentage of those
type g individuals who separated and remained in the labour force, entered the labour force, or are
in the unemployment pool at time t. I estimate the composition effect by keeping pdg,t fixed at the









Table B.21 shows the three probabilities disaggregated by potential salient types: age, sex,
education, relationship to head of household, reason for separation from last job, reason for
on-the-job search and tenure, and also shows the magnitude of the composition effect for each
type. The interpretation of the US C j j|l f sepage , for example, is: compositional shifts in the age of
those who separate and remain in the labour force contribute to 2.8% of the fluctuations in the
JJ|LFSep probability. The remainder of this section discusses the salient results.
B.2.1 Job separation
On-the-job search
The workhorse job search model of job-to-job transitions, the job-ladder model, would predict
that employed job search is procyclical.3 The theoretical reductions in on-the-job search during a
recession, may be the explanation why the JJ|LFSep probability also drops. The LFS provides a
unique opportunity to assess this channel because of the detailed on-the-job search information.
From Table B.21, the results show that fluctuations in on-the-job search behaviour do not play
a role in contributing to the procyclicality of the JJ|LFSep probability (-0.6%). Why not? Figure
B.21 provides an explanation for this. First, the left panel shows the percentage of employed
3See Burdett and Mortensen (1998) for the job ladder model. On-the-job search would be predicted to be
procyclical due to the complimentary between search effort and job finding. The incentives to search are lower
when the job offer arrival rate is lower.
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searching on the job in the UK. There is no clear fall in on-the-job search during the Great
Recession. Second, the right panel disaggregates by reason for search. During the Great Recession,
we see a clear rise in uncertain on-the-job search. This apparent countercyclical nature of on the
job search dovetails nicely with new evidence from Ahn and Shao (2017), who shows that the
time devoted to search on the job rose during the Great Recession in the US.
Reason for separation
We have already seen that there is a clear shift in the type of separation from voluntary to
involuntary during the Great Recession. In the above analysis, I argue that the incorporation of
the reasons for separation is of high importance to accurately understand the impact of the job
finding component of the employment to unemployment probability. Table B.21 confirms this.
The changing composition of the reason for separation contributes to 38.6% and 21.8% of the
fluctuations in the JJ|LFSep probability for the US and UK, respectively.
B.2.2 labour force entry
Education
Economic theory suggests that during expansions, the increased opportunities pull more highly
qualified individuals into the labour market.4 Since the level of education is positively associated
with the ability to find employment (see Table B.21), the possible changes in average education
levels may contribute to more labour force entrants transitioning into unemployment during a
recession. Table B.21 provides no evidence for this - the contribution of changes in education to
the fluctuations in the E|Entry probability is, if anything, negative.
Added worker
The added worker effect argues that inactive household members, or partners, are more likely
to enter the labour market following job loss of another member of their household.5 If added
workers are less likely to find employment upon labour force entry, then the added worker effect
may explain why job finding at the participation margin is procyclical. I study this effect using
the variable, relationship to the head of household, which defines whether an individual is a head,
partner or child. Actually, partners have a higher job finding rate following entry into the labour
4See Pissarides (2000) chapter 7.
5Mankart and Oikonomou (2016) conclude that the added worker effect has increased over the last three decades.
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force. As is then expected, I find no evidence that a proxy for measuring the impact of the added
worker effect can explain procyclical job finding at the participation margin.
This section provides a battery of evidence that compositional changes in observable types,
other than the reason for separation, do not contribute significantly to the dynamics of each of
the job finding probabilities. However, to claim that heterogeneity is unimportant in the story
of labour market dynamics would be false. As we have seen, and has been shown consistently
in the literature, the probability of continuing to search from unemployment increases during
recessions. Elsby et al. (2015) conclude that this feature is primarly the result of a switching
composition of the unemployment pool during a recession, from individuals who are less attached
to the labour force, to individuals who are more attached. This section also only studies variations
in observables. Ahn and Hamilton (2016) argue that unobservables play a particularly important




























FIGURE B.21: On-the-job search in the UK. Note: The left panel shows the proportion of the
employed who are searching. The right panel shows the proportion of the employed who are
searching for each reason. Proportions adjusted for seasonality. The shaded area denotes the
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16−20 71.5 64.9 18.4 59.9 57.0 28.6
21−30 71.9 63.8 19.6 68.3 52.8 30.3
31−40 69.8 61.5 19.0 69.8 49.0 24.9
41−50 66.4 61.9 18.3 64.0 50.1 24.5
51−64/59 65.7 65.2 17.2 55.3 54.6 20.3
Cdage 2.8 1.0 1.1 0.4 -1.7 -0.7
SEX
Male 68.4 62.9 19.0 62.1 50.9 25.7
Female 71.3 64.4 18.3 68.8 55.9 19.9
Cdsex 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.1
EDUCAT ION
Degree or more 76.7 59.0 21.7 71.5 62.0 37.1
More than school 71.4 67.5 20.5 68.4 62.1 31.5
School or less 65.0 72.8 17.1 60.1 48.5 22.9
Cded -3.0 -2.9 -4.2 -6.5 -5.6 -7.1
RELAT IONSHIP TO HEAD
OF HOUSEHOLD
Head 64.6 45.1 23.2
Partner 71.6 58.8 29.8
Child 61.0 57.2 30.2
Cdhhd 0.1 0.4 1.8
REASON FOR SEPARAT ION
FROM LAST JOB
Voluntary 82.0 75.8 54.4 34.7
Involuntary 49.2 45.6 44.7 27.6
Personal 81.1 50.4 53.1 23.7
Other 66.7 78.3 58.8 32.1
Never had a job 55.4 21.9
Cdreas 38.6 21.8 0.7 4.3
REASON FOR ON-T HE-JOB
SEARCH
Worried 62.2





Less than 3 57.8
3−12 61.3
Greater than 12 67.6
Cdten -3.0
TABLE B.21: Heterogeneity of the job finding probabilities. Note: Probabilities based
on measures unadjusted for margin error and seasonality. The reason measure for the
unemployment-to-employment probability refers to the reason they separated from the job they
had before t− 1 if they had one. The interpretation of C j j|l f sepage for the UK is: changes in the
composition of Age contribute to 0.4% of the fluctuations in the JJ|LFSep probability. Source:
Author calculations using Two-Quarter LFS and the SIPP. Ages 16-64/59. The data spans
1996q1-2016q4 for the LFS and 1996m4-2013m5 for the SIPP.
140
B.3 Further description of the data
The Current Population Survey
The CPS flows are based on code from Robert Shimer. Please see Shimer (2012) for further
details.
The Survey of Income and Program Participation
The wealth of precise information in the SIPP makes it a very useful survey to use to analyse
unemployment dynamics, but it also makes it easy to be inconsistent between projects in the
literature. To estimate the worker flows, I use a similar method to that of Nagypal (2008).
A worker is defined as employed if in the last week of the month they are with job/bus -
working, or are with job/bus - not on layoff or absent without pay. A worker is defined as
unemployed if in the last week of the month they are with job/bus - on layoff or absent without
pay, or have no job/bus - looking for work or on layoff. A worker is defined as inactive if in the
last week of the month they have no job/bus - not looking and not on layoff. The number of people
who move from state to state can be estimated using this categorisation.
I estimate job-to-job transitions starting with the employer-employee identifier. These are
EENO1, EENO2, EBNO1 and EBNO2. The first two refer to two different jobs that the survey
participant is attached to during the wave. The last two refer to two different businesses that the
survey participant is attached to during the wave. A survey participant can also have a contingent
job that is not assigned an employer-employee identifier. Attached to each identifier is a start date
and, if the job ended during the wave, an end date. Using these dates it is possible to determine
whether a job was held at the end of a month. I then assign a job that was held at the end of the
month as the main job if the hours that are attached to that job are higher than any other. If they
work equal hours at two, three or all of their jobs then the main job is assigned to the job that the
worker has held for the longest.
Using this definition of a main job, a job-to-job transition is given as a change in the employees
main job. If the employer is employed at time t−1 and t and the employer identifier has changed.
I also make sure that a separation has occurred because they are not holding the previous job
anymore. If a survey participant separates from their employer, they attach a reason for making
the transition which I categorise as seen in Section 3.4. Each month around half of separations
have missing reasons, which is very prominent at the seem. I impute the missing reasons using
a multinomial logit based on an individual’s: age, sex, tenure in last job, education, indicator for
part time work, the month and whether the separation occurred at the seem.
An issue that is unique to the SIPP is known as seam bias: individuals are much more likely to
say that they transitioned from state to state in between waves than another month not in between
waves. In between the first three months and final three months of each panel, each month will
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have exactly one rotation group who is at the seam. I make the standard assumption that the impact
of the seem is constant throughout the panel. Given this assumption, an adjustment for the seam
bias can be made by removing the first three and last three months from each panel.
The SIPP data have missing periods between panels. Between the 1996 and 2001 panel there
are 14 months missing, between the 2001 panel and 2004 panel there are 4 months missing,
and between the 2004 and 2008 panel there are 11 months missing. The X13 Arima SEATS
procedure used to seasonally adjust the data interpolates the missing observations between the
panels. Estimation of the missing observations between the panels is performed by a “skipping”
approach. A maximum likelihood estimation of the process is carried out by skipping the observations
which then uses the fixed point smoother for interpolation of the missing values.
The UK Labour Force Survey
Job-to-job transitions are simply a change in the main job. The tenure method on its own will
give an inaccurate understanding of separations because they may not in fact be separations at
all but just a change in the individuals main job. I assign whether a separation occurred with a
job-to-job transition if the individual gave a reason as to why they left their job in the last three
months or they had had only one job in the second period.
Each period around a quarter of separations have missing reasons. For each two-quarter data
set I impute the missing reasons using a multinomial logit based on an individual’s: age, sex,
tenure in last job, education and indicator for part time work.
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No job f ound
Unemployedt




Probability Unadj TA Unadj TA
sepv -5.3 -8.3 -15.9 -17.6
sepi 21.6 23.6 13.8 13.5
l f |sepv 0.2 0.6 1.1 0.8
l f |sepi 3.1 1.0 1.2 0.9
∑r j j|l f sepr 19.4 16.9 31.9 27.0
u to e 32.4 39.5 30.9 42.1
u to n 17.5 22.1 17.5 28.4
entry -3.1 -4.2 -4.1 -6.9
e|entry 16.4 14.0 22.7 16.5
Residual -2.4 -5.3 -0.7 5.0
job finding 68.2 70.4 85.5 85.6
TABLE B.51: Contribution to unemployment rate variation - time aggregation adjusted rates.
Note: Calculations based on margin error and seasonally adjusted probabilities. Unadj:
Unadjusted. TA: Time aggregation adjusted. The first and third columns are the baseline results
shown in Table 3.1. sepv, for example, refers to the voluntary separation probability. sepi, for
example, refers to the involuntary separation probability. The interpretation of the top left cell is:
the past and present fluctuations in the voluntary separation probability contributes to -5.3% of the
dynamics of the unemployment rate. Source: Author calculations using the SIPP and Two-Quarter













1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
FIGURE B.61: The CPS US monthly job-to-job transition probability. Note: Probabilities
adjusted for seasonality. Shaded areas denote officially defined US recessions. Source: Author











1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014
FIGURE B.62: The SIPP US monthly job-to-job transition probability. Note: Probability adjusted
for seasonality. Shaded areas denote officially defined US recessions. Source: Author calculations
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FIGURE B.63: The UK quarterly job-to-job transition probability. Note: Probability adjusted for
seasonality. The shaded area denotes the officially defined UK Great Recession. Source: Author
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FIGURE B.64: The CPS US monthly worker flows. Note: Probabilities adjusted for margin
error and seasonality. Shaded areas denote officially defined US recessions. Source: Author








































































1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014
FIGURE B.65: The SIPP US monthly worker flows. Note: Probabilities adjusted for margin
error and seasonality. Shaded areas denote officially defined US recessions. Source: Author








































































1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
FIGURE B.66: The UK quarterly worker flows. Note: Probabilities adjusted for margin error and
seasonality. The shaded area denotes the officially defined UK Great Recession. Source: Author
calculations using Two Quarter LFS, ages 16-64/59, 1996q1-2016q4.
Appendix C
C.1 More tables
Non-logarithmic gap Logarithmic gap
β f βs β0 βε β f βs β0 βε
Australia -0.01 1.03 0.00 -0.02 0.24 0.80 0.00 -0.04
Belgium -0.03 1.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.01
Canada 0.43 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.66 0.00 -0.02
Denmark -0.07 1.09 0.01 -0.03 -0.09 1.09 0.01 0.00
France 0.44 0.54 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.58 0.01 -0.09
Germany -0.15 1.23 -0.02 -0.06 -0.58 1.62 -0.01 -0.03
Ireland 0.42 0.73 0.00 -0.15 -0.02 1.05 0.02 -0.03
Italy 0.07 0.92 0.05 -0.03 0.04 1.01 0.01 -0.05
Japan -0.12 1.12 0.00 0.00 -0.11 1.11 0.00 0.00
Luxembourg 0.08 0.99 0.00 -0.07 0.05 0.90 0.04 0.03
Netherlands 0.20 0.96 -0.01 -0.15 -0.20 0.99 0.05 0.07
New Zealand 0.09 0.98 0.01 -0.07 0.16 0.73 0.02 0.10
Norway -0.23 1.22 0.00 0.01 -0.12 1.13 0.00 0.00
Portugal -0.11 1.03 0.00 0.07 -0.32 1.32 -0.01 0.01
Spain 0.58 0.37 0.24 -0.19 0.23 0.87 0.00 -0.10
Sweden 0.23 0.82 0.00 -0.05 -0.21 1.23 0.00 0.00
United Kingdom -0.28 1.28 0.02 -0.01 -0.24 1.19 0.01 0.03
United States 0.49 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.64 0.00 -0.02
Average 0.11 0.91 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.99 0.01 -0.01
TABLE C.11: Comparison between the non-logarithmic and logarithmic deviations in the
unemployment gap.
Note: The non-logarithmic unemployment gap refers to ∆uGapt = ∆uMt − ∆uFt , and the
contributions are estimated using (4.11). The logarithmic unemployment gap refers to
∆ln(ut)Gap = ∆ln(uMt ) − ∆ln(uFt ), and the contributions are estimated using (4.6). The
interpretation of the non-logarithmic results for Australia are: Differences in the variations in
the outflows between males and females contribute to -1% of the dynamics of the unemployment
gap, differences in the variations in the inflows between males and females contribute to 1.03%
of the dynamics of the unemployment gap, 0% of the dynamics of the unemployment gap can be
attributed to differences in initial deviations from steady-state between males and females, and
changes in the error contribute to -2% of the dynamics of the unemployment gap.
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FIGURE C.21: Relationship between male share and the correlation of sector output with overall
output by country
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FIGURE C.21: Relationship between male share and the correlation of sector output with overall
output by country continued
Note: Excluded agricultural sector.
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Male sector share
Poland
FIGURE C.21: Relationship between male share and the correlation of sector output with overall
output by country continued
Note: Excluded agricultural sector.
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FIGURE C.21: Relationship between male share and the correlation of sector output with overall
output by country continued
Note: Excluded agricultural sector.
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C.3 Further information on the outflow estimation process
For completeness, here we provide more information regarding the estimation process for
the unemployment outflow. It should be made clear that this process exactly follows Elsby
et al. (2013), but by gender, and is not a contribution of this paper. One does not have to use
information on unemployment duration of less than one month to estimate the monthly outflow
rate. The OECD provides information on unemployment duration of less than one, three, six and
twelve months. To see how any of these duration methods can be used to estimate the monthly
unemployment outflow rate, begin with
ut+d−ut = u<dt+d−F
<d
t ut . (C.1)
where u<dt+d is the percentage of the unemployed at time t +d and have been there for less than d















t , and f
<12
t . The aim is to use a weighted





t , or the outflow rate exhibits negative duration dependence, then estimates of the
outflow rates with large durations, for example f<12t , will not provide consistent estimates of the
aggregate outflow rates. Only when duration dependence is not present, can all information on
unemployment durations be used.















u1,t u3,t u6,t u12,t u∞,t ut−3 ut−6 ut−12
]′
, (C.5)
and let Vt be the associated covariance matrix of ut . u1,t is the fraction of the unemployed who
have been unemployed for less than one month, u3,t is the fraction of the unemployed who have
been unemployed for less than three months but more than one month, u6,t is the fraction of the
unemployed who have been unemployed for less than six months but more than three months,
u12,t is the fraction of the unemployed who have been unemployed for less than twelve months
but more than size months, u∞,t is the fraction of the unemployed who have been unemployed for
more than twelve months. ut−3, for example, is the unemployment rate at time t−3.
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With the covariance matrix in hand, it is possible to use the Delta-method to write down the
approximate distribution of f̂t as f̂t ∼ N(ft , 1nD f ,tVtD
′
f ,t), where D f ,t is the gradient matrix as in
Elsby et al. (2013). This distribution will be used in the hypothesis test and the optimal weighting
of the four outflow measures for the estimated outflow rate. The hypothesis test is
H0 : ft = f i, (C.6)
where f is a scalar, i is a vector of ones. Using
M f =
1 0 0 −10 1 0 −1
0 0 1 −1
 (C.7)




f . It follows that gt ∼





−1M f f̂t .
For the test we need the number of individuals in each survey. For the countries that crossover
with Elsby et al. (2013), we use the same n but divided by 2 for males and females. For Belgium
the number of households interviewed is approximately 14,625, so we use n = 16,750. For
Denmark the number of individuals interviewed is approximately 40,000 so n = 20,000. For
Luxembourg, the number of households interviewed is approximately 11,250, so we use n =
13,500. Finally, for Netherlands, the number of households interviewed is approximately 50,000,
so we use n = 58750. We test the null at the 5% significance level. See Table C.33 for the results.
The results for the male sample are to reject the null for Australia, Canada, France, Netherlands,
Spain and the US. The results are fortunately the same for the female sample but that for the
Netherlands the hypothesis is not rejected. For countries where the null is rejected, we use f<1t as
the outflow rate. For the case of the Netherlands, for both males and females, we use f<1t as my
estimate for the unemployment outflow rate.
If the null is not rejected we calculate optimal weights following Elsby et al. (2013). We want
to pick the vector of weights, w, to estimate
f̂t = w′t f̂t s.t. w
′
t i = 1, (C.8)
i.e. the estimated aggregate outflow, is a weighted sum of the four outflow measures. Given this
constraint, w minimises
Vf ,t = w′tD f ,tVtD
′
f ,twt . (C.9)












n P-value H0 Rejected? P-value H0 Rejected?
Australia 28,500 1.9 Yes 0.8 Yes
Belgium 16,750 49.3 32.1
Canada 67,500 0.0 Yes 0.0 Yes
Denmark 20,000 10.2 10.4
France 75,000 4.7 Yes 1.7 Yes
Germany 82,500 11.6 15.6
Ireland 48,750 23.4 21.0
Italy 30,000 52.8 21.9
Japan 50,000 48.4 39.1
Luxembourg 13,500 68.9 49.2
Netherlands 58,750 9.1 2.1 Yes
New Zealand 20,000 12.1 5.0
Norway 12,000 35.8 32.2
Portugal 26,250 28.6 24.5
Spain 92,500 0.1 Yes 0.0 Yes
Sweden 10,000 27.8 26.5
United Kingdom 60,000 8.7 7.6
United States 65,000 0.0 Yes 0.0 Yes
TABLE C.33: The approximate number of individuals in each survey and the outcome of the
hypothesis test for each country.
Note: n is based on the respective labour force surveys and when there is overlap corresponds to
the same numbers used in Elsby et al. (2013) divided by 2. For Netherlands, we proceed assuming
that the test was also rejected for Males.
Source: Author calculations based on data compiled from OECD (2018b) and OECD (2018c).
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so w<12t is 1, less the sum of the other three weights. The objective function can be written as:












f ,tMww̃t , (C.11)
which results in the optimal set of weights as:
w̃t =−(M′wD f ,tVtD′f ,tMw)−1M′wD f ,tVtD′f ,te1. (C.12)
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C.4 Further mathematical details
Here we provide derivations of important equations in the paper.
C.4.1 Unemployment and steady state











= st(1−ut)− ftut ⇒
dut
dt
+(st + ft)ut = st . (C.14)
This is a first order linear differential equation in u. If we make the assumption that flows are not
changing within a period, say τ months, the solution can be written as
ut = u∗t + ce
−τ( ft+st), (C.15)
where c is the constant of integration. c represents initial deviations from steady state c = ut−τ −
u∗t . Substiting c into (C.15) and setting τ = 12 months gives (C.13).
C.4.2 Non-logarithmic decomposition
In order to asses deviations in unemployment rates as opposed to logarithmic deviations we







First-differencing and letting e−12(st+ ft) ≈ e−12(st−1+ ft−1), we have
∆ut = (1− e−12(st+ ft))∆u∗t + e−12(st+ ft)∆ut−12 + ε. (C.17)
Now all we need is a categorisation for ∆u∗t . As is shown in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) and
Smith (2012), among others, it is straightforward to show that














st(st−12 + ft−12)− st−12(st + ft)
(st + ft)(st−12 + ft−12)
=
st ft−12− st−12 ft




Including st ft− st ft in the numerator we have
∆u∗t =
st ft− st ft + st ft−12− st−12 ft
(st + ft)(st−12 + ft−12)
=
∆st ft
(st + ft)(st−12 + ft−12)
+
∆ ftst

















which is equivalent to (C.18), where the final equality follows from multiplying the first ratio
by st−1/st−1 and the second by ft−1/ ft−1. Combining (C.17) and (C.18), we can write the

















+ e−12(st+ ft)C ft−12, (C.22)
where Cs0 =C f0 = 0. Finally, the contribution of initial deviations is given as
C0t = e
−12(st+ ft)C0t−12 with C00 = ∆u0. (C.23)
Smith (2012) also provides a non-logarithmic decomposition. We have found that when using
her decomposition, the errors are large, so we resort to this decomposition. Table C.44 shows the
results when applying this decomposition method.
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Males Females
β f βs β0 βε β f βs β0 βε
Australia 0.24 0.77 0.00 -0.01 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00
Belgium 0.56 0.41 0.00 0.03 0.60 0.28 -0.01 0.13
Canada 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.34 0.00 0.00
Denmark 0.41 0.60 0.01 -0.01 0.39 0.62 0.00 -0.01
France 0.71 0.21 0.02 0.06 0.89 0.05 0.02 0.04
Germany 0.51 0.48 0.03 -0.02 0.81 0.12 0.12 -0.05
Ireland 0.65 0.34 0.03 -0.01 0.66 0.28 0.05 0.01
Italy 0.60 0.33 0.00 0.06 0.58 0.30 0.03 0.10
Japan 0.42 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.63 0.00 0.01
Luxembourg 0.59 0.47 0.00 -0.05 0.07 0.92 0.01 0.00
Netherlands 0.15 0.82 -0.02 0.05 0.29 0.80 -0.01 -0.07
New Zealand 0.66 0.68 0.00 -0.35 0.56 0.57 0.00 -0.13
Norway 0.42 0.56 0.00 0.02 0.43 0.56 0.00 0.01
Portugal 0.49 0.53 0.00 -0.02 0.52 0.41 0.00 0.07
Spain 0.48 0.51 0.03 -0.02 0.51 0.57 -0.02 -0.07
Sweden 0.32 0.68 0.00 -0.00 0.16 0.81 0.00 0.02
United Kingdom 0.50 0.49 0.00 0.01 0.93 0.03 0.01 0.03
United States 0.72 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.22 0.00 0.00
Average 0.50 0.51 0.01 -0.01 0.54 0.45 0.01 0.01
TABLE C.44: Contributions to unemployment variations for males and females using the
non-logarithmic decomposition.
Note: The interpretation of the male results for Australia are: Variations in the outflows contribute
to 24% of the dynamics of the unemployment rate, variations in the inflows contribute to 77% of
the dynamics of the unemployment rate, 0% of the dynamics of the unemployment rate can be
attributed to initial deviations from steady-state, and changes in the error contribute to -2% of the
dynamics of the unemployment rate.
Source: Author calculations based on data compiled from OECD (2018b) and OECD (2018c).
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C.5 Steady-state vs non-steady-state
If the economy remains in steady-state in all periods notice that the baseline decomposition in
the text collapses to:
∆ln(ut) = (1−u∗t−1)[∆lnst−∆ln ft ]+ ε. (C.24)
Table C.65 shows the results when using the steady-state and non-steady-state decomposition for
males and females. The steady-state decomposition is not suitable for two reasons. First because
flows are relatively small for many of the countries, the convergence to steady-state is slow. This
results in very large errors as we can see. Secondly, because the unemployment flows are, in
general, slightly larger for females relative to males, the convergence to steady-state is quicker
for females relative to males. This is likely to result in slightly larger errors for males relative to
females. We can see that this is in general true - the average absolute value of the error for males
and females is 0.35 and 0.31, respectively.
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C.6 Differences during the 2020 crisis
The crisis in 2020 seems likely to devastate labour markets as economies around the world
attempt to minimise the number of lives lost through various social distancing policies. Figure
C.62 shows the unemployment rate by gender for the US and Canada, where the last date is
April 2020. The rise in unemployment during the current crisis is incredible. It dwarfs the
unemployment rise in any economic downturn over the entirety of available data from the OECD.
As we have discussed in this paper, typically, the unemployment rate rises proportionately more
for males than females in recessions. This trend seems to have reversed during the 2020 crisis.
The female unemployment rate rose significantly more than for males. If the results in the current
paper extend to the 2020 crisis, then the reason for the larger rise in female unemployment
is predominantly due to a proportionately larger rise in females separating from their jobs and
flowing into unemployment, and the types of industries that are being affected in the current crisis
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FIGURE C.62: The monthly unemployment rate by gender in the US (left) and Canada (right)
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